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Abstract
The thesis addresses the issues of error through misidentification and 
immunity to error through misidentification in relation to the problem of the first 
person. First, it provides an explanation of error through misidentification. 
Secondly, it shows that there are two possible ways of understanding 
immunity to error through misidentification. It is then argued that the first 
understanding of immunity to error through misidentification leads to what is 
labelled “the trilemma about the self”. That is to say, either we provide an 
explanation of immunity to error through misidentification, but we subscribe to 
two contentious metaphysical views about the self—the Cartesian and the 
Idealist; or else we hold the view that the self is identical with a human being, 
but we have no explanation of immunity to error through misidentification. It is 
then shown that in order to solve the trilemma, a different understanding of 
immunity to error through misidentification must be offered. After discussing 
various possible understandings of immunity to error through 
misidentification, a sound account of it is finally provided. Moreover, it is 
shown how non-inferential, introspection-based mental self-ascriptions can 
comply with it, in such a way that they turn out to be logically immune to error 
through misidentification.
Finally, by drawing on Evans’ and Peacocke’s accounts of the possession 
conditions of the first person concept— in which lEM l-judgements play a
central role— , it is shown that it is a concept of a human being who thinks of
herself as such. Hence, our first person concept is firmly anti-Cartesian and 
anti-idealist. As a consequence, it is maintained that not only is there no need 
to hold the Cartesian and the Idealist metaphysics of the self in order to 
explain why some l-judgements can be immune to error through 
misidentification, but it is also argued that one can no longer be either 
Cartesian or Idealist. For that would expose one to conceptual incoherence.
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Introduction
Throughout the history of modern philosophy the problem of the first person 
has played a central role. Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Kant have all given 
different responses to the question: who is the I who thinks, feels and 
perceives? This question has been inherited by contemporary philosophy. 
Within the analytic tradition Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein—just to mention 
the fathers of that tradition— have all engaged with it.
This thesis starts precisely from the particular way in which Wittgenstein, in 
his middle period,^ phrased that question. For he noticed that there is an 
important difference among our uses of the first person in speech and— we 
can add— in thought. On the one hand, it is possible, when one self-ascribes 
a physical property to make a mistake in identifying who has that property. 
Hence, it is possible for one to self-ascribe a physical property which is (or 
can be) true of someone else. On the other hand, when one self-ascribes 
psychological properties, then there is no question of wrongly identifying the 
subject who has them. In this latter case, the use of T as subject—as it was 
labelled by Wittgenstein, as opposed to the use of T as object— is guaranteed 
against a particular kind of mistake. In the literature on the topic the mistake in 
question has become known as error through misidentification and the 
corresponding impossibility of error as immunity to error through
'Cf. The Blue Book.
misidentification.^ Hence, according to Wittgenstein, when a subject self­
attributes a psychological property she can (at most) be fallible about the 
property in question, but she cannot be wrong as to whether she is the one 
who has (or seems to have) it. By contrast, according to Wittgenstein, when a 
subject self-attributes a physical property she can be wrong both relative to 
that property and as to whether she is the one who has (or seems to have) it. 
Quite surprisingly, Wittgenstein concludes that while uses of T as object are 
genuinely referential and refer to a person, i.e. to a human being or an 
embodied self, uses of T as subject are not. That is to say, when T is used 
as subject, it does not refer at all and, a fortiori, it does not refer to an 
embodied self.
Now, both the difference between uses of the first person that are liable to 
error through misidentification and those that are immune to it, and 
Wittgenstein’s claim regarding the non referential role of the use of T as 
subject, are in need of explanation. In fact, the difference between uses of T 
which are liable to error through misidentification and those which are 
immune has been addressed several times in the literature, but quite seldom 
in a comprehensive way. That is to say, many philosophers have referred to it 
in their work and have also made attempts at clarifying it, but they have rarely 
considered it central to their reflections about the first person and the 
particular features of the first-personal use of psychological verbs.^ This
^These labels have been introduced in Shoemaker 1968, reprinted in Shoemaker 1994a. 
^Shoemaker and Evans are certainly the ones who have made the most in giving a 
central role to error through misidentification and immunity to error through
thesis intends to remedy the situation. For it is only by seeing which role 
immunity to error through misidentification really plays within reflections about 
the self that it will be possible to understand Wittgenstein’s claim about the 
non-referring role o f ‘I’ when used as subject and it will be possible to assess 
it and show it to be mistaken.
Hence, in the first section, entitled "Error through Misidentification and 
Immunity to Error through Misidentification at the Origin of the Trilemma About 
the Self, the case is made for showing how the attempts at explaining 
immunity to error through misidentification of certain uses of the first person 
can lead to holding various positions about the self. To such an end, an 
exhaustive characterisation of error through misidentification is given in Ch. 1. 
It then becomes clear that error through misidentification is an 
epistemological phenomenon that depends on the grounds on which certain 
judgements (that, in turn, can be linguistically expressed) are made. In 
particular, if the relevant judgement is based on (a non-necessarily occurrent) 
belief in an identification component, which would constitute the subject’s 
rational ground for her judgement, then the latter is liable to error through 
misidentification. That is to say, the subject who makes the Judgement could 
have wrongly identified (or recognised) the object or person her judgement is
misidentification within their reflections on the first person. Wright and Peacocke, by 
contrast, have devoted attention to these phenomena, but they have not taken them to 
be pivotal to an understanding of various issues related to the first person. Pryor has 
focused on them in a systematic way, but he has not considered the relevance of these 
issues within the broader context of the reflection on the first person.
about. The relevance of insisting on the epistemological nature of error 
through misidentification becomes clear when this approach is compared to 
what can be called a semantic approach to the phenomenon at hand. 
According to the latter, error through misidentification consists in a split 
between the semantic reference of a certain term used to give expression to 
one’s judgement and the intended reference, or speaker’s reference, of that 
term. Hence, if X says "John has come to the pub", the person in the pub may 
not be the semantic referent of ‘John’, i.e. it could be someone else; yet, that 
person is the intended referent of ‘John’, when that name is used by the 
speaker on that particular occasion. Consequently, the subject can think and 
manage to say something true of the person presented to her, although the 
means used to give expression to her judgement are inaccurate. By contrast, 
we argue that, when error through misidentification occurs, the subject does 
not just want to refer to the person presented to her. Rather, she wants to refer 
to whom she takes to be the semantic referent of ‘John’, whom she thinks, 
mistakenly, to be the same as the person presented to her in the pub.
Having a clear characterisation of error through misidentification allows us. 
on the one hand, to dispense with a semantic understanding of immunity to 
error through misidentification (relative to the first person) which has been 
proposed in the literature on the topic. According to such a view, the first- 
person is governed by the token-reflexive rule, both at the level of language 
and of thought, i.e. it is governed by the rule according to which each token of 
the first person, either in speech or in thought, refers to its producer. Hence, 
uses of the first person can never exhibit a split between semantic referent
and speaker’s referent. In short, since the first person is an automatic 
in dex ic a I ,which  hits its target in virtue of the token-reflexive rule, it can never 
be competently used by a subject in order to refer to someone else. Hence, 
on a semantic understanding of immunity to error through misidentification, 
all uses of the first person would turn out to be so immune. By contrast, we 
argue that although the linguistic meaning of T is given by the token-reflexive 
rule—a fact this that, however, does not prevent ‘1’ from having a sense (cf. Ch. 
7)—this is entirely compatible with the possibility for some uses of the first 
person to be affected by error through misidentification, once the relevant 
judgements are made on certain grounds. This issue is taken up both in 
Ch. 1 and 2 in connection with the semantic understanding of error through 
misidentification and of immunity to error through misidentification. 
respectively.
On the other hand, the characterisation of error through misidentification 
presented in Ch. 1 allows us to see more clearly one possible way in which 
immunity to error through misidentification can be understood. This is the 
main topic of Ch. 2. In fact, one may think that the l-judgements which are 
immune to error through misidentification are those which are based on a 
(non-necessarily occurrent) belief in an identification component, which, 
however, cannot be wrong. Such an understanding of immunity to error 
through misidentification is then closely parallel to our understanding of error 
through misidentification.
4 mAutomatic indexical" is an expression due to Perry 1997.
In fact, we argue that such an understanding of immunity to error through 
misidentification is at the origin of two influential views about the self, which 
both deny that the self who thinks, feels and perceives is identical with a 
human being. The thought is this: misidentification o f physical objects is 
always possible. Hence, the referent of uses of the first person which are 
immune to error through misidentification cannot be a physical object such as 
a human being.
The Cartesian metaphysics of the self, which provides us with an 
extraordinary object, i.e. a mental substance which is present to the mind for 
each act of thought, and with extraordinary conditions for our encounter with 
such an object, i.e. a conception of the mind as a theatre where everything 
presented to the subject cannot be mistakenly identified, seems to be prima 
facie able to make sense of the possibility for some l-judgements to be 
immune to error through misidentification. However, the Cartesian 
metaphysics of the self and of the mind are problematic. For dualism is a 
difficult position to maintain. Moreover, the infallibility of the subject with 
respect to her mental states implied by the Cartesian conception of the mind 
can be shown to be mistaken. Finally, as Hume and Lichtenberg noticed, it is 
prima facie feasible to hold that no subject of sensation, perception and 
thought is presented to one as an object when one is aware of one’s 
sensations, perceptions and thoughts.
As a reaction to Cartesianism, Wittgenstein, in his middle period, seems to 
have put forward the view that uses of the first person which are immune to
6
error through misidentification are not about a person at alL^ Hence, if no 
object at all is given for recognition or identification, when the relevant I- 
judgements are at stake, then the latter will be immune to error through 
misidentification by default. This position has become known in the literature 
as the no-subject or Idealist view about the self, and its offspring at the level of 
language as the no-reference view about ‘I ’. But this position too is highly 
problematic. For it would seem to imply that mental states are not owned. 
Moreover, it would be at odds with our linguistic intuitions, since we take T to 
be a referential pronoun, from (the use of) which the existential generalisation 
follows.
Therefore, on the first understanding of immunity to error through 
misidentification, which calls for a metaphysical account of it, i.e. an account 
according to which l-judgements that are immune to error through 
misidentification are so because of the particular nature of the self, we reach 
the following dilemma. We do have a prima facie explanation of immunity to 
error through misidentification, but we either endorse the bad Cartesian 
metaphysics of self, or we endorse the bad Idealist metaphysics of the self 
and the bad semantics of the no-reference view about T.
However, the situation is even more complicated than that. For, those who 
sympathise with the prim itivist position about the self, according to which the
®Wittgenstein’s claims in The Blue Book with respect to the first person have been 
interpreted in various ways. Yet, this thesis does not have exegetical ambitions and 
assumes the received view according to which Wittgenstein endorses the claim that 
uses of T as subject are not genuinely referential.
self is identical with a human being, still owe us an explanation of how certain 
l-judgements can be immune to error through misidentification. Yet, as we 
have seen, on the first understanding of immunity to error through 
misidentification, such an explanation is not even in view. For such an 
explanation presupposes that there be infallible recognitions or 
identifications. However, since no physical object can ever be infallibly 
recognised or identified, if l-judgements are about a human being, then they 
can never be immune to error through misidentification. Hence, we are 
confronted with the following trilemma. Either we have a prima facie 
explanation of immunity to error through misidentification— but we either 
endorse the bad Cartesian metaphysics of the self, or the bad metaphysics 
and semantics of the Idealist position— or else we opt for a sound
metaphysics of the self and a sound semantics of the first-person, but we 
have no explanation of immunity to error through misidentification. 
Consequently, the solution of the trilemma consists, at least in part, in offering 
an alternative account of immunity to error through misidentification which 
makes it compatible with the reference view about T and with a primitivist 
metaphysics o f the self. In fact, it also consists in showing precisely which 
classes of l-judgements are immune to error through misidentification and 
why this is so.
In order to give an alternative account of immunity to error through 
misidentification one can propose the following: one may hold that I- 
judgements which are immune to error through misidentification are those 
not based on any (non-necessarily occurrent) belief in an identification
—  8
component. This alternative way of understanding immunity to error through 
misidentification would certainly allow one to avoid metaphysical explanations 
of that phenomenon, since it would only appeal to the kind of grounds on 
which the judgement is made. Hence, it would replace the metaphysical 
explanation of immunity to error through misidentification with an 
epistemological explanation of it, which would also be in keeping with our 
ep/sfemo/og/ca/understanding of error through misidentification. Yet. such an 
alternative account of immunity to error through misidentification has to be 
precisely characterised. Moreover, it has to be shown which l-judgements are 
immune to error through misidentification in this second way and why this is 
so.
Our understanding of the dialectic within which considerations having to do 
with immunity to error through misidentification are intertwined with an 
account of the metaphysics of the self and the semantics of the first person 
allows us to make a taxonomy of the most prominent views with respect to 
these issues which have been recently put forward in the literature on the 
topic. Hence, we call "revisionist those accounts of immunity to error through 
misidentification that depart from the first account of immunity to error through 
misidentification presented in Ch. 2. Amongst them, we distinguish further 
those which aim at offering a substantive response to the trilemma and those 
which just offer a deflationist response to it. The difference among these 
positions is as follows. Substantive responses not only aim at making 
immunity to error through misidentification of certain l-judgements compatible 
with reference to a human being, but they also try to rule oufthe Cartesian and
9
the Idealist positions on conceptual grounds. As a consequence, if they are 
right, one can no longer be either Cartesian or Idealist about the self, because 
that would expose one to conceptual incoherence. By contrast, deflationist 
responses just aim at making immunity to error through misidentification of 
certain l-judgements compatible  with reference to a human being. As a 
consequence, if they are right, one need no longer be either Cartesian or 
Ideaiist about the self, although these are still conceptually coherent, albeit 
problematic, positions. The aim oi this thesis is to offer a sound revisionist 
account of immunity to error through misidentification and an exhaustive 
substantive solution to the trilemma. For, as it will become evident, 
substantive responses have so far been wanting with respect to the 
explanation of why introspection-based mental self-ascriptions are immune to 
error through misidentification.
Hence, in the second section, entitled "A Revisionist Account of Immunity to 
Error through Misidentification and a Substantive Response to the Trilemma; 
Evans", we present, amend and defend Evans' revisionist account of 
immunity to error through misidentification and his substantive response to 
the trilemma. We do so by introducing the basic elements of his theoretical 
framework and his account of immunity to error through misidentification first 
(cf. Ch. 3). We then introduce his account of l-thoughts, giving some historical 
background to it (Ch. 4). Finally, in Ch. 5 we consider the details of his 
proposal with regard to l-thoughts and their immunity to error through 
misidentification. In particular, we present and defend his extension of 
immunity to error through misidentification to l-thoughts based on somatic
—  10
proprioception and on perception of one’s environment. These turn out to be 
at least de facto immune to error through misidentification. Moreover, 
according to Evans, these kinds of self-ascriptions must be at least 
dispositionally in place for one to be credited with the possession of the first 
person concept. Hence, we claim that Evans is right to say that our first 
person concept is a concept of an embodied self that is located in space. 
Hence, we agree with Evans that our first person concept is firmly anti- 
Cartesian and anti-idealist.
We also argue that Evans is right in pointing out that only non-inferential 
introspection-based mental self-ascriptions are logically immune to error 
through misidentification, while inferential mental self-ascriptions are liable to 
error through misidentification. Yet, we argue that there is an asymmetry, 
which is in need of explanation, between de facto immunity to error through 
misidentification of some bodily self-ascriptions and logical immunity to error 
through misidentification of non-inferential introspection-based mental self­
ascriptions.
Finally, we consider a different pattern of argument used by Evans in order 
to oppose the Cartesian and the Idealist on conceptual grounds. Roughly, it 
consists in a double application of the Generality Constraint. We argue that 
only one strand of it is successful and that it shows that in order to be able to 
self-ascribe mental properties subjects must think of themselves as 
embodied. Still, this argument does not establish the full anti-idealist point 
according to which we have an awareness of ourselves as embodied when 
we self-ascribe mental properties on the basis of introspection.
—  11
In the third section, entitled "Revisionist Accounts of Immunity to Error 
through Misidentification and Deflationist Responses to the Trilemma", we 
turn to different accounts of immunity to error through misidentification and to 
various deflationist responses to the trilemma. In Ch. 6 we take into account 
Shoemaker’s, Wright’s and Pryor’s papers on the topic. On the one hand, this 
allows us to clarify the difference between de facto and logical immunity to 
error through misidentification. On the other hand, it allows us to present and 
discuss other revisionist accounts of immunity to error through 
misidentification, which have been presented in the literature on the topic.
Finally, it allows us to consider some possible explanations of why 
introspection-based mental self-ascriptions are logically immune to error 
through misidentification. However, we argue that, although these 
explanations present some elements that are relevant to an exhaustive 
explanation of immunity to error through misidentification, they are either 
partially wanting or incomplete.
In Ch. 7 we turn to Peacocke’s account of l-thoughts which allows us to 
conclude the discussion of the nature of this class of thoughts introduced with 
Evans. We then argue that Peacocke’s account of immunity to error through
i
misidentification of introspection-based mental self-ascriptions is illuminating I
but that it rests on the assumption that one can only be introspectively aware ]
of one’s own mental states. We point out that we do not wish to take issue
i
with this assumption, but that we wish to show why it holds a priori. We also j
I
take into account his more recent work on the epistemology of l-thoughts j
which is helpful in illuminating why when one self-ascribes a mental property j
12
one is entitled to do so, even if, at least in some cases, one is not presented 
with oneself as an object, i.e. as an embodied entity.
Finally, in the last section, entitled "The Exhaustive Substantive Response 
to the Trilemma", a sound revisionist definition of immunity to error through 
misidentification is given. It is then shown why non-inferential introspection- 
based mental self-ascriptions are logically immune to error through 
misidentification. That is to say, it is shown why a subject cannot be 
introspectively aware of someone e lse ’s mental states and thus why the 
subject who self-ascribes the relevant mental state on those bases is 
necessarily the same as the one who has it
In fact, it turns out that such an account of logical immunity to error through 
misidentification of the relevant self-ascriptions rules out the Idealist 
conception of the self (and its semantic offspring), since it maintains that no 
mental state can exist un-owned. Moreover, it dispenses with the Cartesian 
metaphysics of the self as unnecessary to an explanation of immunity to error 
through misidentification of the relevant l-judgements and as misguided on 
epistemological grounds.
Thus, the revisionist account of immunity to error through misidentification 
proposed, which is in keeping with Evans’, together with the endorsement of 
his theoretical framework, allows us to maintain a substantive response to 
the trilemma. For immunity to error through misidentification becomes 
compatible with some bodily self-ascriptions. These, in turn, are at least 
dispositionally necessary in order for a subject to have the first person 
concept. Hence, our first person concept is firmly anti-Cartesian and anti-
13
Idealist. Moreover, our account of why non-inferential, introspection-based 
mental self-ascriptions are logically immune to error through misidentification 
allows us to supplement Evans' own position. Thus, we will finally be able to 
offer an exhaustive substantive response to the trilemma about the self.
— i 4 —
SECTION
ERROR THROUGH MISIDENTIFICATION AND IMMUNITY TO 
ERROR THROUGH MISIDENTIFICATION AT THE ORIGIN OF 
THE TRILEMMA ABOUT THE SELF
Summary
in this section we clarify and define the notions of (EM) error through 
misidentification (Ch. 1) and (lEM) immunity to error through misidentification 
(Ch. 2) and show how a certain understanding of I EM leads to the trilemma 
about the se if.
To such an end, in Ch. 1
• we discuss recognition-based judgements and introduce EM (§ 1);
• we compare our understanding of EM with Shoemaker’s and Pryor’s 
(§ 1.1 ):
• we extend the class of EM-judgements to comprise not only recognition- 
based judgements, but also identification-based ones (§ 2);
• by so doing we disagree with Pryor (§ 2.1);
• we distinguish EM from the possibility of a split between speaker’s 
reference and semantic reference (§ 3);
• we summarise our conclusions (§ 4).
In Ch. 2
• we offer a first definition of lEM which is closely parallel to our definition of 
EM (§1):
• we show how this definition forces one to explain lEM of some I-
judgements by reference to the particular nature of the se lf Two metaphysical 
views about the self, i.e. the Cartesian and the Idealist, are introduced as 
possible explanations of lEM. Finding them problematic, we claim that they 
confront supporters of the first definition of lEM with a dilemma (§ 2);
• the trilemma about the self is introduced; either we explain lEM, but we
endorse either the Cartesian or the Idealist position about the self; or else we 
hold a primitivist view about the self, according to which the self is identical to 
a human being— and T refers to such an entity— but we have no explanation of 
lEM (§ 3);
• we consider semantic solutions to the trilemma {§ 4), finding them 
mistaken,
• we proceed to make a taxonomy of the possible solutions to the trilemma.
We submit that only revisionist accounts of lEM, which depart from our first 
definition of lEM, offer the prospects of solving the trilemma (§ 5);
• we further subdivide revisionist accounts into substantive and deflationist 
ones, according to the kind of reply they give to the trilemma (§ 5.1).
— 17
Chapter One
Error Through Misidentification
In the Blue Book, in the context of his discussion of solipsism, Wittgenstein 
famously introduces a distinction between two uses of ' I ' /  He writes:
There are two different cases in the use of the word 'T' (or "my") 
which I might call "the use as object" and "the use as subject". 
Examples of the first kind of use are these: "My arm is broken", "I 
have grown six inches", "I have a bump on my forehead", "The wind 
blows my hair about". Examples of the second kind are: "/ see so- 
and-so", "/ try to lift my arm", "/ think it will rain", "/ have a toothache".
One can point to the difference between these two categories by 
saying: The cases of the first category involve the recognition of a 
particular person, and there is in these cases the possibility of an 
error, or as I should rather put it: The possibility of an error has been 
provided for (...). It is possible that, say in an accident, I should feel 
pain in my arm, see a broken arm at my side, and think it is mine, 
when really it is my neighbour's. And I could, looking into a mirror, 
mistake a bump on his forehead for one on mine. On the other hand, 
there is no question of recognizing a person when I say I have 
toothache. To ask "are you sure that it's you who have pains?" would 
be nonsensical. Now, when in this case no error is possible, it is 
because the move which we might be inclined to think of as an error, 
a ‘bad move’, is no move of the game at all (...). And now this way of
1^ am not going to engage in a discussion of the theme of solipsism in Wittgenstein. 
For a reconstruction of it, from Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations, cf. Glock 
1996, Hacker 1997, Pears 1987.
stating our idea suggests itself: that it is as impossible that In making 
the statement "I have toothache" I should have mistaken another 
person for myself, as it is to moan with pain by mistake, having 
mistaken someone else for me. To say, "1 have pain" is no more a 
statement about a particular person than moaning is.^
Wittgenstein seems to be making two points: first, there are cases in which 
our use of T can be based on a mis-recognition of ourselves, and cases in 
which this is not a possibility.^ Secondly, his examples may seem to suggest 
that all and only mental self-ascriptions are such that there is no possibility of 
misrecognising the subject they are about, namely oneself.^ The first point has
'BIB, pp. 66-67.
terminological remark. ‘Misrecognition’ is not an English word. Moreover, 
‘recognition’ is a success word, i.e. a word which means the result of the successful 
process of recognising someone/something. However, here ‘recognition’ is taken in a 
slightly more etymological sense. That is to say, ‘recognition’ indicates the result of a 
process of ns-cognising something/someone, i.e. a process in which a subject takes 
someone/something to be the same person/thing she has already been presented with. 
Now, such a process can go right or wrong. ‘Recognition’ will be used to indicate the 
result of a successful re-cognition, whereas ‘misrecognition’ will be used to indicate the 
result of an unsuccessful one, i.e. the result of a process in which the wrong 
object/person is taken to be the same as the one previously encountered. The reason 
of this terminological choice will become evident in the following when a distinction 
between identification and recognition will be introduced together with a distinction 
between misidentification and misrecognition.
'^ It is not obvious that Wittgenstein maintained the view that all and only mental self- 
ascriptions are immune to error through misidentification (cf. Garrett 1995),
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become known in the literature as a distinction between i-judgements which are 
liable to error through misidentification (EM) and those which are immune to 
error through misidentification (lEM).^ We will presently see the rationale behind 
these labels. As for the second point, it states that lEM is a function of the 
subject-matter of the l-judgement. From these two assumptions, i.e. that there is 
a genuine distinction between EM/IEM for I-judgements and that it is a function 
of their subject-matter, Wittgenstein quite surprisingly seems to conclude that I- 
judgements which are lEM are not about a particular person.® Both the 
assumptions and the conclusion need some explaining. In this chapter we will 
consider the first assumption, i.e. that there is a distinction between uses of T 
which are EM and those which are lEM, while leaving the second assumption 
and Wittgenstein’s conclusion for discussion in the following chapter.
1. Recognition-Based Judgements and Error Through Misidentification
In order to have a better understanding of EM and, consequently, lEM, we must 
have a grasp of recognition-based judgements, since it seems that the
nevertheless his examples seem to point in that direction. Be that as it may, I am not 
engaging in an exegesis of Wittgenstein’s writings on this topic.
These labels were introduced by Shoemaker 1968, reprinted in Shoemaker 1994a. 
page reference to the latter. Cf. Shoemaker 1994a: 81.
®Garrett 1995 has argued that Wittgenstein does not maintain that T is not a 
referring expression. Again, I am not interested in offering an exegesis of this passage 
from Wittgenstein.
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phenomenon we wish to explain arises precisely in connection with this kind of 
judgements, in fact, it is easier to bring out the features of recognition-based 
judgements by reflecting on judgements based on misrecognition. We will 
introduce an example first, and then we will consider the formal or general 
features that recognition-based judgements have, and what goes wrong in the 
case of misrecognition.
Let us suppose that a subject knows a, i.e. she is acquainted with her and 
can tell her apart from other persons and let us suppose that the subject enters 
a room and sees, sitting in a corner, a person that looks similar to a. This 
person is wearing a white shirt. So the subject thinks [a is wearing a white 
shirt].^ However, the person sitting in the corner is not a, but someone who 
looks similar to her. Hence, the subject’s judgement is not mistaken as far as 
the predication component is concerned, but it is mistaken as far as the 
identification component is concerned. That is to say, although the subject is 
right in thinking that there is someone wearing a white shirt, she is wrong in 
thinking that it is a.
What we can say about this example is that a judgement affected by 
misrecognition arises out of circumstances in which the subject is presented 
with a person and takes that person to be a, when in fact that person is not a. 
On the basis of what she perceives she forms the judgement [a is Fj. If the 
judgement is false, it is so at least because there has been an error in the
^Square brackets will be used to indicate propositional contents and concepts as 
opposed to sentences, names and predicates.
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identification of the subject, namely that person is not a.® Hence, we can say 
that error through misidentification occurs as a result of a misrecognition of the 
object the subject is presented with.
Notice, moreover, that the subject must already have a concept relative to a 
which she applies to this person, whom, however, is not a. Call this the 
identification concept. It is important to note that, when recognition (as opposed 
to identification proper, as we will see) is at stake, not only must such a concept 
be a singular one, i.e. a concept which is only true of a, but also that it must 
have been acquired by means of a causal interaction of the subject with the 
object.
Moreover, the subject must form a concept of the person/object perceptually 
given to her ready for recognition. Call this the base concept. This will be. 
characteristically, a perceptual demonstrative concept, i.e. a concept 
expressible by means of a complex demonstrative expression like ‘that
This sentence may be puzzling, but—since we are considering the general 
case—we have to leave open the possibility that [a is F] be true, although the subject’s 
judgement is not based on the perception of a. So, for instance, it may be the case that 
a is behind the subject in the room and is in fact wearing a white shirt. However, the 
subject’s judgement, based on a mistaken recognition of the person sitting in the 
corner, would be only accidentally true of a, who is in fact wearing a white shirt, but 
who is not the person presented to her for recognition. Moreover, we can imagine a 
situation in which the lighting conditions are bad and the person the subject is 
presented with is neither a nor is she wearing a white shirt but a light grey one. In that 
case the subject’s judgement [a is wearing a white shirt] would be mistaken both 
relative to the identification component and to the predication component.
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person/object’, and formed on the basis of a demonstrative individuation of the 
particular perceptually given to her.® Notice, moreover, that the subject does not 
know and, in fact, must not know that the object she is presented with and on 
which her base concept depends is different from a. With this piece of 
terminology, we can now say that a judgement based on misrecognition occurs 
when and only when the subject wrongly thinks that the base concept and the 
identification concept are coinstantiated by the object perceptually given to her. 
Since EM arises in cases of misrecognition, we can represent what happens 
when a judgement is affected by EM as follows:
[That person is F] & [That person = a]
[a is F]
The first conjunct depends on a demonstrative individuation of the object we 
are presented with, which gives us the base concept [That person] and involves 
a predication component relative to [F]; by contrast, the second conjunct 
involves an identity judgement to the effect that the base concept and the 
identification concept are taken to be coinstantiated. This is the identification 
component that leads to the recognition-based judgement [a is F] and it is the 
distinctive mark of this kind of judgement.
% terminological remark. ‘Individuation’ will be used in the following to mean the 
discrimination of a particular, which is characteristically (though not necessarily), 
perceptually given to one and could be object of demonstrative reference. Hence, our 
use of ‘individuation’ has nothing to do with the fact that the subject possesses a 
principium individuationis of the object presented to her.
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In fact, a recognition-based judgement could be exhausted by the 
identification component. For instance, when a subject thinks [That man is NN],
she is recognising that man as NN, i.e. she is taking the base concept and the 
identification concept to be coinstantiated. What, however, is relevant for 
recognition is the fact that she must have already been acquainted with NN and 
that she is applying the singular concept [NN] as a result of a new encounter
with him/her. What goes wrong in all cases of misrecognition is precisely the 
fact that the base concept and the identification concept are wrongly taken to be 
coinstantiated. Since the error occurs in the identification component, it is 
natural to consider the resulting judgement [a is F] as affected by error through 
misidentification.
However, it is important to note that [a is F] need not be the result of either an 
explicit or an unconscious inference. Rather, what we are saying is that a 
judgement such as [a is F] can be considered as recognition-based if it is 
causally and rationally triggered by a belief on the subject’s part in the 
individuation/predication component and by a belief in the identification 
component, i.e. [There is something/someone which/who is F] and [That 
thing/person is identical to a]. The reason why the judgement is not seen as 
actually involving an inference containing an identification component is that it 
would not be truthful to the phenomenology of experience, nor required by 
theoretical reasons. Hence, we agree with Peacocke who writes;
Suppose you are able to recognize Michael Dummett (MD); and 
suppose you come on the basis of your perceptual experience to 
believe something about MD (...). The fact that in such an example 
the beliefs that MD is thus-and-so and that this man is MD may well
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be acquired simultaneously does not prevent the former from resting 
on the latter. An experience can cause one to acquire a structure of 
beliefs simultaneously, a structure in which some beliefs are rationally 
dependent upon others, beliefs which would be abandoned if those 
others were abandoned. (...). There is no contradiction in a belief both 
resting upon an identity in the sense of being causally and rationally 
sustained by it, even though it did not initially result from a temporal 
sequential process of conscious inference.
So the idea is that the belief in the predication and in the identification 
component need not be actually entertained in a “sequential process of 
conscious inference". However, these beliefs must be causally and rationally 
efficacious, i.e. it is because they are (maybe not occurrently) held that the 
subject makes the relevant judgement and, moreover, they constitute the 
subject’s rational grounds for the judgement.
To sum up: what is distinctive of EM recognition-based judgements is 
precisely the fact that the identification concept has been acquired through an 
encounter with the object, and is deployed on the basis of a perceptual 
encounter with an object which, however, is different from the one which was at 
its origin. In other words, if the identification concept had not been acquired 
through an encounter with its object (demonstrative individuation) and/or it were 
not applied on the basis of a new perceptual encounter with an object 
(recognition), then the judgement [a is F] would not count as a recognition- 
based one. To put the point rather crudely: there would not be re-cognition if 
there had not been an individuation of the object in the first place and a new 
encounter with it (or with another one which looks sufficiently similar to the one
10,Peacocke 1983: 143-144.
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at the origin of our singular concept) later on. It has to be stressed that while 
these constraints on the conditions in which the judgement is formed must be 
met in order to have a recognition-based judgement that can eventually be 
affected by EM, this does not mean that the actual judgement should 
(necessarily) be considered as the result of an inference involving the two 
components. The idea is just that a new encounter with an object, plus memory 
traces left from a previous encounter with a possibly different object, can trigger 
the recognition which, in a conceptually endowed creature, immediately issues 
in the relevant judgement. This, in turn, is causally and rationally sustained by a 
(not necessarily occurrent) belief in an identification component and in a 
predication component.
We are now in a position to characterise error through misidentification as 
follows:
A singular judgement of the form [a is F] is affected by EM, relative to the 
subject, if the thinker has the singular concept [a] of an object a and 
applies /a/to the distinct object x, as a consequence of a misrecognition.^^
it is important to stress that a subject would be having a thought about a 
which she mistakenly thinks to be the same as the object she is presented with,
i.e. X, which she does not know to be different from a. Hence, when the
^This characterisation will be revised shortly and this is why it only states a sufficient 
condition for error through misidentification.
26
judgement [a is F] is affected by EM, it must be considered as about a, which, 
however, is not the same as the object the judgement is actually based on.^^
1.1 EM. A Comparison Between Definitions: Shoemaker and Pryor
In order to appreciate the consequences of our definition of EM, it is useful to 
compare it with the definitions offered by Shoemaker, who was the first to draw 
systematic attention to EM and lEM, and by Pryor who, to an extent, holds 
similar views to ours. Our definition of EM is compatible with Shoemaker’s:
To say that a statement ‘a is (|)’ is subject to error through 
misidentification relative to the term ‘a’ means that the following is 
possible: the speaker knows some particular thing to be (|), but makes 
the mistake of asserting ‘a is (|)' because, and only because, he 
mistakenly thinks that the thing he knows to be (f> is what “a” refers 
to/13
Obviously Shoemaker’s definition should be amended in such a way as to 
account not only for sentences but also for judgements which are EM, and for 
the fact that we can falsely believe a to be 0, i.e. EM is compatible with there
'^By contrast, Rovane (1987) and Christofidou (1995) seem to think that if a 
judgement is affected by EM, then it is about the object which is actually given to us in 
the particular episode in which recognition occurs. For a discussion of. Ch. 2. 
^^Shoemaker 1994a: 82.
27
being also an error in the predication component^ The reason it is preferable 
to consider judgements instead of sentences is that there are things we do have 
actual beliefs about but that we do not assert. Hence, talk in terms of actual 
belief or judgement covers this broader case. Moreover, it is customary to 
distinguish between actual beliefs and dispositional ones on the basis of 
whether or not the subject is actually entertaining a given belief. We will use 
‘judgement’ to indicate actual belief and ‘belief to indicate dispositional belief. 
The reason EM is taken to affect judgements is that we are interested only in 
those actual beliefs the subject comes to entertain and, possibly, express. By 
contrast, we have maintained that the reason she entertains these mistaken 
judgements is her belief—which need not be occurrent— in a mistaken
identification component, brought about, in turn, by an error in recognition due 
to a shortcoming of the subject’s recognition system.^®
According to Pryor, the kind of misidentification our definition highlights is 
labelled “de re misidentification’’. The salient feature of such a kind of 
misidentification is that it depends on misrecognition and hence on the fact that 
the subject has been acquainted with an object but, on a new encounter,
similar amendment to Shoemaker’s definition can be found in Peacocke 1999 
269, although he opts for beliefs and thought constituents or modes of presentations, 
rather than for judgements and concepts.
^^ A description of human recognition abilities falls beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Notice, moreover, that there can be dispositional beliefs which are affected by EM, but 
we will concentrate only on actual ones.
28
mistakenly takes a different object to be the same as the one once presented to 
her. Pryor defines de re misidentification as follows:
[W]e have a case of de re misidentification whenever the following 
three conditions obtain:
(i) There is some singular proposition about x, to the effect that it is 
F, that a subject believes or attempts to express. (...).
(ii) The subject’s justification for believing this singular proposition 
rests on his justification for believing, of some y, that y is F and 
that y is identical to x. (...).
(Hi) However, unbeknownst to the subject, y ^ x. (...).
I do not assume that whenever your justification for believing one 
proposition rests on your justification for believing other propositions, 
you will have formed or even entertained a belief in those latter 
propositions. Nor do I assume that you have based the first belief on 
a belief in those latter propositions.
However, Pryor’s considerations with regard to utterances affected by error 
through misidentification are slightly different from ours. In particular, he 
distinguishes between levels of referential intentions. Hence, he argues that by 
referring to the object perceptually given to us, we aim at referring to the 
semantic referent of the singular term (or what we take to be the semantic 
referent of the singular term). Consequently, our basic referential attempt 
makes us refer to the object perceptually given to us, whereas our secondary 
referential attempt is directed towards the semantic referent of the singular term 
(or what we take to be the semantic referent of the singular term). He then 
concludes that in the utterance the subject says something about the object 
perceptually given to her. But, as it is evident from Pryor’s definition of de re
®Pryor 1998: 274-276.
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misidentification, the judgement which is affected by EM . and leads to an 
utterance which is, in turn, affected by EM, is about the semantic referent of the 
singular term (or what we take to be the semantic referent of the singular 
term )T
By contrast, since our starting point is the judgement, rather than the 
utterance, we agree with Pryor’s claim that the utterance is about the semantic 
referent of the singular term used to express it, but we disagree with respect to 
his interpretation of the utterance as being also about the object perceptually 
given to one. For this would mean that one’s utterance corresponds, at one and 
the same time, to two different propositions or, in our terminology, judgements 
that could also have different truth-values.^® Since it is not clear at all how this 
could happen, it seems safer to hold that the utterance just reflects the 
judgement. This, in turn, is affected by EM, which means that it is based on two
^^ Cf. Pryor 1998: 273-275. In particular, example 2, p. 275. A similar position is held 
by Shoemaker 1994a; 83: “Suppose that I am selling neckties, that a customer wants a 
red necktie, and that I believe I have put a particular red silk necktie on a shelf of the 
showcase that is visible to the customer but not to me. Putting my hand on a necktie on 
that shelf, and feeling to be silk, I might say This one is red’. Here it could be said that I 
have identified, correctly or incorrectly, the object I refer to in saying 'this’ as the object 
‘I have in mind’ (...). [in this case] I intend to refer to a certain red necktie I believe to be 
on the shelf, but there is also a sense in which I intend to refer, and do refer, to the 
necktie actually on the shelf (...)”.
®^ln fact, supposing that the predication is correct, then, if the judgement is about the 
object perceptually given to one, it is true; whereas, if it is about the semantic referent 
of the singular term, it is false.
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(not necessarily occurrent) beliefs, i.e. one in a predication/individuation 
component, triggered by the presence of an object, and one in a mistaken 
identification component, triggered by our recognition-system. Hence, in the 
standard case of an utterance affected by EM, the utterance (as well as the 
judgement) is about the semantic referent of the singular term but it is based on 
the object perceptually given to one, which is in fact different from the semantic 
referent of the singular term. This point will become important in the following 
(of. § 3), where we will distinguish the phenomenon of EM from the 
phenomenon of the split between semantic reference and speaker’s reference. 
There we will argue, amongst other things, that, in the latter case, the 
utterance, like the judgement, is about the object perceptually given to one. 
Hence, the difference between utterances which are affected by EM and those 
which just present a split between semantic reference and speaker’s reference 
is that the former ones are about the semantic referent of the singular term, 
whereas the latter ones are about the object perceptually given to one, which is 
the speaker’s referent of the singular term.
2. Identification-Based Judgements and Error Through Misidentification
We should now consider a further possibility in which error through 
misidentification is not supposed to affect a recognition-based judgement, i.e. a 
judgement in which the identification concept has been acquired through a 
causal interaction with the object; rather, it affects an identification-based 
judgement, i.e. a judgement in which the identification concept has not been
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acquired through a causal interaction with the object. We will introduce this 
case with an example first, and then we will discuss the general features of it.
Suppose that a subject is at a conference and in the audience there is a 
woman who is very active in the discussion and is clearly an expert on the topic. 
Given the present context and the subject’s background knowledge (she has 
read books written by her, she has a rough idea of her age and physical 
appearance, through testimony and inference, etc.), she makes a guess, and 
thinks [That woman is NN]. However, the woman is not NN, but someone else. 
Here we have a base concept [that woman] and an identification concept [NN]. 
In symbols, we can represent what happens thus:
[That woman = NN]
In this particular case we have only the identification component, but what we 
will be saying in the following does not rest on that, and a predication 
component could be added without any harm to the considerations we are 
going to make. The constituents of the identification component are a 
demonstrative concept (the base concept), expressible by That/this woman’ 
and the identification concept expressible through either a proper name or a 
definite description, e.g. ‘NN’ or ‘the such-and-such’. What is important to note 
is that the identification concept which is a singular one. i.e. a concept which is 
true only of a specific referent, has not been acquired through a perceptual 
interaction with the object/person o f which it is a concept. In other words, it is 
not itself the result of a demonstrative identification. Hence, the judgement 
[That woman = NN] is not the expression of a recognition, in the sense we have 
characterised it in § 1. Rather, it is an expression of an identification, i.e. the
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subject takes a particular to be an instance of a (singular) concept she has 
acquired other than through a previous encounter with its only instance. What 
identification-based judgements have in common with recognition-based ones is 
that they involve the exercise of two (singular) concepts, but while in the latter 
case both concepts depend on a perceptual identification of the object, in the 
former case only one does.
Notice, moreover, that this is not to say that proper names work like definite 
descriptions. For, in our example, the reference of ‘NN’ is fixed through a body 
of information the subject has about NN, but its semantic role is to refer to NN 
and not to any person who, in a logically possible world, satisfies the definite 
description(s) used to fix the reference of ‘NN’.
Now consider the case in which the subject forms the judgement [NN is a 
fascinating person] on the basis of how she sees the woman she takes to be 
NN behave during the conference. In such a case we can represent what 
happens thus:
[That woman is a fascinating person] & [That woman = NN]
[NN is a fascinating person]
However, although there is someone who is a fascinating person, that 
someone is not NN. Thus, it seems as if, prima facie, the judgement [NN is a 
fascinating person] is affected by EM.
Yet, if we accept the possibility of a split between semantic reference and 
speaker’s reference and, hence, that ‘NN’ can mean NN for the community and 
NN* for a particular speaker, then it is no longer obvious that error through
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misidentification has occurred. After all, for the speaker ‘NN’ designates the 
person NN* who is perceptually given to her. So, we have a choice here: either 
we consider the judgement [NN is F] as affected by EM, but then we cannot 
allow for the possibility of a split between semantic reference and speaker’s 
reference—for otherwise our identification component would not be mistaken,
since, for the speaker, ‘NN’ means that woman (NN*) perceptually given to her: 
or else we think that there can be a split between semantic and speaker’s 
reference, but then, by the same token, we cannot say that [NN is F] is affected 
by EM. In order to make a decision, however, we have to be clear about the 
difference between error through misidentification and the possibility of a split 
between semantic reference and speaker's reference. We will turn to this in § 3. 
In the mean time let us dwell on Pryor’s account of EM of what we have called 
identification-based judgements.
2.1 De Re Misidentification and Which-Misidentification: Pryor
According to Pryor, we should distinguish between two sorts of error through 
misidentification (and consequently between two sorts of immunity to error 
through misidentification). On the one hand, there is de re misidentification, 
which we mentioned in § 1.1 and which is similar, although not identical, to our 
understanding of EM. On the other hand, there is what Pryor calls which- 
misidentification. The characteristic feature of this latter kind of EM is that there 
is no recognition of a particular involved, because the subject does not have an
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identification concept formed on the basis of a previous encounter with an 
object. Pryor considers the following example:
I smell a skunky odor, and see several animals rummaging around in 
my garden. None of them has the characteristic white stripes of a 
skunk, but I believe that some skunks lack these stripes. Approaching 
closer and sniffing, I form the belief, of the smallest of these animals, 
that it is a skunk in my garden. This belief is mistaken. There is a 
skunk in my garden, but it is not the small animal 1 see.^ ®
Pryor then defines wf7/c/7-misidentification as follows:
[Which-misidentification] occurs when:
(i) A subject has some grounds G that offer him knowledge of the 
existential generalization 3xFx.
(ii) Partly on the basis of G, the subject is also justified, or takes 
himself to be justified, in believing of some object a that it is F.
(iii) But in fact a is not F. Some distinct object y is F, and it’s 
because the grounds G “derive” in the right way from this fact 
about y that they offer the subject knowledge that 3xFx. ^
Hence, according to Pryor, we should realise that there can also be EM when 
there is no mistaken identification component. Consequently, according to 
Pryor, we should realise that there are two altogether different kinds of EM, i.e 
de re and w/7/cf7-misidentification.
However, this conclusion is mistaken and brought about by a misleading way 
of interpreting the “ingredients” that can occur in an identification component. 
For, as we saw in § 2, an identification component can also involve, besides an 
indexical such as T, a name, and, for that matter, a (rigidified) definite
T ryo r 1998. 281. 
' “Pryor 1998: 282.
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description, which the subject has not acquired through a perceptual encounter 
with a given object. If we allow for this possibility, then Pryor’s example too 
would involve an identification component. For it should be construed as 
follows: [There is a skunky odor], [This (small animal) = the animal which is the 
cause of the skunky odor I can smell], [This is a skunk], therefore [There is a 
skunk in my garden]. Here there is an identification component, i.e. [This (small 
animal) = the animal which is the cause of the skunky odor I can smell], which, 
however, is mistaken because the small animal I see is not the animal 
responsible for the skunky odor I can smell. Moreover, there is a mistaken 
predication because the animal I can see is not even a skunk.
Consequently, it does not seem right to conclude that there exist two different 
kinds of EM (and consequently of lEM). Rather, there exist different kinds of 
identification components. Namely, those which involve the exercise of two 
concepts which are both based on an encounter with the object(s) and those 
which do not (they can either involve one concept which is dependent on the 
subject’s encounter with the object, or none at all). Hence, the generalised 
definition of EM is as follows:
A singular judgement of the form [a is F] is affected by EM, relative to the 
subject, iff the thinker has the singular concept [a] of an object a and 
applies [a] to the distinct object x as a consequence of either a 
misrecognition or a misidentification.
Here are some examples that should help to clarify our definition:
(a) [Kripke is wearing a white shirt];
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(b) [Kripke is very active in the discussion];
(c) [Kripke is a knight].
(a) The subject is acquainted with Saul Kripke, she sees someone who 
resembles him and judges [S. K. is wearing a white shirt]. Here the mistaken 
identification component is [That person = S. K.] and both concepts depend on 
a causal (i.e. perceptual) connection of the subject with the object. Here EM 
arises because of misrecognition.
(b) The subject is not acquainted with S. K. But she is at a conference which 
she knows S. K. may attend as well. She sees someone who is very active in 
the discussion and forms the judgement [S. K. is very active in the discussion]. 
Here there is a mistaken identification component for it is not true that [That 
person = S. K.]. However, while [that person] is a singular concept the subject 
has because of her acquaintance with a certain individual, [S. K.] is a concept 
she has acquired otherwise than through a perceptual encounter with S. K 
Here, then, EM arises because of misidentification.
(c) The subject is not acquainted with S. K. However, she thinks that S. K. is 
the author of The Logical Basis o f Metaphysics and she knows that the author 
of IBM  is a knight. Hence, she forms the judgement [S. K. is a knight]. Here the 
mistaken identification component is [S. K. = the (actual) author of IBM], where 
neither concept has been acquired by the subject through a perceptual 
encounter with either S. K. or the (actual) author of IBM. Here EM arises 
because of misidentification. Notice, however, that all these concepts can be 
considered as singular ones, provided that the definite descriptions be taken as 
rigid.
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3. Semantic Reference and Speaker’s Reference vs, Error Through 
Misidentification
The characterisation of EM proposed in the previous section should help us 
avoid the mistake of thinking of EM as equivalent to the split between speaker’s 
reference (SPR) and semantic reference (SR), which can arise only in cases of 
referential readings of singular sentences. If, by contrast, the two phenomena 
were one and the same, then we could easily explain the impossibility for all 
comprehending uses of T to be affected by EM. For that would be a 
straightforward consequence of the fact that if a speaker masters the use of T 
according to the token reflexive rule— any token of T refers to its producer—
then she cannot use T to refer to someone else. Hence, her use of T could 
never exhibit a split between SR and SPR and will always be lEM (similar 
considerations would apply to uses of the first person in thought).
However, in order to clarify the difference between the split SR/SPR and EM. 
let us dwell a little on the former. Consider the following case, in which such a 
split is generated in the use of the proper name, despite the fact that most 
cases by means of which the split between SR and SPR is presented contain 
definite descriptions.^^ A subject is at a conference sitting next to a friend of
2 1 .■^As we shall see in the next chapter, Christofidou 1995 maintains, on these 
grounds, that all uses of the first person are immune to error through misidentification.
T)f. Donnellan 1966, Kripke 1979. I actually think that the split between SR and 
SPR can be shown also in the case of complex demonstratives. Suppose I say That 
star is very bright’, pointing to a luminous point in the sky which is in fact Venus. My
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hers. The speakers are A and B, but the labels with their names have been 
swapped. So she says to her friend ‘A is wearing a nice jumper’, meaning the 
person who is behind the label with the name ‘A’ and her friend agrees with her. 
However, the subject is talking, and her friend understands the subject’s 
utterance as being about the person who is in fact called ‘B’. Thus, the subject’s 
utterance is true, in a sense, but only if we read it referentially, i.e. as about B, 
i.e. about the person who is given to the audience independently of the name by 
which she is called. For the name ‘A ’, which features in the sentence uttered by 
the subject, is just a means at the level of language to refer to the intended 
object, which, however, is demonstratively given at the level of thought.
Thus, the subject’s judgement is in fact correct, being a singular judgement 
about an object demonstratively given to her. By contrast, it is the sentence that 
she uses to express it which is not appropriate because it features in the 
subject’s position a name whose semantic reference is different from its 
speaker’s reference. So, cases of split between SR and SPR are those which, 
once analysed, present a dichotomy between the sentence and the judgement. 
In symbols:
judgement could be true, although Venus is a planet. I could actually manage to make 
my audience understand my sentence and make them agree with me. But obviously 
the semantic reference of ‘that star’ would be none at all, whereas the intended 
reference or its speaker’s reference would be Venus. Hence, it is just because ‘That 
star’ serves the only purpose of purporting reference to the intended object which is 
given independently of the expression I choose to use that I can menage to say
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Judgement; [That person is F] Sentence: ‘A is F’
Notice, however, that if the context did not provide the subject with a name for 
the object she has individuated, her judgement would be fine in this case too. 
since she would have just thought, of the object perceptually given to her, that it 
has the property F. In symbols:
[That person is F]
In other words, if we abstract from the means of expression which can be 
supplied by the context, and we express the judgement the subject is making, 
we would express it thus: ‘That person is F’, which, if false, could only be false 
because the property F does not apply to the person perceptually given to the 
subject. That is to say, in our example the subject would be entertaining a de re 
judgement about that particular x which is given to her and to which she could 
refer in thousands of different ways, and her judgement could be false iff the 
property F were not true of that object.
However, one could object that, really, it is not only the case that the subject 
just says that A is F . Rather, she also comes to think that the person 
perceptually given to her is A. According to this point of view, at the level of 
judgement, the situation can be represented as follows:
[That person is F] & [That person = A]
[A is F]
something true of Venus. Thus, my sentence has to be read referentially and not 
attributively.
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Hence, in this case there would be a mistaken identification component (and 
hence EM), which, in turn, would make it the case that the speaker's reference 
and the semantic reference of ‘A ’ be different.
Yet, no matter how complicated things can get in actual life, it has to be 
stressed that in basic cases of a split between SR and SPR, the subject intends 
to refer to the object perceptually given to her and her judgement is about that 
very object. By contrast, when EM arises, as we saw, the subject intends to 
refer to and is forming a judgement about (what she takes to be) the semantic 
referent of the singular term she may use to give expression to her 
judgement.^^
To see this more clearly, consider that in at least some cases of a split 
between SR and SPR, if the subject were told that the person in question is not 
A, she could substitute ‘A ’ which features in her sentence with a different means 
of expression obtained from the context, such as The person sitting behind the 
label A' or That person on the right of the person behind the label B', etc. But 
no such substitution could occur in the expression of the judgement [A is 
wearing a white shirt] which is affected by EM. This is so because the subject 
neither does nor wants to talk about the very person, whoever she is, who is 
perceptually given to her at the moment in which her judgement occurs, to 
which she could refer in thousands of different ways. On the contrary, the 
subject intends to talk about A whom she takes to be as the same person as the 
one perceptually given to her. In other words, contrary to most cases in which
^Although EM and the split between SR and SPR can be combined, we are 
considering simple cases in order to make clear the nature of different phenomena.
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there is a split between SR and SPR, the subject could not manage to express 
correctly her judgement by saying That person is F’, because she is not aiming 
at individuating that person but at recognising the person perceptually given to 
her as a particular person A she has already been acquainted with.
4. Conclusions
The considerations of the previous section should help us make a decision 
about the example we introduced in § 2 (e.g. someone sees a person at a 
conference and takes her to be NN) showing either that EM is possible when no 
recognition is taking place or that a split between semantic and speaker’s 
reference is possible, but then EM will not be occurring. In fact, it seems rather 
obvious that the ambiguity cannot be completely dispelled save by reference to 
the intentions of the speaker. If it is her intention primarily to talk about that very 
person perceptually given to her, then EM does not occur and we are just 
presented with a split between SR and SPR. By contrast, if the speaker wants 
to talk about NN, then, if the person presented to her is not NN, there is an error 
through misidentification, because the speaker would not substitute NN' with 
any other means of expression. Moreover, there would be an error through 
misidentification, although no recognition proper is taking place, because we 
have allowed for error through misidentification to occur also when the 
identification component is not itself the result of a recognition and involves 
singular concepts which have been acquired other than through a causal 
interaction with their referents. Hence, we see that referential intentions are
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relevant to the determination of the content of one’s judgement. However, once 
the content of one’s judgement has been fixed, then whether or not the latter is 
affected by EM is solely a function of the grounds on which the judgement is 
based, i.e. of whether it is based on a wrong identification component.
We can now summarise all the relevant possibilities and their components as 
follows:
Concept/Judgement Error
(Description)
Kind of Error 
(Name)
Individuation [That person/object]
The singular base 
concept is acquired 
through the perceptual 
demonstrative 
individuation of the 
particular.
No error is 
possible
Predication [That person/object is F] The object/person 
does not have the 
property F.
Mistake of 
predication
Identification-
based
judgement
[That person/object = A]
There is an 
identification concept 
[A], but this is not a 
concept acquired 
through acquaintance 
with its referent.
The base concept 
and the 
identification 
concept are not 
coinstantiated.
Both EM and a 
split between SR 
and SPR are 
possible, 
depending on the 
intentions of the 
speaker.
Recognition-
based
judgement
[That person/object = A]
The identification 
concept [A] is acquired 
through acquaintance 
with its referent.
The identification 
concept and the 
base concept are 
not coinstantiated.
Error Through 
Misidentification.
Let us now bring our considerations to bear on the case of the first person. As 
noted above, if EM were equated with the split between SR and SPR, then we 
could explain why lEM occurs, relative to T and other “automatic” indexicais
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such as ‘now’ and most uses of ‘here’.^ "^  For, if a subject masters the use of ‘I’, 
specified by the token-reflexive rule, then she cannot use it to name someone 
different from herself. In other words: it is the mark of the competent use of T 
that a speaker does not use it to refer to someone else. However, in such a 
case all comprehending uses of T would be lEM. So we would have lost the 
alleged genuine distinction between uses of T which are EM and those which 
are lEM. To state it clearly, if EM is equated with the possibility of a split 
between SR and SPR, and lEM with its impossibility, then, given the reflexivity 
of T, all (competent and sincere) uses of T would be lEM and, thus, we could 
not draw a genuine distinction between uses of T which are lEM and those 
which are not.
However, if we distinguish between EM and the split between SR and SPR in 
the way proposed, then we can see how it is possible for some l-judgements to 
be affected by EM. Consider the case in which I am seeing a reflection in a 
mirror and on the basis of it, I form the judgement [I am getting fat]. Luckily for 
me, the person reflected in a mirror is someone else. So there is a chance that 
my judgement be false: I have mistaken someone else for me. Since my 
judgement is not well grounded, it is possible that in fact I am not getting fat, but 
someone else is. In this case, although [I] refers to myself and there is no split 
between SR and SPR, the grounds on which my l-judgement is based involve a 
mistaken identification component. Consequently, the judgement is affected by 
EM.
24/Cf. Perry 1997 for a discussion of “automatic indexicais”. In particular. Perry 1997: 
595-598.
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We should describe this as a case in which there is the, individuation of a 
person x, whom I take to be myself, when in fact it is someone else. I am 
unaware of that and I think about myself, although I mistakenly think I am the 
same as the person who is perceptually given to me in the reflection. The case 
can be represented as follows:
[That person is F] & [That person = I]
[I am F]
Using our terminology, we can say that the base concept given through the 
individuation component is fine, the predication may be correct, but the 
identification component goes wrong, because the subject mistakenly takes the 
base concept [That person] and the identification concept [I] to be 
coinstantiated. However, both the use of T in the sentence which may give 
expression to the judgement and the use of [I] in the judgement would be 
correct: they do refer to the subject. Once more, it is important to note that this 
rules out the possibility of equating lEM with the impossibility of a split between 
SR and SPR. For in the example just taken into account, the latter split does not 
occur and yet EM arises. This concludes the discussion of EM in general and of 
EM relative to l-judgements; what we must still explain, however, is the 
possibility for l-judgements to be lEM.
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Chapter Two
Immunity to Error through Misidentification at the Origin of the 
Trilemma About the Self and the Forms of Its Solution
In the previous chapter we saw how it is possible for some first-person 
judgements to be affected by EM. However, we must still explain how it is 
possible, at least for some self-ascriptions, to be lEM. In this chapter we will 
consider one possible explanation, which, however, will expose us to a trilemma 
about the self. To anticipate a little: either we have an explanation of I EM of 
mental self-ascriptions, in which case we are committed to either Cartesianism 
or Idealism about the self; or else we maintain that the self is identical with a 
human being, to whom the first person refers, but we do not have an 
explanation of lEM of mental self-ascriptions. Finally, we will consider some 
general features common to most solutions to the trilemma and we will offer a 
taxonomy of them, which shall give us a scheme of how to proceed in the 
following.
1. The First Definition o f Immunity to Error Through Misidentification
Our problem is: how can it be that in the case of the first-person it seems 
impossible, at least in some cases, that there could be EM? In order to see why, 
let us consider what it would be for a singular judgement to be IBM in general. 
To such an end we must go back to the definition of EM.
A singular judgement of the form [a is F] is affected by EM, relative to the 
subject, iff the thinker has the singular concept [a] of an object a and 
applies [a] to the distinct object x, as a consequence of a misrecognition or 
a misidentification.^
lEM would thus be defined as follows:
!EMdfi A singular judgement of the form [a is F], formed on the basis of a 
recognition or an identification, is lEM, relative to the subject, iff it is not 
possible for the thinker to apply the particular singular concept [a] to any 
other object but the relevant object a.
The motivation behind this definition of I EM is twofold: on the one hand, it is 
prima facie plausible to hold that—as the label suggests— immunity to error
through misidentification can occur just in the case where there is an 
identification (or a recognition) which, however, cannot go wrong. On the other 
hand, singular judgements have often been considered to involve an 
identification or recognition of a particular. According to such a model, when
^All the specifications and constraints introduced in Ch. 1 still apply here.
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one makes a singular judgement one takes a particular to be an instance of a 
given singular concept [a]. Hence, if singular judgements involve either the 
identification or the recognition of a particular, then the possibility for the 
judgement to be lEM will naturally be understood as due to the fact that it is 
impossible for the subject to misrecognise the object which is given to her for 
recognition or identification.^
Given our terminology, we can read the above-mentioned definition of I EM as 
saying that lEM is guaranteed iff in the particular episode of recognition there is 
no possibility of wrongly taking the base concept and the identification concept 
to be coinstantiated. But when is it that we can guarantee that such a 
misapplication is impossible? It seems that, if recognition occurs at all, then lEM 
depends on the fact that the object individuated and which grounds our base 
concept cannot be mistaken for any other. Consequently, the nature of the 
object we are presented with and the conditions in which it is given to us must 
be such that no misrecognition or misidentification is possible.
Mie will criticise this model at length in the following chapters. As we will presently 
see, the Cartesian may hold that when one self-ascribes a mental property one is in 
fact presented with one’s self, i.e. the mental substance one is, which one identifies as 
oneself. In this case T would function in a way which is similar to (at least some) uses 
of proper names, where an object presented to the subject is identified as NN.
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2. lEM of l-Judgements and the Dilemma About the Self
As we saw in the previous chapter, according to Wittgenstein, there are some 
judgements that are lEM. Consider the recognition-based 1-judgement [I am F];
[That person is F] & [That person = I]
[I am F]
Given our definition of lEM, it will be lEM iff there is no possibility of applying 
the identification concept [I] to the wrong person.
Now, the problem seems to be this. If a judgement is lEM, given lEM^fi, this 
means that it is based on an infallible recognition of the object thought about. 
However, we are never infallible in recognising physical objects. That is to say 
it is always possible for us to take the wrong object to be an instance of a 
certain identification concept. Indeed, it would be wishful thinking to believe that 
even in the case of objects and people we are most fond of or have long been 
acquainted with, we could be infallible in recognising them. That is to say, it is 
always possible, given infelicitous conditions of either the environment, or the 
subject or both, that the latter goes astray in recognising a certain object or 
person. Hence, if lEM is understood along the lines of lEM^n, it must be the 
peculiar nature of the object thought about and the particularly advantageous 
conditions of our encounter with it that will guarantee that our judgement is lEM.
This position would square with Nozick’s methodological claim that only a 
particular account of the nature o f the object thought about could explain “why.
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when we reflexively self-refer, we know it is ourselves to which we refer"? We 
will not discuss Nozick’s proposal. However, it is relevant to our purposes 
because it is symptomatic of an explanatory strategy of the phenomenon of 
lEM, which, in our view, would lead quite naturally to the Cartesian and the 
Idealist positions about the self; namely the strategy according to which an 
account of I EM has to be looked for in a suitable account of the metaphysics of 
the self. In other words, if lEMdu holds, then lEM will be a phenomenon whose 
explanation is essentially metaphysical. Let us now see why assuming lEMdn 
would lead to either Cartesianism or Idealism about the self.
According to the Cartesian ontology, there are two sorts of substance 
physical and mental. In the case of the first person we are presented in thought 
with our self, i.e. the mental substance we are, and we cannot be presented 
with anything but our self. For we cannot be introspectively aware of someone 
else’s self. Moreover, the fact that the self is presented in introspection 
guarantees that we are infallible in recognising it, because, according to the 
Cartesian conception of the mind everything that happens in it is transparent to 
the subject. Consequently, the Cartesian seems to be prima facie able to
^Nozick 1981: 90. As a positive claim about the nature of such a self he proposes 
the following: “the I is delineated, is synthesised around ... [the] act of reflexive self- 
referring, An entity is synthesised around the reflective act and it is the Ï  of that act’ 
(Nozick 1981; 87). Hence, if the entity T refers to is synthesised around the very act of 
reflexively self-referring, then there is no possibility for one to misidentify the entity one 
is referring to by using that very token of T. I thank John Campbell for drawing my 
attention to Nozick.
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explain lEM of mental self-ascriptions, by making reference to the particular 
nature of the self and the peculiar conditions in which it is encountered.
By contrast, in the case of bodily self-ascriptions, a Cartesian will make sense 
of the possibility that they are liable to EM by saying that in those cases the 
subject will be misrecognising her body, i.e. the body to which her thinking self 
is connected and which is hers in virtue of being that body in which her thinking 
self is located, which can be cause of sensations, which is respondent to her 
will, etc. Using our terminology we can say that EM arises because of a 
perceptual encounter with a bodily entity which the subject wrongly takes to be 
an instance of the identification concept [my body].
However, there are, of course, huge problems with the Cartesian dualist 
metaphysics; how do the mental and the physical substance connect and 
interact? But, more importantly, what are the conditions of identity of the 
thinking self, so that it makes sense to say that in an episode of recognition, the 
subject is recognising that self as the same she encountered in another thought 
episode? Finally, the driving thought against Cartesianism about the self is that, 
in a given thought episode, the subject is not really presented with an object, i.e 
she does not experience a mental substance at all. This is indeed Hume’s point 
glossed by Lichtenberg by saying that from the Cogito, Descartes should have 
inferred that there is thinking, i.e. a conscious mental episode, but not that there 
is a substance which thinks. Hence, it is quite mysterious how the Cartesian 
could actually provide an explanation of I EM, given that, on closer reflection, her 
account of the nature of the self is deeply problematic.
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The reaction to the Cartesian metaphysics of the self and its explanation of 
I EM motivated Wittgenstein’s position in the Blue Book. For Wittgenstein 
endorsed Lichtenberg’s objection to such an extent that, in the passage from 
the Blue Book we quoted in the previous chapter, he concluded by saying that 
first-person mental self-ascriptions are not about a person at all. The thought is 
as follows; on the one hand, no physical object is such that it cannot be 
mistakenly recognised and, on the other hand, Cartesian substances are myths. 
Yet, some mental self-ascriptions are lEM and this is a fact in need of 
explanation. Hence, the proposal is to deny that there is a self given for 
recognition when mental self-ascriptions are made. Thus, if no object at all is 
given for recognition, in the circumstances envisaged, then the first-person 
judgement cannot be based on a misrecognition. Consequently, it will be lEM 
by default.
The case is different for bodily self-ascriptions. For the subject can be 
presented with a different body, form the corresponding base concept, and take 
this and the identification concept [my body] to be coinstantiated, thus leading to 
a judgement that is EM. A consequence of this view, therefore, is that T has a 
double meaning; when it is used as object, it is an expression that refers to this 
person] whereas, when it is used as subject, it is not. That is to say, not only 
does it fail to refer to this person, but it also fails to be a referring expression 
altogether. This, however, given Wittgenstein’s overall position about language, 
is not to say that the first person pronoun has no meaning, for it has got a use. 
but simply that it is not used to refer to anything.
52
However, Wittgenstein’s claims are problematic. In particular: how do we 
interpret first-person sentences containing a psychological predicate in the 
present tense, like ‘I am in pain’? If T is not referring to a person, then it is not a 
referring pronoun altogether. But this position has bad consequences. For one 
thing, from ‘I am in pain’ the existential generalisation ‘Someone is in pain’ 
would not follow. Moreover, it would be impossible to explain the truth-value link 
between ‘I am in pain’ and ‘AC is in pain’. For we could not say that one of 
these sentences is true (or false) iff the other sentence is true (or false) 
because they are about the same subject. For ‘I am in pain’ would not be a 
sentence about a subject at all. Moreover, shall we conclude that mental states 
have no owner? Would that be tantamount to saying that mental states are 
floating around, without a subject who owns them? These are questions that 
would require an exegesis of Wittgenstein’s views on the self, which falls 
beyond the scope of this work. However, it seems reasonable to hold that his 
views could, at least prima facie, be open to these quite problematic 
developments. Still, it is also important to note that Wittgenstein’s views in the 
Blue Book are mainly motivated by a reaction against the Cartesian 
metaphysics of the self.'^ If this is the case, then, whatever their developments 
might be, they would primarily be a symptom of the fact that the Cartesian 
metaphysics of the self is an attempt at solving theoretical problems, where the 
alleged solution, instead of solving them, creates new ones. Unfortunately, the 
Wittgensteinian response and its possible developments would not leave us in 
a better position.
*Cf. Bib, pp. 63, 69.
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Consequently, on the view that lEM of mental l-judgements should be 
explained by reference to the nature of the particular object we are presented 
with in an episode of recognition and by reference to the peculiar conditions in 
which the recognition occurs, we seem to reach a dilemma; either T refers to a 
Cartesian ego, or it does not refer at all. We will call these horns of the dilemma 
the Cartesian and the Idealist positions about the self. While the former label is 
clear enough, since it names the stereotype of the Cartesian position about the 
self, the latter label is slightly more mysterious. The reason why we are 
adopting it in the present context is that it conforms to Evans' terminology we 
will consider in the next chapters. Moreover, by using this label we will avoid the 
trouble of engaging in a close exegesis of Wittgenstein’s position. Be that as it 
may, by “Idealist position about the se lf we will understand the position 
according to which mental self-ascriptions are lEM because no self at all is 
given for recognition. Natural developments of this view include the no­
reference view about T and the no-subject view about mental self-ascriptions.
We can schematise the dilemma as follows:
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Self lEM of mental self­
ascriptions
Consequences
Cartesian Salient object: a 
thinking substance 
which is present to 
the subject for each 
act of thought.
Given the nature of 
the self and the 
conditions of our 
encounter with it, 
we cannot 
mistakenly 
recognise it.
The self is 
essentially a 
thinking substance. 
T, when used as 
subject, refers to it.
BAD
METAPHYSICS
Idealist No object Since there is 
nothing to 
recognise, our use 
of T as subject is 
lEM by default.
There is no self. 
T, when used as 
subject, is not a 
referring 
expression.
BAD SEMANTICS 
and possibly BAD 
METAPHYSICS as 
well.
3. I EM of I-Judgements and the Trilemma About the Self
What we have seen so far is that under a possible model of explanation of lEM 
of mental self-ascriptions, according to which it should be explained by 
reference to the particular nature of the object encountered and the conditions 
in which the encounter takes place, we are confronted with a dilemma. That 
this, as it stands, is a real dilemma, seems to be indisputable: it is hard to see 
why one would be willing to live with the consequences of either of its horns. 
However, one may think that after all the dilemma does not really hold, because 
it is possible to provide an explanation of I EM which is compatible with the fact 
that T refers to this person, i.e. a primitive entity with both physical and 
psychological properties, such as a human being.
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To anticipate a little, the answer to this claim is that if we share the Idealist 
and the Cartesian assumption that non-inferential mental self-ascriptions are 
lEM— where lEM is understood along lEM^n— then the appeal to the fact that
the self is embodied is not going to provide an explanation of lEM. Let us 
expound on this.
We have seen that in the case of the Cartesian position, the nature of the self, 
together with the conditions of the encounter with it, can offer a prima facie 
explanation of why psychological l-judgements are lEM (according to lEMdn). 
Similarly, according to the Idealist view, the absence of an object to recognise 
can explain why uses of T as subject are lEM (according to lEM^fi). The 
question is now this: can the fact that the subject is an embodied entity explain, 
as such, the fact that when she judges [I think], or [I am in pain], she cannot 
misrecognise herself and thus form an EM judgement?
in fact, if one holds on to IE Man the mere appeal to the fact that the subject is 
a person is a complete non-starter. For, although this view would be preferable 
both at the metaphysical level and at the semantic one, it would not rule out the 
possibility that, in making a recognition, the subject could take another person 
to be an instance of the first-person concept. In fact, the reverse is true, namely 
the appeal to the fact that the subject is person can perfectly well explain the 
possibility of misrecognising oneself and forming l-judgements that are affected 
by EM. As a matter of fact, the view according to which the self is a person 
would be compatible with the fact that all l-judgements based on recognition are 
open to error through misidentification. This would be so because it is always an 
open possibility to apply the first-person concept to the wrong person. Hence, a
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proponent of the view according to which the self is embodied, who also shares 
the assumption that mental self-ascriptions are based on a recognition or 
identification of oneself, should be prepared to endorse the consequence that 
mental self-ascriptions such as [I am in pain], or [I am thinking] be always liable 
to error through misidentification. But nobody would be prepared to say that this 
kind of mental self-ascription could be affected by error through 
misidentification. Hence, such a theorist, on the basis of the assumptions we 
have made so far, is in danger of denying that there is a genuine distinction 
between self-ascriptions which are EM and those which are I EM, because all 
self-ascriptions would turn out to be open to EM. But this, in turn, will contrast 
with the intuitive thought that at least some mental self-ascriptions are lEM. If, 
however, the supporter of the view that selves are persons tried to save the 
intuitive thought that at least some mental self-ascriptions are lEM, then it is 
obvious that—given the assumptions we have been making all along, i.e. that it
is the nature of the self and of the conditions of our encounter with it that are 
supposed to explain lEM of mental self-ascriptions, understood according to 
lEMdfi— she would not be able to explain how it is possible for at least non-
inferential mental self-ascriptions to be lEM. Indeed, the mere appeal to the fact 
that selves are embodied is of no help whatsoever.
So the dialectical situation seems to be this; the Idealist and the Cartesian 
seem, given certain assumptions, to be able, at least prima facie, to offer an 
explanation of the fact that mental self-ascriptions are lEM. By contrast, given 
those very assumptions, the supporter of the view that selves are persons does 
not seem to be in a position to explain it. So, for the latter to be able to solve the
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problem of lEM of mental self-ascriptions, she must offer an altogether different 
account of lEM.
At this stage it seems fair to say that we have a trilemma: either we opt for a 
prima facie explanation of I EM of mental self-ascriptions, but then we endorse 
either the Cartesian position about the self or the Idealist one, and we end up 
having either a bad metaphysics or a bad semantics; or else we opt for a sound 
metaphysics and a sound semantics, but we have no ready at hand explanation 
of I EM of mental self-ascriptions.
We can visualise the horns of our trilemma as follows:
Self I EM of mental self- 
ascriptions
Consequences
Cartesian Salient object: a 
thinking substance 
which is present to 
the subject for each 
act of thought.
Given the nature of 
the self and the 
conditions of our 
encounter with it, 
we cannot 
mistakenly 
recognise it.
The self is a 
thinking substance. 
T, when used as 
subject, refers to it.
BAD
METAPHYSICS
Idealist No object Since there is 
nothing to 
recognise, our use 
of T as subject 
cannot but be lEM.
There is no self. 
T, when used as 
subject, is not a 
referring 
expression.
BAD SEMANTICS 
and possibly BAD 
METAPHYSICS as 
well
Primitivist A person, i.e. a 
primitive entity with 
both physical and 
psychological 
properties, such as 
a human being.
?
Sound metaphysics 
and semantics, but:
NO EXPLANATION 
OF lEM OF 
MENTAL SELF­
ASCRIPTIONS
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4. Epistemological vs. Semantic Accounts o f JEM
All we have been saying so far presupposes that there is a genuine 
distinction—which is in need of explanation, of course— between uses of T 
which are EM and those which are lEM. But it can seem open to one to deny 
that there is any such distinction. In fact, as we anticipated in chapter 1 (§§ 3-4) 
one could say that all uses of T are, in some sense, lEM. That is to say, any 
use of the first-person either in speech or in thought is governed by the token 
reflexive rule (TRR) according to which any token of it refers to its producer. 
Hence, no matter how mistaken a subject is, she cannot be mistaken about the 
fact that in making a first-person judgement she is correctly identifying herself.
The thought seems to be this: in so far as, in the case of the first-person, 
reference to the right object is guaranteed by TRR, then there is no possibility 
of error through misidentification. In other words, if, per impossibile, error 
through misidentification could occur, then the subject would not refer to herself 
by using the first person but to the person who is actually responsible for it 
seeming to her that there is someone who is ^Fing. Since this cannot ever be 
the case, given that comprehending uses of T are governed by the token 
reflexive rule, then the possibility of EM is ruled out as well. Hence, all cases of 
alleged misidentification relative to the first-person are in fact cases of 
mispredication. This idea is clearly expressed by Andrea Christofidou, who 
writes:
Even if my memories and perceptions deceive me, and it is not I who 
climbed the steps of St. Paul’s but a friend, then I misidentify, not 
myself, but the person who climbed the steps; my use of T refers 
correctly to me, and refers to me directly and unmediatedly. In
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discovering that 1 did not after all climb the steps of St. Paul’s, then I 
should say ‘so ! did not climb them’, and then I should try to explain 
how I could have fallen into error. But the error has nothing to do with 
the self-reference of T. If there is a problem with propositions such as 
‘I climbed the steps of St. Paul’s', the mistake is in the predication 
component, not in the identification component. I have misascribed to 
myself a predicate, but the reference or identity of T is unshaken: T is 
immune to error through misidentification, whatever the predicate 
might be.
(...) [Djiscussions in this area have been vitiated by the failure to 
distinguish between two types of immunity: immunity to error through 
misidentification (which covers all uses of T whether these involve 
corporeal predicates, or mental predicates, or both) and what I call 
immunity to error through misascription (which covers only certain 
mental predicates).^
In short, according to this position, if EM occurs, this implies that no reference 
to the semantic referent is made. Since, however, in the case of the first-person. 
TRR makes it the case that all uses of the first-person refer to oneself, then this 
means that EM can never affect first-person judgements. Consequently, in the 
case of first-person judgements (a) lEM is always guaranteed, and (b) I EM is a 
consequence of the semantics of the first-person, i.e. lEM is a consequence of 
TRR.
However, this style of explanation amounts to conflating lEM with the 
impossibility of a split, in the case of competent uses of T, between semantic 
reference and speaker’s reference, which is indeed guaranteed by TRR. In 
other words, the latter impossibility, which we could also gloss, in positive 
terms, as the guarantee, in the case of the first-person, that not only does it
Christofidou 1995: 227, fn. 7.
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always refer, but it always refers to the right person, i.e. oneself, is indeed a 
consequence of the semantics of the first-person and, in particular, of the 
reflexivity of the first-person pronoun. But this, as we saw in chapter one, does 
not mean that in a particular case our first-person judgement cannot be 
prompted by a mistaken recognition and, hence, be affected by EM.®
Moreover, we have already seen in the previous chapter that it is a 
characteristic of a//judgements which are affected by EM that the singular term 
used to express them does not refer to the object perceptually given for 
recognition but to its semantic referent. Hence, reference to the semantic 
referent is always compatible with EM, no matter whether the judgement 
contains the first-person or any other singular concept. In fact, what goes 
wrong, both in the case of judgements containing the first-person and 
judgements containing other singular terms, when affected by EM, is not the 
fact that the subject refers, by using a certain expression, to something different 
from the semantic referent. Rather, when EM occurs, the speaker mistakenly 
takes the term in question (and its associated concept) to be instantiated by the 
object perceptually given to her, which, however, is not its semantic referent.
A similar mistake, with respect to lEM, can be found in Carol Rovane’s papers 
on the topic. She writes:
®Pryor seems to agree with our position. He writes; “[T]he claims “I am bleeding”, "I 
have a broken arm” and so on, will never suffer from badly aimed reference. My use of 
"I” in these claims will always refer to the person my basic attempt aimed to refer to. 
However, these claims are vulnerable to da re misidentification”. Pryor 1998: 301, fn. 
22.
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[When EM occurs] [w]e are inclined to say that I must have intended 
to refer to myself when I used the expression 'me' and that I thought 
that in referring to myself I was also referring to the person reflected 
in the mirror. Hence it is more natural to interpret my utterance as 
false of myself rather than true about the person reflected in the 
mirror. Nevertheless, the alternative interpretation might be warranted 
in certain circumstances, and, when it is, we have a use of the first 
person that incorporates error through misidentification (italics mine).
We must grant, then, that, although uses of ‘I’ can be subject to 
referential error through misidentification, it is extremely rare that they 
are. There is always the strongest presumption that a speaker 
intends to speak of herself in using T. With other referring terms, it 
seems, there is more scope for error through misidentification and, 
hence, more scope for supposing that a speaker intends to speak of 
something that is not the standard semantically determined referent 
of the term she uses.^
Here, again, the assumption is that if EM occurs, then no reference is made 
to the semantic referent of the singular term used to give expression to one’s 
judgement. Rather, reference would be made to the object presented to one. 
However, Rovane endorses a radical Fregean semantics. Hence, according to 
her, reference is always mediated by a set of beliefs about the referent. In the
^Rovane 1987; 153-154. Rovane firstly generates the following puzzle, i.e. how is it 
that although I may have false beliefs about me, I am still referring to myself by using T 
and not to the person who is at the origin of my beliefs? Moreover, when do my beliefs 
turn into beliefs about someone else? Then, in order to solve it, she goes on to suggest 
that this is so because we have mostly true beliefs about ourselves. By contrast, in the 
case of other objects or people we are more likely to have false beliefs about them, 
thereby failing to refer to them, despite our intentions. A similar problem is raised by 
O’Brien (1995: 240), in the course of the discussion of Evans, and traced back to 
discussions with John Campbell (p. 247, fn. 15).
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case of the first-person, she thinks that most of our beliefs about ourselves are 
true. Consequently, this guarantees that, by using T, we do refer to ourselves. 
Hence, this rules out the possibility of EM in most uses of the first-person. Here 
again, although lEM does not apply to all first-person judgements but only to 
some or most of them, it is, nevertheless, a consequence of the semantics of T. 
Namely, it is a consequence of the fact that the reference of T is fixed by a set 
of mostly true beliefs.
However, if we are right in claiming that all uses of T which are affected by 
EM refer to the subject, then this means that there is nothing special in the 
semantics of the first-person which is the key to a proper explanation of lEM of 
l-judgements. From this we can also conclude that a proper explanation of lEM 
of l-judgements will not advert to aspects of the semantics of, in our case, the 
first-person. Nor, for all we have been saying in this chapter so far, will it advert 
to the particular nature of the self and o f the conditions of our encounter with it. 
Rather, it will advert to the epistemological aspects of some first-person 
judgements. For, as we have begun to see in the previous chapter and will see 
further on, EM and I EM have to do with the kind of grounds on which our first- 
person judgements are based. Hence, our task is to vindicate the idea that a 
proper understanding of lEM can only be reached within the confines of an 
epistemological investigation. Let us now consider in more detail the various 
accounts that are revisionist of the original definition of lEM and how they 
combine with possible solutions to the trilemma.
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5. The Forms of the Solution to the Trilemma
The characterisations of EM and lEM offered in the last chapter and at the 
beginning of the present one allow us to make a taxonomy of the solutions 
which can be given to the problem of explaining lEM of some self-ascriptions. 
This, in turn, will be useful in order to give a taxonomy of the possible solutions 
to the trilemma.
Recall the definition of lEM we gave:
lEMdfi A singular judgement of the form [a is F], formed on the basis of a 
recognition or an identification, is I EM relative to the subject, iff it is not 
possible for the thinker to apply the particular singular concept [a] to any 
other object but the relevant object a.
In the following we will call a conservative solution to the problem of 
explaining I EM of some first-person judgements a solution that does not depart 
from this definition. As a consequence of holding this definition, conservative 
solutions are forced to appeal to the nature of the self and to the conditions of 
our encounter with it in order to explain lEM of mental self-ascriptions. As we 
have seen, the Cartesian and the Idealist solutions are conservative ones, but. 
unfortunately, they give rise to a dilemma. To repeat: we have at least a prima 
facie explanation of lEM of mental self-ascriptions, but we subscribe either to a 
Cartesian dualist metaphysics of the self or to the no-reference view about T 
and, possibly, to an equally embarrassing metaphysics of the self, i.e. the no­
subject view. Both horns, as we have seen, are problematic. By contrast, to 
insist that T does refer to a person (i.e. to a human being) is not by itself
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sufficient to explain lEM of non-inferential mental self-ascriptions, understood 
according to lEMcifi. Hence, the proposal that allows us to save both a sound 
metaphysics and a sound semantics, fails precisely to explain I EM, when it is 
defined as above. For this reason, at the end of the previous section, we 
concluded that, in fact, we are presented with a trilemma; if we hold lEM^n then 
we can explain lEM of mental self-ascriptions, but we give up the prospects of 
having either a sound metaphysics or a sound semantics. By contrast, if we 
hold that the self is identical with a human being and that T refers to it, we have 
a sound metaphysics and a sound semantics, but we do not have an 
explanation of lEM— understood according to I EM an— of some mental self­
ascriptions.
In order to make an explanation of I EM compatible with the fact that selves 
are persons and the fact that T refers to an embodied self, accounts of lEM that 
are revisionist of the original definition of lEM have been offered as well. In the 
following, we will call them "revisionist accounts" tout court. The main 
characteristic of these accounts consists in the fact that they offer a re-definition 
of lEM which is meant to show how it is possible for lEM to arise without giving 
rise to the trilemma.
Amongst revisionist accounts of lEM we can distinguish further between 
those which aim at offering a substantive response to the trilemma, and those 
which just offer a deflationist response to it. According to the former, it is not 
sufficient to show that a proper understanding of I EM is compatible with the fact 
that T is a referring expression and that it refers to an embodied entity. Rather, 
we should also conclude that the Cartesian and the Idealist cannot even get off
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the ground, as it were. This is so because— it is argued— in order to make use
of the first-person concept at all we must think of ourselves as embodied 
entities, contrary to both the Cartesian and the Idealist positions. This result, in 
turn, is taken to be a consequence of the fact that, according to the proponents 
of this view, in order to have the first-person concept at all, the subject must be 
at least dispositionally able to make bodily self-ascriptions which are lEM, 
where this is thought to be incompatible with the Cartesian and the Idealist 
positions (we will see why in discussing Evans).^ In short, according to 
substantive responses to the trilemma, we cannot be either Cartesian or 
Idealist, for these positions, once properly analysed, are conceptually 
incoherent or unintelligible from the stand-point of the supporter of the view that 
selves are embodied.^
By contrast, according to deflationist responses to the trilemma, given that the 
redefinition of I EM offers a way of explaining why some mental self-ascriptions 
are lEM, and extends the class of lEM judgements to some bodily self­
ascriptions and to certain uses of demonstrative expressions, it undercuts the 
specific motivation behind the trilemma. That is to say, since lEM becomes 
compatible with reference to material objects, like in the case of some 
demonstrative judgements, and with self-ascriptions of bodily properties, the 
alleged explanation of lEM of some mental self-ascriptions can no longer be 
considered a motivation for either the view that T does not refer or it refers to a
Cf. Evans 1982. But see also McDowell 1997. 
Vor a discussion, cf. section II.
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Cartesian egoJ° However, deflationist responses to tfie trilemma do not take 
issue with whether the Cartesian and the Idealist uses of the first-person 
concept are intelligible or coherent. Rather, they maintain the following position: 
lEM of mental self-ascriptions is not enough motivation for either the Cartesian 
or the Idealist conception of the self, since lEM is no less compatible with the 
latter positions than it is with the position according to which the self is 
embodied. Hence, if there is a real issue about the nature of the self and the 
semantics of T, it cannot be motivated by considerations concerning lEM, at 
least not lEM alone. Rather, the Cartesian and the idealist positions, if 
motivated at all, must be motivated by different sorts of considerations, which 
have to be further investigated. In short, according to deflationist responses to 
the trilemma, we need not be either Cartesian or Idealist. For we can explain 
lEM and hold that the self is identical with a human being. In fact, the 
deflationist and the substantive accounts can be combined. For instance, 
according to Evans, the deflationist account is the first step towards the 
substantive solution to the trilemma. However, they need not be so combined 
and, in fact, most of the time, they are not.^  ^ Let us now introduce these 
positions in more detail.
‘^Yhis seems to be Shoemaker’s, Wright’s, Pryor’s and Peacocke’s position. For a 
discussion, of. section III.
’’^ Consider for instance Peacocke 1999, Wright 1998, Shoemaker 1994a. For a 
discussion, cf. section III.
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5.1 Revisionist Accounts o f lEM and Deflationist and Substantive Responses to
the Trilemma^^
Three moves are common to deflationist and substantive responses to the 
trilemma despite their differences: first, a redefinition of I EM, secondly, the 
denial that lEM of self-ascriptions depends on their subject-matter and, finally, 
the observation that certain uses of demonstratives are also I EM. We will start 
by taking up this latter point.
Noticing that certain uses of demonstratives are lEM is meant to show that 
lEM has nothing to do with the referential role of the singular term featuring in 
the sentence used to express the judgement. Hence, this point is often made 
against the Idealist position, whose possible development consists in the no­
reference view about T. For— it is argued—although some uses of 
demonstrative expressions are lEM, nobody would deny that they do refer. 
Let us consider some of the examples used to make the point that certain uses 
of demonstratives are lEM. Consider, for instance, the case in which the subject 
sees a rug in front of her and judges [That rug is a Persian Nain], or she sees 
something approaching very fast and judges [That thing is approaching very
terminological remark on the use of ‘response’ which is made throughout this 
work. None of the authors we will consider in this work directly addresses the trilemma, 
for the obvious reason that it is our own claim that there is such a trilemma. However, 
from what they say we have tried to formulate various possible responses to it.
^^ Cf. Shoemaker 1994a, Wright 1998, Pryor 1998, Peacocke 1999, discussed in 
section III.
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fast]. In both cases we have a perceptual-demonstrative judgement where a 
property is attributed to an instance of an observational concept such as [That 
thing] or [That rug]. There being a genuine perceptual-demonstrative judgement 
at all guarantees that the demonstrative concepts used to make it have a 
referential function. Moreover, since the judgement does not involve as part of 
the grounds on which it is based any belief in an identification component of the 
form [That F = the such-and-such], then “there is no room for error resulting 
from the falsity of such a b e l i e f . I n  other words, these perceptual 
demonstrative-judgements contain only an individuation component. That is to 
say, they only involve the exercise of a single, demonstrative concept, on the 
basis of a perceptual discrimination of a particular. Hence, they fall underneath 
the threshold o f the distinction between EM/IEMdn', for, if there is no 
identification component, given that no recognition is going on at all, then, a 
fortiori, there is no possibility of making a mistake of identification either. Hence, 
if error arises, it can only affect the predication component.
However, those who aim at offering a conservative account of lEM would 
think that this is a conflation, because if the conditions for the possibility of 
misidentification are not met, because no identification is going on at all, then 
there is no legitimate sense in which we could speak of immunity to error 
through misidentification either. After all— the thought would be— to notice that 
sounds are colourless, thus guaranteeing that they cannot be of two different
are assuming that perception is veridical and, hence, that [That thing] and 
[That rug] refer.
^^Peacocke 1999: 287.
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colours all over at the same time, would not help in explaining why a surface, 
which is necessarily coloured, cannot be of two different colours all over at the 
same time. Similarly, to notice that demonstratives can be used in such a way 
that the question of their being affected by EM does not even arise, because 
there is no identification component, cannot be used to explain why certain uses 
of T, which, at least prima facie, involve an identification component, are lEM.
By contrast, those who aim at offering a revisionist account of lEM argue that 
to notice that certain uses of demonstratives are lEM is important and indeed 
crucial to an understanding of lEM in general. For it helps to bring out the fact 
that any judgement is lEM Just in case it falls underneath the threshold of the 
distinction EM/IEM^n. That is to say, any judgement that is I EM is such not 
because an infallible recognition or identification is taking place, but because no 
recognition or identification is taking place at all. Consequently, the judgement 
would not involve as part of the grounds on which it is based any belief in an 
Identification component. This would suggest a revision of the first definition of 
lEM along the following lines;
IEMdf2 A singular judgement of the form [a is F] is lEM relative to the 
subject, iff it is not formed on the basis of a recognition or identification of 
the object thought about and, consequently, iff it does not involve an 
identification component.
®^Not all parties engaged in this debate give an explicit definition of IBM along these 
lines (Of. Wright 1998), but most do (Of. Evans 1982, Peacocke 1999).
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An argument in favour of such a definition of lEM is the following one: if any 
judgement about a particular involves recognition (or identification) and 
recognition (or identification), in turn, involves fallibility, then all judgements can 
be affected by EM. Hence, there would be no lEM judgement, contrary to our 
initial intuitions. By contrast, if we wish to save our initial intuition that at least 
some l-judgements are lEM, then, by holding lEMdn, lEM would only be 
guaranteed by maintaining contentious metaphysical views. Hence, in order to 
avoid endorsing bad metaphysical views, while preserving our initial intuition 
that there are lEM uses of the first person, IEMdf2 ought to be preferred over 
lEMdn.
At this stage we need not choose between the two accounts of lEM we have 
introduced in this chapter.^^ What we should point out, however, is that it is not 
enough to give a correct definition of lEM in order to solve our trilemma. Rather 
what is more important, and indeed, more difficult, is to provide arguments in 
favour o f such a definition and explain how some first-person judgements can 
comply with it.
Another point which is usually made by appealing to the fact that 
demonstratives can also be used to express judgements which are lEM is that 
in these cases not only is reference made, but it is made to spatio-temporal 
objects. Hence, I EM of some self-ascriptions is compatible with the fact that T 
not only refers, but it refers to an embodied entity.
will come back to this issue in Ch. 8, where we will also revise this preliminary 
revisionist definition of lEM and will offer further arguments in its favour.
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While deflationists can be content with this result, because they just aim to 
show that I EM is compatible with the position according to which T refers to a 
person, substantive theorists want to show that some self-ascriptions of bodily 
properties are also lEM. Once this point is coupled with the thought that lEM 
bodily self-ascriptions must be at least dispositionally in place for one to have 
the first-person concept at all, then the substantive position can be fully fleshed 
out. For these two claims together imply that subjects must think of themselves 
as embodied in order to have the first-person concept. Consequently, the 
Cartesian and the Idealist by departing from such an use of the first-person are 
maintaining only prima facie intelligible positions about the self. But, in fact, they 
are surreptitiously altering the concept of the first-person, to such an extent that 
their views become unintelligible from our stand point.
Thus, in order to show that our first-person concept is of embodied entities, 
the second argument common to most deflationist and substantive accounts is 
introduced. This amounts to the denial of the domain-specificity of self­
ascriptions that are lEM. That is to say, contrary to what we saw in the previous 
chapter, it is denied that all and only mental self-ascriptions are I EM. The denial 
consists of two steps: first, it is commonly noticed that there are some mental 
self-ascriptions which are based on inference involving an identification 
component and which are, therefore, subject to EM. Secondly, it is shown that 
also some bodily self-ascriptions are IEMdf2 - In particular self-ascriptions of 
bodily properties based on proprioceptive information and on perceptual 
information derived from the environment are taken to be lEM t^s- We will 
consider these arguments in detail in section II.
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still, any response to the trilemma cannot hope to be fully effective unless it 
engages in a positive explanation of why non-inferential mental self-ascriptions 
are IEMdf2. That is to say, in order to provide a fully-fledged way out of the 
trilemma, not only must substantive and deflationist accounts endorse a 
definition of lEM which is revisionist of lEMdn, but they must also explain why 
some mental self-ascriptions (as well as some bodily ones) can comply with it. 
To my knowledge, however, an exhaustive account of why some mental self­
ascriptions are lEM^^, within the framework of either a deflationist solution to the 
trilemma or of a substantive response to it has not yet been given. We can 
represent the situation as follows:
Revisionist Accounts 
lEMdfz
Deflationist Responses
1. Some demonstrative 
judgements are I EM
2. Some bodily self-ascriptions 
are lEM
3. Some mental self­
ascriptions are I EM
4. lEM is compatible with the 
fact that the self is embodied 
and with the fact that T refers 
to such an entity
5. We no longer need to be 
either Cartesian or Idealist 
in order to explain lEM
Substantive Responses
1. Some demonstrative 
judgements are lEM
2. Some bodily and some 
mental self-ascriptions are 
lEM
3. The disposition to make 
bodily self-ascriptions which 
are lEM is necessary in order 
to have the first-person 
concept
4. Our first-person concept is 
incompatible with the 
conception of the self 
endorsed either by the 
Cartesian or the Idealist
5. We can no longer be 
either Cartesian or Idealist
Both Deflationist and Substantive Responses must 
explain why some mental self-ascriptions are IEMdf2
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So, in the following we will analyse Evans’ substantive response to the 
trilemma. Then we will move on to various deflationist solutions. Finally, we will 
provide both a sound revisionist definition of lEM and an explanation of why 
non-inferential mental self-ascriptions can comply with it.
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SECTION II
A REVISIONIST ACCOUNT OF IMMUNITY TO ERROR 
THROUGH MISIDENTIFICATION AND A SUBSTANTIVE 
RESPONSE TO THE TRILEMMA: EVANS
Summary
In this section we consider the most thorough substantive response to the 
fr/Vemma which has been given so far in the literature, namely Evans’. Such a 
response is presented in the context of a theory of singular thoughts (i.e. 
perceptual demonstrative thoughts, here-thoughts and 1-thoughts). According 
to such a theory there are some kinds of thought which are not reducible to 
descriptive thoughts and which are Russellian, i.e. object-dependent. That is 
to say, these thoughts would not exist if the objects they are about did not. In 
order to present and evaluate Evans’ response to the trilemma the exposition 
must proceed with some care, however.
To such an end, in Ch. 3
• we present some fundamental tenets of Evans' theoretical framework 
(§ 1), namely
• Russell’s Principle (RP) (§ 1.1) and
• the Generality Constraint (GC) (§ 1.2);
• we discuss demonstrative identification (§ 2) ;
• paying particular attention to the role information-links play within it (§2.1)
• and showing how such links are the route to the claim that perceptual 
demonstrative thoughts are Russellian (§ 2.2);
• we then turn to Evans’ account of EM and to his revisionist account of I EM 
(§ 3). According to Evans, lEM is a consequence of the fact that the judgement 
is identification-free. In turn, this is a consequence of the fact that lEM 
judgements are solely based on a way of gaining information directly from 
objects such as perceiving them. We propose some corrections to Evans' 
account, in particular we argue that an account of lEM should be, in the first 
place, an account of lEM judgements, rather than an account of lEM 
knowledge.
In Ch. 4 and 5 we turn to Evans’ account of l-thoughts.
In Ch. 4
• we connect Evans’ treatment of l-thoughts with his treatment of perceptual 
demonstrative ones (§ 1);
• we introduce further characteristics of l-thoughts by considering Evans’ 
sources, namely, Frege (§ 2) and
• Perry (§ 3);
• we present another main tenet of Evans’ account, namely the Objectivity 
Requirement (OR) (§ 5). According to such a tenet, for the first-person concept 
to be adequate it must be a concept of a creature who thinks of herself as 
embodied, as located in space, and as on a par with all other objects which 
are thought of as existing independently of being perceived.
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In Ch. 5
• we turn to Evans’ defence of the claim that our first person concept meets 
OR, and to his attack against the Cartesian and the Idealist. To such an end,
• we present and defend Evans’ claim that also bodily self-ascriptions are 
lEM when based on appropriate grounds (§ 1). Once this result is considered 
within Evans’ theoretical framework, according to which in order for a subject 
to have the first person concept she must have discriminative knowledge of 
herself, it shows that the subject, by having discriminative knowledge of 
herself as embodied and located in space, has a concept of herself as an 
embodied self. We discuss:
• bodily self-ascriptions based on somatic proprioception (§ 1.1) and
• physical self-ascriptions based on outer perception of one’s environment 
(§ 1.2). In both cases we argue that Evans’ arguments for saying that the 
relevant self-ascriptions are lEM, because the nature of the information is 
such that they cannot be rationally based, at least de facto, on inferences 
involving identification components, are conclusive;
• we consider Evans’ attack to the assumption which seems to be 
presupposed by the Cartesian and the Idealist conceptions of the self that all 
mental self-ascriptions are lEM (§ 2). We agree with him that only non- 
inferential mental self-ascriptions are I EM. But we argue that he has not 
provided us with an explanation of why introspection-based mental self­
ascriptions are logically lEM, i.e. they are such that they could never involve.
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as part of the subject’s rational grounds for them, a belief in an identification 
component;
• we then turn to a different pattern of argument used by Evans. This is 
meant to show that the ability to self-ascribe mental properties presupposes 
the ability to think of oneself as a human being. This pattern of argument 
makes use of GC. In (§ 3) we show how this kind of argument can work in the 
case of self-ascriptions of beliefs and
• in (§ 4) we show how this pattern of argument can work in the case of self­
ascriptions of inner and outer perceptions. But, we argue that Evans 
argument is not enough to show that all cases of mental self-ascriptions are 
based on awareness of oneself as an embodied entity;
• in § 5 we summarise our conclusions.
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Chapter Three
Evans: Perceptual Demonstrative Thoughts and the Revisionist 
Account of lEM
in this chapter we are going to present Evans’ theory of perceptual 
demonstrative thoughts and his account of immunity to error through 
misidentification. In fact, the chapter will be quite expository. This is for four 
reasons: first, in order to understand Evans’ conception of EM/I EM we need 
some background about his overall approach to singular thoughts. This was first 
approached and brought out with vigour in his treatment of perceptual 
demonstrative thoughts. Secondly, a presentation of Evans’ views on what he 
calls “demonstrative identification” will allow us to understand better the 
phenomenon which, in previous chapters, we have called “demonstrative- 
individuation”. For we will understand better the conditions under which we can 
say that a subject has demonstratively individuated (or identified, in Evans’ 
terminology) a particular perceptually given to her.^ Thirdly, this will allow us to
We hope that our terminology is clearer than Evans’. For instance, as we will see, 
he defines immunity to error through misidentification in terms of identiflcation-freedom. 
But this does not mean that there is no demonstrative identification of a particular in 
Evans’ original sense of identification. On the contrary, it is a consequence of what 
Evans calls the demonstrative identification of a particular that the corresponding
see more clearly why, according to Evans, some uses of demonstratives are 
lEM. Fourthly, Evans' discussion of l-thoughts and of their being lEM is closely 
connected to his discussion of perceptual demonstrative thoughts (and here- 
thoughts as well). Consequently, an understanding of Evans' claims with regard 
to the first person will certainly benefit from an introductory discussion of his 
approach to perceptual demonstrative thoughts.
In fact, it should be kept in mind that Evans' theory of singular thoughts 
comes in a package. He was interested in giving an account of the conditions of 
the possibility of singular thoughts: perceptual demonstrative thoughts, here- 
thoughts and l-thoughts. According to him, despite some differences, which we 
will see in the following, all these forms of thought are essentially Russellian, 
which is object-dependent. Moreover, they are inter-related, since, according to 
Evans, what enables a subject to have perceptual demonstrative thoughts is the 
capacity to locate the objects of thought in egocentric space, i.e. the space 
which has its origin in a system of axes originating from the subject. This is 
possible only because of the subject’s capacity to have here-thoughts. Since, 
however, here-thoughts are thoughts about positions in egocentric space, they 
can be entertained only by a subject who has a conception of her position with 
respect to other objects and has a conception of herself as occupying a region
judgement will be identification-free. As will become clear, “identification-freedom” 
means absence of an identification component, in our sense (of. Ch. 1). Using our 
terminology, however, things are clearer. ‘'Identification-freedom’' is just what Evans 
means (but see in the following for a precise characterisation) and it is a consequence 
of the demonstrative individuation of a particular.
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of space within which she can act. Thus, here-thoughts are dependent on I- 
thoughts. Notice, however, that Evans never tried to reduce any one of these 
forms of thought to any of the other ones. Rather, he just pointed out that they 
are inter-connected.
Hence, the structure of the chapter will be as follows; we will introduce some 
basic elements of Evans' theory of singular thoughts. Afterwards, we will turn to 
his account of perceptual demonstrative thoughts, paying particular attention to 
the role of informational-links. Finally, we will present and discuss Evans’ 
account of immunity to error through misidentification in connection with 
perceptual demonstrative thoughts and we will propose some corrections to it 
which will be relevant in the following chapters, both for assessing Evans' own 
solution to the trilemma and for reaching a good understanding of immunity to 
error through misidentification.
1. Russell's Principle and The Generality Constraint
According to Evans, singular terms can be referring devices only if the 
appropriate kinds of thought are in place. In Evans' terminology the thoughts 
that allow one to make reference to an object constitute one’s Idea of the 
object.^ Moreover, for an Idea of an object to be adequate, not only must it be
^An Idea of an object is different from a Fregean sense in that it does not exist 
objectively, i.e. “independently of anyone’s grasp of it’’. However, two people, by 
exercising two numerically distinct Ideas of an object, "may thereby ‘grasp’ the same 
Fregean sense. What this means is that they may think of the object in the same way.
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based on a perceptual link with the object, but it must also give the subject 
discriminative knowledge of the object it is about and meet a constraint of 
generality so that it can enter into indefinitely many thoughts about that object. 
The former constraint constitutes Evans' interpretation of Russell’s Principle, 
whereas the latter constraint is a consequence of his adherence to the 
Generality Constraint. We will consider them in turn.
1.1 Russell’s Principle
Evans borrowed Russell’s Principle (RP hereafter) from Russell and he phrased 
it as follows:
RP: a subject cannot make a judgement about something unless he 
knows which object his judgement is about.^
This principle has not always had good press, particularly because of the 
difficulty of determining what the “knowing which” requirement would amount to. 
In fact, it was a consequence of Russell’s own interpretation of it that only 
sense-data could be known in the way specified by this principle. We shall not 
engage in a discussion of the interpretations of RP."  ^However, it states a sound 
general condition upon thought about objects. For if a subject did not have any 
knowledge whatsoever of the object her thought is allegedly about, then it would
(And the way of thinking would be available even if no one ever thought of the object in 
that way.)”. (Evans 1982: 104, fn. 24).
^Evans 1982: 89. Cf. also Russell 1912: 58.
Vor a discussion, see Evans 1982, McDowell 1990, Millikan 1993, Sacchi 1999.
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become altogether dubious that she could really think about it. Obviously, then, 
the problem, in order to make RP a viable principle, is to determine what sort of 
knowledge must be involved in each kind of thought about objects, or 
particulars, we may have. Hence, different forms of knowledge must be at work 
when we think about perceptually given objects, bearers of proper names we 
are not acquainted with, abstract objects, ourselves, places and times. In other 
words, RP is a principle which governs all our thoughts about objects. The 
substantive explanatory task, then, is to specify what it amounts to for each 
specific kind of singular thought we want to characterise.
Evans argued, on the one hand, that if, in the case of perceptual 
demonstrative thought, we understand “knowing which” as implying descriptive 
information about an object perceptually given to one, then a subject may have 
a perceptual demonstrative thought about an object in a very limited number of 
cases. By contrast, if we understand “knowing which” as involving no restriction 
whatsoever, then, by the very fact that one is causally interacting with the 
object, one would be credited with a thought about that object perceptually 
given to one. In order to make RP a “substantial principle”, in the case of 
perceptual demonstrative thought, Evans proposes to read “knowing which” as 
meaning that one must have “discriminating knowledge”. That is to say, “The 
subject must have a capacity to distinguish the object of his judgement from all 
other things”.^  We will come back to this in § 2.
"Evans 1982:89.
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1.2 The Generality Constraint
Let us now turn to the Generality Constraint. Evans’ version of it is indeed a 
developed version of Strawson’s suggestion that, in order to block solipsism, we 
should realise that a subject can be granted with an understanding of the 
mental predicate used for a mental self-ascription just in case she is also able to 
apply that predicate to other subjects.® Obviously, it is not our concern to 
determine whether Strawson’s move against solipsism was successful. 
However, the gist of it is that we should see our mastery of a certain predicate F
as the result of the ability to ascribe it to any subject a, 6, c..., n of which the
predicate may be significantly, “though not necessarily truly, affirmed”.^ Evans’ 
insight consists in generalising this principle and in bringing it to bear at the 
level of thought. Here is his formulation of it:
GO; If a subject can be credited with the thought that a is F, then he 
must have the conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that 
a is G, for every property of being G of which he has a conception.®
As a consequence, we should realise, according to Evans, that:
the thought that a is F [lies] at the intersection of two series of
thoughts; the thoughts that a is F, that a is G, that a is H, ..., on the
one hand, and the thoughts that a is F, that b is F, that c is F, ..., on 
the other (...).®
®Cf. Strawson 1959: 99. 
hbid.
®Evans 1982: 104.
®Evans 1982: 209. Cf. Evans 1982: 104, fn. 21.
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The main motivation behind GC is that of resisting the conception of thoughts 
as isolated occurrences in the subject’s head, seeing them, instead, as possible 
only on the basis of various abilities, which can be exercised independently of 
one another on different occasions. It should also be stressed that, according to 
Evans, GC does not merely consist in a play of substitutions of subjects and 
predicates. Rather, it also consists in the ability to embed a thought within more 
complex structures. In fact, subjects should be able to reflect on their previous 
thoughts and recall them, thus using the past mode of thought. Similarly, they 
should be able to make them objects of suppositions about the future. Finally, 
they should also be able to embed them within various propositional attitudes 
and use them in prudential and moral reasoning.^®
It is important to stress that GC should be subject to certain limitations. For, 
as Strawson noticed, in order to be credited with the mastery of a given 
predicate, one must be able to attribute it to any subject of which that predicate 
could be significantly, though not necessarily truly, predicated. Similarly, in the 
case of GC, we should impose the constraint that the various properties which a 
subject must be able to ascribe to an object, in order to be credited with a 
thought about that object, should be relevant properties, i.e. those which can be 
significantly attributed to the object in question. However, once we impose this 
constraint, GC seems quite plausible.
Hence, we see that according to Evans, one's Idea of an object is adequate, if 
we have discriminative knowledge of the object and can exploit such knowledge 
in indefinitely many thoughts about that object. Let us now turn to Evans' way of
10,'Cf. Evans 1982; 105, fn. 27.
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giving substance to the idea that in order to think of an object we must have 
discriminative knowledge of it, by considering his discussion of demonstrative 
identification.
2. Demonstrative Identification
Having presented Evans’ reading of RP and GC we are now in a position to 
appreciate better his account of demonstrative identification (or individuation, in 
our terminology), which is fundamental to an understanding of Evans’ 
conception of lEM. It has to be stressed that Evans was interested in specifying 
the conditions in which a subject can be credited with a perceptual 
demonstrative thought about an object, i.e. with a thought about an object which 
“crucially depends upon the subject’s currently perceiving that object”. F i r s t ,  
we will dwell on his account of perception and the role it plays in grounding the 
relevant demonstrative judgements. Secondly, we will consider Evans’ claim 
that perceptual demonstrative judgements are Russellian, i.e. object-dependent.
2.1 Towards A Clarification Of Our Concept o f Perception: The Role Of 
Information-Links
Evans endorsed an account of the content of perception in terms of non- 
conceptual content. According to such a view, by being causally linked to an
87
object, subjects thereby acquire non-conceptual information about it. That is to 
say, they enjoy a mental state that has representational content, i.e. it 
represents the world as being thus-and-so, and has correctness conditions, i.e. 
it can be either veridical or non-veridical. However, this mental state does not 
depend, for its very existence, on the subjects’ possession of the concepts 
relevant to its canonical specification.^^ Such non-conceptual information, in 
turn, is available at a personal level and can be relevant to action, thinking and 
reason-giving procedures.^® What, however, has still to be clarified is the
'^Evans 1982; 72.
^^his is not the place to engage in a discussion of non-conceptual content. For an 
elaboration, of. Peacocke 1992. For the opposite view, according to which experiences 
can have representational content just in case the subject has the conceptual 
resources relevant to its (canonical) specification, of. McDowell 1994. For a 
liberalisation of non-conceptual content to experiences of subjects who do not have 
any conceptual resources, cf. Bermudez 1994.
®^l am representing Evans as having a straightforward conception of non-conceptual 
content. However, his pioneering remarks in this area are less sharp than I have 
represented them as being. Since it is not my main task to offer an exegesis of Evans, I 
am running the risk of over-reading his remarks. Yet, 1 do not think I am doing great 
violence to what he actually says. For what he says in Ch. 5 of The Varieties of 
Reference is that through our sensory system (but not only that) we receive information 
of objects. Hence, we get into a position in which we have a mental state with a certain 
representational content, which, in turn, is specifiable by means of an open sentence. 
Consequently, such a content would not have correctness conditions (of. fn. 10, p. 
125). However, Evans also claims the opposite, i.e. that the content can have 
correctness conditions (of. pp. 226-227). Moreover, it is uncertain whether it constitutes
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precise role of the information-link in the process of acquiring knowledge about 
the object which can eventually issue in demonstrative thoughts about it.
According to Evans, the mere information-link with an object is not enough to 
give us discriminative knowledge of that object. For, according to Evans, we 
must also be able to locate the object. Fiowever, in certain cases the ability to 
locate the object can consist in the practical ability to locate it relative to oneself 
and other objects by exploiting the spatial information afforded by perception. 
This, in turn, may suggest the idea that the information-link between the subject 
and the object is not only necessary but also sufficient in order for one to have a 
demonstrative Idea of an object. We shall presently see that this is not the case. 
Yet, let us clarify what has been said so far by means of the following example;
the content of a conscious experience either, although it can have some causal role in 
the determination of action (of. p. 156, sq. For an opposite claim, cf. pp. 226-227). 
However, at least when these mental states are possessed by creatures endowed with 
some conceptual powers, then they become part of their conscious experience and can 
enter their acting, thinking and reasoning (cf. ibid.). Be that as it may, it is important to 
note that the conceptual powers which are needed in order for conscious experiences 
to have a certain representational content are not the ones which would be used in a 
canonical specification of that very content (cf. p. 159). Finally, it seems that concepts 
are brought to bear on the content of experiences through judgement (in fact, 
judgements are “reliably caused” by these mental states, cf. p. 227). Hence, it seems 
that Evans’ position and Peacocke’s (cf. Peacocke 1992) are quite similar. For, 
although it is disputable whether both of them ascribe non-conceptual representational 
content only to experiences of creatures who have some conceptual powers, they both
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a subject is perceiving a glass in front of her. According to Evans, in this case 
the spatial information afforded by visual perception is enough (to first 
approximation)^'^ to enable the subject actually to locate the object in egocentric 
space, i.e. in the portion of space which has its origin in a system of axes 
originating from the subject. Hence, perception affords us discriminative 
knowledge of the object in question, which can issue in a demonstrative 
thought, such as [This glass is empty].
Moreover, according to Evans, in such a case, perceptual information is 
unmediatedly relevant to the determination of the truth value of a sentence 
containing a demonstrative expression, i.e. if one gets to know anything on that 
basis, then one does not know it through inference involving an identification 
component. That is to say, by being perceptually aware of an object 
(supposing the conditions of perception are favourable and the perceptual 
system of the subject is working reliably), the subject is immediately in a 
position to determine whether the object has a certain perceivable property. 
Thus, an information-link is a necessary condition for perceptual demonstrative
hold that the concepts which are needed to specify that content are not the ones which 
would figure in a canonical specification of the content of the experience.
^Vrovided that the subject has an adequate conception of space. Cf. below.
^^Evans 1982: 146: “[A] subject who has a demonstrative Idea of an object has an 
unmediated disposition to treat information from that object as germane to the truth and 
falsity of thoughts involving that Idea. (When I say that his disposition is unmediated, I 
mean that it is not the product of any more general disposition to treat as germane to 
the truth and falsity of those thoughts information received from an object satisfying 
some condition, together with a recognition that the object satisfies that condition)”.
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identification. The further question is whether it is also a sufficient condition for 
it. That is to say, we have to ask whether the mere causal interaction with the 
object is enough to enable the subject to have an adequate Idea of the object.
Unsurprisingly, given Evans' adherence to RP and GC, the information-link is 
not sufficient for having an adequate Idea of the object, i.e. knowing which 
object one’s thought is about and being able to use such knowledge in 
indefinitely many thoughts about that object. In fact, according to Evans, there 
are two possibilities: either the information-link enables one to have knowledge 
of the spatio-temporal location of the object, or one knows what it would be for a 
judgement of the form [This = ôt] to be true. That is to say, either the
information-link suffices for enabling the subject to locate the object or it does 
not. If it does not, however, one can still form an adequate Idea of the object 
through perception if one knows what it would be for a judgement like [This = ôt]
to be true, where (ôt) is a fundamental Idea of an object, i.e. descriptive
knowledge of its location and of the fact that it is responsible for what the 
subject is perceiving.
Let us illustrate the second possibility by means of an example. Consider the 
case of perceiving a man on television. Obviously, if the subject could rely only 
on the information-link in order to locate the object, she would say that the 
object is in/on the screen, which would be an inadequate thing to say. Thus the 
current perception gives the subject some knowledge only relative to the
%f. Evans 1982: 145-151. 
^^ Cf. Evans 1982: 149.
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immediate referent of Th is ’, namely a little figure on the screen. So, according 
to Evans, in order for the subject to form an adequate Idea of that object, she 
must be able to know what it would be for a judgement like [This = the man who 
is responsible for the sounds and images I am now perceiving] to be true. By 
knowing what that would be like, the subject can attain demonstrative- 
identifications of objects far away from her, and form adequate Ideas of them.
All this further work, however, is not done by being informationally linked to 
the object of perception. Rather, some further conceptual element must be at 
play, in particular, some conception of objects and their being spatially located 
in a public world that extends beyond the subject’s perceptual reach must be at 
work.^® Thus, according to Evans, information-links between subjects and 
objects are not enough or sufficient in order to form an adequate Idea of the 
latter.
Notice, however, that, according to Evans, in this latter case, one should not 
conclude that, since sometimes perceptual demonstrative thoughts need to be 
connected to thoughts containing further conceptual elements (as in the case of 
[This = the man who is responsible for the sounds and images I am perceiving 
now]), perceptual demonstrative thoughts as such can be reduced to these 
descriptive thoughts (e.g. This glass = the glass I am now perceiving here). For, 
according to Evans, the former case, which could lead one to think that such a 
reduction could be possible, is in fact not a case of reduction at all. The idea is 
that even when subjects use some descriptive knowledge about the object they
^®Evans 1982: 149: “It is when an information-link does not provide the subject with 
an ability to locate the object that a conceptual element is needed for identification”.
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are perceiving, they are in fact setting up a link between a demonstrative 
identification which gives them demonstrative knowledge of the direct object of 
perception and some more general conception of that object. But still, there is a 
purely demonstrative element related to the first term of the identity, namely 
Th is ’, which is non-eliminable, according to E v a n s . T h a t  there is a 
demonstrative, ineliminable element even in mixed thoughts like the ones we 
are considering can be brought out by reflecting on the fact that the subject is 
immediately sensitive to the possible variations the direct object of her 
perception can undergo, as in the case where it suddenly disappears, and she 
somehow reacts to its deeds. For instance, the subject would switch off the 
television, had the man disappeared from the screen, but she would not say 
that he is hiding somewhere, nor would she start an inquiry about what he really 
did in the place where the scene she was watching was shot.
Now we have to make two further complications of this model: first, we have 
to understand whether in the “easy” case of pure demonstrative identification it 
is really true that the information-links alone can enable the subject to locate the 
objects she is perceiving. Secondly, we have to understand whether sortal 
concepts are needed in order to have demonstrative identifications of objects 
and thus perceptual demonstrative thoughts about them.
In order to answer the first question, Evans embarks on a discussion of here- 
thoughts. For our purposes it is enough to recapitulate the gist of his discussion, 
which comes down to the following: information-links are necessary but not 
sufficient conditions for actually being able to locate an object in one’s
19-'Cf. Evans 1982: 150-151.
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egocentric space, i.e. the portion of space which can be captured by a system 
of axes originating in the subject, which is relevant to her perceptions and 
actions.
The idea is that, in order to have an adequate Idea of the space around one, 
i.e. an adequate Idea of the here in question, the subject must be able to 
conceive of her egocentric space as a part of public space. Hence, in order to 
have an adequate Idea of the location of an object within egocentric co­
ordinates, i.e. in terms of ‘here’, ‘there’ , ‘to my left’ , ‘to my right’, etc., the subject 
must also be able to understand what it would be like to locate that object within 
public or objective co-ordinates, such as between X and Y, to the left of Z and 
the right of G, etc. To illustrate: suppose that a subject is in the Quad in St. 
Andrews, in the middle of the lawn. Suppose also that she is looking attentively 
at one of the benches. Further, suppose that she is able to locate it in 
egocentric space: in front of her, on her left hand-side, etc. But, according to 
Evans, for this location to be adequate, i.e. to exhibit a grasp of the category of 
place, the subject should also be able to locate the bench within a system of 
public co-ordinates, i.e. as between the Lower College Hall and School 1, etc. 
This, according to Evans, does not mean that she must actually be able to 
locate the bench within such public co-ordinates, but just that she should be so 
disposed, if she is to be credited with an adequate Idea of the location of the 
b e n c h . O n  this reading RP would amount to the following:
(RP1) In order for a subject to have a singular thought about an
object perceptually given to her she must have discriminative
^Cf. Evans 1982: 152.
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knowledge of It. That is to say, she must actually be able to locate It 
in a system of egocentric co-ordinates and disposltionally able to 
locate it in a system of public co-ordinates.
Hence, although having an adequate Idea of an object is originally 
understood by Evans disjunctively (i.e. either one is practically able to locate an 
object in egocentric space, or one knows what it would be like for an object to 
be located in public space), it has to be born in mind that even in the case of the 
demonstrative individuation of an object made on the basis of perception, one’s 
Idea of the object would be adequate only if the subject had the disposition to 
think of that object as located in public space.
Finally, according to Evans, if RP1 is satisfied then we could have a perfectly 
adequate Idea of the object in question even if we had no idea of what sort of 
object that is.^^ Let us exemplify: a subject could be on the beach in St. 
Andrews and find a mysterious object of a roundish shape, quite small, sort of 
brownish and wonder whether this is a stone or an egg. According to Evans, 
then, she would have a perfectly adequate Idea of that object, relative to [This] 
in the question [What is this?], for instance, even if she did not know what sort
Evans 1982: 173: “One has an adequate [demonstrative] Idea [of an object] in 
virtue of the existence of an information-link between oneself and the object, which 
enables one to locate that object in egocentric space. (That the Idea is adequate 
depends on one’s ability to relate egocentric space to public space)”.
% f. Evans 1982: 178-179.
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of object that is, provided that there is something like discovering or finding out 
what that object is?^
2.2 Consequences: Russellian Thoughts
We have noted above that, according to Evans, perceptual demonstrative 
thoughts are irreducible to descriptive thoughts, perhaps containing “more 
fundamental” indexical-thoughts, such as here-thoughts (or l-thoughts). This, in 
fact, is the key to an understanding of Evans' further claim that perceptual 
demonstrative-thoughts are Russellian, that is, object-dependent: were there no 
object there would be no thought either. For, according to Evans, if perceptual 
demonstrative thoughts are irreducible to descriptive thoughts and it is part of 
the conditions of possibility of these thoughts that there be an information-link 
between the subject and the object, then an object is needed in order to set up 
this link. Were there no object, there would be no information-link either, nor, 
consequently, any perceptual demonstrative thought at all. Hence, one’s 
thoughts would seem to have empirical content, but that would be just an 
illusion. Let us consider this claim in some more detail.
According to Evans, if there is no object and a subject is having an 
hallucination, then, if she forms the judgement [That a is F] she is not in fact
^As we shall see in Ch. 8, the fact that actual knowledge of the sort of object one is 
presented with is not required for perceptual demonstrative thoughts may help to avoid 
the mistake of thinking that demonstrative thoughts always involve identification and, 
therefore, cannot be lEM.
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having a singular thought at all because the necessary condition for singular 
thoughts, namely being informationally linked to an object, is not satisfied. 
Hence, according to Evans, the subject would suffer not only from a perceptual 
illusion but also from a cognitive illusion: she thinks she is thinking a singular 
thought, when in fact she is not thinking such a thought at all.
Consider the following situation: a subject is thirsty and sees a glass of water 
in front of her. That would lead to the thought [That is a glass of water] which 
can enter the following reasoning procedure: [I am thirsty], [That is a glass of 
water], [In order to drink it 1 should reach out for it], which can move the subject 
to act accordingly. Now consider the case in which she is hallucinating a glass 
of water in front of her and she is actually thirsty. From the first-person 
perspective it is plausible to say that all the reasoning and acting we envisaged 
in the former case will repeat identically in the latter case.
Now a broadly Fregean theorist can say that the subject was entertaining the 
same singular thought and that is why having a reliable perception or an 
hallucination makes no difference whatsoever from the first-person point of 
view. But Evans, as we have seen, denies that, in the case of hallucinations, 
there is any singular thought at all. Now, we can take Evans to be saying two 
different things: either there is nothing in the subject’s head, so to speak, no 
thought whatsoever, as it were, or else there is some thought, but not the one 
the subject takes herself to be having. The former possibility is not very 
plausible, for we could not make sense of the subject’s behaviour. That is to 
say, we could not even regard it as a kind of action, given that the belief which 
should issue in the formation of an intention that would turn merely bodily
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behaviour into a piece of action would be lacking. The second alternative, 
however, is more promising. But what is there in her head? According to Evans, 
we should say that the subject entertains a thought which, phenomenologically, 
looks like a singular thought which is in good standing, but which, however, 
does not really have content (it has just an illusion of content). However, from a 
third-person perspective, we would say that the subject thinks that she thinks a 
genuine singular thought, although she is not thinking such a thought at all. This 
would reconcile our attribution with her subsequent behaviour, and also with her 
phenomenology, but would open a gap between the first-person and the third- 
person perspective. That is to say, it may well be that the subject is ignorant of 
the real status of her thoughts or beliefs, which is in fact evident from a third- 
person perspective. This would have consequences with respect to first-person 
authority. For we usually take subjects to know the content of their thoughts. For 
instance, if a subject tells us that she thinks that water is wet we would like to 
grant her with at least knowledge of what she is thinking about, namely water. 
But, according to the object-dependency thesis, we should conclude that in a 
world without water, the subject would not know even that much. For she would 
just be under the illusion of thinking of water. In this sense, therefore, she would 
not have authority over the contents of her thoughts.^"^ Be that as it may, this is 
not a problem we will address here. All we need to point out is that there are 
ways, though quite costly ones, of reconciling the idea that if there were no 
object perceptually given to one, then one would merely have an illusion of
^See Burge 1994 and Davidson 1994 for ways of reconciling externalism and self- 
knowledge.
— 98 —
content, with the observation that, however, the subject “feels” and acts as if 
she had a thought with a singular content.
To recapitulate and conclude: we have seen, so far that, according to Evans, 
perceptual demonstrative thoughts are object-dependent. Moreover, the 
perceptual link between the subject and the object, though a necessary 
condition for demonstrative thought, is not a sufficient one. For both Russell’s 
Principle and the Generality Constraint must be met. We have considered these 
conditions in general and we have then considered their application in the case 
of perceptual demonstrative thought. Let us now turn to Evans’ defence of the 
idea that some uses of demonstratives are I EM.
3. Immunity to Error Through Misidentification as a “Corollary” of Identification-
Freedom^^
As we have anticipated in chapter 2, Evans’ account of lEM is revisionist. That 
is to say, it does not conform to the following definition:
lEMdfi A singular judgement of the form [a is F], formed on the basis of a 
recognition or identification, is lEM, relative to the subject, iff it is not 
possible for the thinker to apply the particular singular concept [a] to any 
other object but the relevant object a.
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According to Evans, lEM is a corollary of a judgement’s being identification- 
free. Let us see how he spells out this notion. He holds that we can distinguish 
between two ways of gaining knowledge about the truth of a singular 
proposition: there is knowledge that is identification-dependent and knowledge 
that is identification-free. Notice, however, that this terminology can be 
somehow misleading, for it will turn out that judgements which are identification- 
free are nevertheless based on identification. But the point is that this is 
demonstrative identification (or individuation, in our terminology), which is not 
based on knowing the truth of an identity judgement.^^ This brings us to Evans’ 
definition of identification-dependence, which goes as follows:
When knowledge of the truth of a singular proposition, [a is F], can be 
seen as the result of knowledge of the truth of a pair of propositions,
[b is F] (for some distinct Idea, b) and [a = b], I shall say that the 
knowledge Is identification-dependent: it depends (in part) on the 
second basis proposition, which I shall call the identification 
component.^
For example, knowledge of [This man is the chairman of the Department] can 
be seen as the result of knowing the truth of a pair of propositions such as [NN 
is the chairman of the Department] and [This man = NN].
^Evans 1982: 183: “Now there is a general connection between identification- 
freed om (in the narrow sense), with its corollary (italics mine) of immunity to error 
through misidentification, and the presence of an informational component (...)".
^Cf. fn. 1.
^Evans 1982: 180.
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Now, before moving on to the rest of Evans’ account, we should point out that 
he does not spell out exactly what knowledge of the pair of propositions 
requires. In particular, it does not seem right to suggest, as Evans’ passage 
may suggest, that one gets to knowledge of a certain singular proposition by 
actually entertaining a pair of other singular propositions of which one knows 
the truth. Rather, it is enough that one’s judgement be rationally grounded on 
the non necessarily occurrent belief in that pair of propositions. Obviously, then, 
EM would arise just in case the identification component is mistaken.
Notice, moreover, that if identification-dependency is the route to the 
possibility of EM, it is preferable not to phrase it in terms of knowledge. For, EM 
arises precisely in the case where there is identification-dependence but the 
identification component is mistakenly believed to be true. So, we must have a 
formulation of identification-dependency which is clearly compatible with the fact 
that a judgement be identification-dependent and also affected by EM. If we 
avoid phrasing identification-dependency in terms of knowledge, then it 
becomes evident that it would not be right to suggest that if the subject is 
mistaken about the identification component she is not entitled to any belief 
whatsoever. For, obviously, she would not know the singular proposition [a is F], 
but she could still be entitled to believe [Something is F], i.e. she could still hold 
the predication component.
We can thus put forward the following definition of identification-dependency:
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A judgement [a is F] is identification-dependent when it is causally and 
rationally based on a pair of not necessarily occurrent beliefs, [b is F] (for 
some distinct Idea b) and [a = b].^^
Such a definition of identification-dependency is then clearly consistent with 
the possibility of the subject’s being mistaken (at least) about the identification 
component, thus entertaining a judgement which is affected by EM. Let us now 
turn to identification-freedom.
According to Evans, to first approximation, identification-free judgements are 
the ones that are not dependent on knowledge of such a pair of propositions. 
But this would make non-singular judgements identification-free. For consider 
the descriptive name ‘Julius’, i.e. ‘Julius’ =df the inventor of the zip: in such a 
case, according to Evans, knowledge of the truth of [Julius is the inventor of 
something] would not depend on knowledge of the truth of [X is F] and 
[X = Ju l i us ] . i n  fact, it is not obvious that this is as much as true. For, after all, 
it is because the subject knows that Julius = the inventor of the zip, that she can 
know that Julius is the inventor of something. However, it is clear that Evans is 
interested in lEM of perceptual demonstrative judgements. Hence, the narrower 
notion of identification-freedom he is introducing, if not motivated by general 
theoretical reasons, would anyway be more adequate for the purpose of 
accounting for lEM of perceptual demonstrative judgements.
Evans’ narrower notion of identification-freedom is defined as follows:
^Of course the judgement is occurrent and the belief is dispositional. 
^Cf. Evans 1982: 180-181.
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[K]nowledge of the truth of a singular proposition is identification-free 
in the narrow sense if (i) it is not identification-dependent and (ii) it is 
based on a way of gaining (perceptual) information from objects.^
In this case too Evans must leave room for the singular proposition believed 
to be immune to a certain form of error, namely EM, while maybe mistaken as 
far as the predication component is concerned. Hence, to make this clearer, it is 
preferable to avoid talk in terms of knowledge of the truth of a singular 
proposition. Thus, it would be enough for the notion of narrow identification- 
freedom to read as follows;
The judgement [a is F] is identification-free in the narrow sense, if (i) it is 
not identification-dependent and (ii) it is based on a way of gaining 
(perceptual) information from objects.
Hence, the judgement [a is F] would be lEM in the narrow sense if (i) it is not 
based on an identification component and (ii) it is based on a way of gaining 
(perceptual) information from objects.
Notice that it is a consequence of Evans’ theory about perceptual 
demonstrative-thoughts that they can be identification-free in the narrow sense. 
For, according to Evans, perceptual demonstrative thoughts are based on a 
way of gaining information directly from the objects. Consequently, the subject 
can know that [This is F] is true directly, i.e. without basing her belief on any 
identity proposition. In fact Evans writes:
20,Evans 1982: 181
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We have the possibility of knowledge which is identification-free (in 
the narrow sense) when a subject is in a position, on receipt from an 
object (place) of information warranting ascription to something of the 
property of being F, to ascribe that property to that object (place) 
without relying on an identification [fn. In the sense of an identification 
component; not in the sense required by Russell’s Principle (...)] of 
the object (place) from which he receives the information.^^
According to Evans, identification-freedom is a notion of the utmost 
epistemological importance. For it is at the basis of the possibility of knowledge, 
since either knowledge of a proposition is identification-free, or, on pain of an 
infinite regress, it must ultimately rest on knowledge of a proposition which is 
identification-free.
According to Evans, lEM is a corollary of identification-freedom in the narrow 
sense. For, if a judgement is the result of knowledge which is identification-free, 
then the subject immediately knows not only that a property is instantiated, but 
also that it is instantiated by a certain object perceptually given to her. Hence, 
identification-free knowledge does not leave room for wondering which object is 
instantiating the property in question. Consequently, it does not leave room for a 
mistake in individuating which object is F.
In fact, Evans' main point is that in normal conditions the deliverances of the 
subject’s perceptual system will provide her with immediate knowledge both of 
the fact that some property is instantiated and of the fact that it is instantiated in
*Evans 1982: 183. Ibid. fn. 56.
% f. Evans 1982: 181. Notice that this can hold despite our amendments because 
true identification-free judgements would be known and would be at the basis of the 
possibility of knowledge.
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the object concerned (provided that she has an adequate Idea of the object in 
quest ion) .Hence,  if the subject's perceptual system is working in a reliable 
way, and conditions are normal, if it looks to her as if an object in front of herself 
is red, then she will have ipso facto knowledge of the truth of the proposition 
[That is red]. By contrast, if she is hallucinating a red object, then she will just 
have an illusion of content. That is why, according to Evans we should realise 
that some demonstrative judgements are lEM. In our terminology, we can see 
how Evans is driving home the point that if a demonstrative judgement is merely 
based on the individuation of a particular, then the informational-link the subject 
has with the latter is such to give her knowledge of [That is F] which does not 
rest on knowledge of any identification-component (provided that she also 
meets RP1 and GC). Therefore, her judgement will be lEM.
However, it would not make any difference to the issue of lEM, if we read 
identification-freedom as not mentioning knowledge. For it may perfectly well be 
the case that the subject's perceptions are inaccurate and she thinks that there 
is something red when there is something orange instead. But that would not 
mean that her judgement is not immune to error through misidentification 
relative to the subject. That is to say, if she has information (hence, there is an 
object) as if there were a red object, she ipso facto knows that there is
^Evans 1982: 181: “The way of gaining information from something (an object or a 
place) with which such an Idea is associated will, in certain circumstances {normal 
circumstances) yield knowledge that some property, say that of being F, is instantiated; 
and, provided that the subject has an adequate Idea of the object (place) concerned, 
this will ipso facto constitute knowledge that that object {place) is F”.
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something, i.e. that particular object, but she can be mistaken with respect to 
whether it really is red.
It should also be pointed out that satisfaction of condition (ii) of Evans’ 
definition of identification-freedom is not by itself sufficient for making a 
judgement identification-free. For, obviously, a judgement can be based both on 
a way of gaining perceptual information from an object and on an identification 
component (e.g. the case of [That man is the head of the Department] we saw 
above). Flence, satisfaction of condition (ii) is sufficient for identification-freedom 
only if conjoined with satisfaction of condition (i). in other words, identification- 
freedom in the narrow sense can be rephrased as follows :
The judgement [a is F] is identification-free in the narrow sense iff it is 
solely based on a way of gaining (perceptual) information from objects.
Obviously, it is a consequence of Evans’ definition of identification-freedom in 
the narrow sense that not only can demonstrative thoughts (solely) based on 
perceptual individuation of a particular be lEM, but also that all other 
judgements (solely) based on a way of gaining information from objects are 
lEM. For this reason, as we will see in the following chapters, many 1- 
judgements too are lEM, according to Evans. Let us now turn to Evans' account 
of them.
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Chapter Four
An Interlude: Evans on 1-Thoughts and the Objectivity 
Requirement
Evans’ discussion of l-thoughts is so intricate and complicated that, for 
expository purposes, it is best to break it down in two parts. Hence, in this 
chapter we will present the basic features of Evans’ proposal, and also give 
some historical background to it. In the next chapter we will consider Evans’ 
more contentious claims about l-thoughts which are meant to provide both a 
revisionist account of I EM of relevant self-ascriptions and a substantive 
response to the trilemma. The structure of this chapter will be as follows: we will 
present Frege’s account of l-thoughts, which is the ancestor of Evans’ views. 
We will then consider the dispute between Perry and Evans about l-thoughts. 
which will allow us to clarify some background assumptions in Evans’ treatment 
of l-thoughts in The Varieties o f Reference, which we have not yet examined. 
Finally, we will expound Evans’ reading of the Objectivity Requirement with 
regard to l-thoughts.
1. 1-Thoughts
Evans’ discussion of self-identification follows the general lines he has set forth 
for perceptual demonstrative-identification we presented in the previous 
chapter. Hence, l-thoughts turn out to be object-dependent and irreducible to 
any other kind of thought, whether descriptive or containing other allegedly 
more fundamental indexical elements (e.g. here and this). According to Evans, 
these features of l-thoughts are shown in action and reason-giving procedures. 
In addition, Evans maintains that the information-links between the subject and 
her body are necessary but not sufficient conditions for l-thoughts and that 
conformity to Russell’s Principle and the Generality Constraint is also required 
in order for l-thoughts to be possible. The former requires the subject’s capacity 
to locate herself (but recall the specifications introduced in Ch. 3) relative to the 
objects in her environment; whereas the latter requires one’s Idea of oneself to 
enter into indefinitely many thoughts about oneself. In order to understand 
better Evans’ account of l-thoughts it is necessary to look at its sources, namely 
Frege and, to a certain extent, Perry. We will now consider these in turn.
2. 1-Thoughts: Frege
Evans inherits Frege’s conception of l-thoughts, to a certain extent. Frege 
agreed with the widespread view according to which the essence of self- 
consciousness is self-reference, i.e. the ability to refer to oneself either in 
speech or in thought by means of the first-person pronoun. Since, however,
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according to Fregean semantics, reference has to be mediated by the 
appropriate kind of thought about the referent, an inquiry into the nature of 1- 
thoughts will automatically be an inquiry into the conditions of possibility of self- 
consciousness (there is more about this issue below).
Now, the reason it is difficult to attain a proper understanding of l-thoughts is 
that, if we are persuaded that a thought is made out of senses and, therefore, 
that T must have a sense, then we have to account for this sense. Yet, this is 
far from being a straightforward matter. For, as Frege himself noticed, the sense 
of T is never equivalent to the sense of any other coreferring expression. In 
order to see why, it is sufficient to run Frege’s test for difference of sense.
Consider the case of Oedipus saying The killer of Laius must be brought to 
justice’, when, unbeknownst to him, he is the killer of Laius.^ Alternatively, 
consider the case of John Smith who speaks of the fortune inherited by the 
person named in a will, John Horatio Auberon Smith, without realising that he is 
talking about himself.^ Then consider the case of a man who is seeing 
someone reflected in a mirror and says That man is sitting on a chair’, when, 
unbeknownst to him, it is he himself who is reflected in the mirror.
In all these cases, the subject is intentionally referring to the person the 
definite description/proper name/complex demonstrative refers to and yet he 
can still fail to realise that he is talking about himself. Consequently he would 
assent to sentences such as The killer of Laius must be brought to justice’, 
‘JHAS has inherited a fortune’. That man is sitting on a chair’, but he would not
^Cf. Evans 1982: 206-207.
%f. Anscombe 1990: 135-137.
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assent to the corresponding first-person sentences, although they are about the 
same referent. The different attitude the subject would take towards these 
sentences is explained, within a Fregean semantics, as due to the fact that the 
referent is presented differently. Thus, the mode of presentation or sense 
associated with T is different from the mode of presentation associated with 
any other coreferring singular expression. In other terms, we cannot provide T 
either with a descriptive sense, or with a sense reducible to the sense of any 
other expression which has the same reference as T. Moreover, that there is a 
difference between the mode of presentation associated with T and that 
associated with any other coreferring expression can be seen by considering 
the role l-thoughts play with respect to action and reason-giving procedures.^ 
Consider the case of Oedipus: before realising that he himself was the killer of 
Laius, he searches for the killer throughout his kingdom. Once he realises that 
he himself is the killer of Laius, Oedipus abandons the city of Thebes in order 
for it to regain its prosperity. Thus, Oedipus can justify his action by saying that 
he has done so because he wanted Thebes to regain its prosperity and 
because he knew that it was his presence that was causing trouble. Obviously, 
none of these justifications could have been used in order to explain Oedipus’ 
behaviour before he realised he was the killer of Laius, although, before 
realising that, he could think of the killer of Laius, plan how to take action 
against him, and so forth.
^Evans 1982: 207, Perry 1990, 1994. Cf. also Peacocke 1983: 127-sq.
'^ In fact this connection between l-thoughts and action was first noticed by Perry 
1990, 1994.
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This kind of considerations can lead one to conclude, with Frege, that;
Everyone Is presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in 
which he is presented to no-one else. So, when Dr. Lauben thinks 
that he has been wounded, he will probably take as a basis this 
primitive way in which he is presented to himself. And only Dr.
Lauben himself can grasp thoughts determined in this way. But now 
he may want to communicate with others. He cannot communicate a 
thought which he alone can grasp. Therefore, if he now says ‘1 have 
been wounded’, he must use the T in a sense which can be grasped 
by others, perhaps in the sense of ‘he who is speaking to you at this 
moment', by doing which he makes the associated conditions of his 
utterance serve for the expression of his thought.^
Notice that these private l-thoughts are nevertheless thoughts, according to 
Frege, and not ideas (in Frege’s sense), that is, private representations of 
oneself, including sense-impressions deriving from one's own body.® But how 
should we conceive of them?
Let us recapitulate the features of l-thoughts, according to Frege.
(a) They are primitive;
(b) They are private to their thinkers;
^Frege 1918, reprinted in Harnish 1994. Page reference to the latter. Frege 1994; 
524.
®The difference between thoughts and ideas or representations {Vorstellungen) is 
crucial to Frege. The latter are private representations which need a bearer in order to 
exist. Frege does not deny that they exist, but he denies that communication and 
science would be possible if they were what we try to convey by means of our words. 
For ideas are necessarily private to their bearers and no science or common 
knowledge would be possible if we were actually talking about our own 
representations.
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(c) They are incommunicable;
(d) They are objective.
On the one hand, (a) amounts to saying that they are not equivalent to any 
thoughts containing any other mode of presentation of the referent. That is to 
say, they are irreducible.
On the other hand, (b) allows for two possible interpretations; (b.1) there are 
as many l-thought types, i.e. as many modes of presentation of the self, as 
there are individuals. We can illustrate the consequences of this position by 
quoting Husserl;
The word T names a different person from case to case, and does so 
by way of an ever-altering meaning. What its meaning is at the 
moment, can be gleaned only from the living utterance and the 
intuitive circumstances which surround it (...). In solitary speech the 
meaning of T is essentially realized in the immediate idea of one’s 
own personality (...). Each man has his own l-presentation (...) and 
that is why the word’s meaning differs from person to person.^
(b.2) There is just one l-thought type, or mode of presentation of the self, 
which is exemplified in as many l-thought tokens as there are individuals. The 
idea has been clearly stated by Peacocke, who writes;
Suppose Peter thinks ‘I am hungry’ and Paul thinks ‘1 am hungry’.
Since we are following the Fregean model, the modes of presentation 
they each express by T must be different; for they determine different 
objects, Peter and Paul respectively. But of course when they think 
these thoughts, Peter and Paul think of themselves in the same type 
of way. It is this type which is denoted by ‘[self]’. The constituent of all 
Peter’s first-person thoughts is called a token mode of presentation; it
^Husserl 1970; 315-316.
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can be taken to consist of the type [self] indexed by Peter, that 
person himself. This token m.p. will be denoted by ‘[selfPeter]’. So it is 
token m.p.’s which are constituents of thoughts and which pick out 
particular objects. But one should not be misled by the word ‘token’: 
there is nothing relevantly unrepeatable about [selfpeter]. On many 
different occasions, Peter may have attitudes to thoughts which 
contain it as a constituent.®
It is not clear whether Frege held (b.1) or (b.2). As we shall see, however, 
(b.1) and (b.2) have a different bearing upon whether l-thoughts are shareable 
or not. In fact, l-thoughts conceived of as in (b.1) are not communicable 
because (c) they are private to their thinkers.^ What about l-thoughts conceived 
of as in (b.2), then? (b.2) in fact says that there is a unique mode of 
presentation of the referent each of us grasps when she is entertaining an I- 
thought. However, depending on how we think of this mode of presentation, the 
resulting l-thoughts will be communicable or will fail to be so.
Now, as far as (d) is concerned, according to Perry, once communicability is 
given up, then the objectivity of thoughts is impaired too. For, according to his 
reading of Frege, the former is a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
latter. By contrast, Evans points out that communicability is only a sufficient but 
not a necessary condition for objectivity.^® Hence, if communicability is 
impaired, this does not mean that objectivity is as well. We will consider whether
®Peacocke 1983: 108. Cf. also Peacocke 1983; 119-121.
This would square with Frege's suggestion that in order for communication to be 
possible some "public" sense must be attached to T. Hence, this would be indirect 
evidence in favour of the fact that Frege held (b.1).
°^Cf. Evans 1985; 313-sq.
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Evans succeeds in maintaining the objectivity of l-thoughts despite their 
incommunicability or non-shareability, after considering Perry’s conception of I- 
thoughts and the Objectivity Requirement.
3. 1-Thoughts: Perry
According to Perry, if we want to maintain the objectivity of l-thoughts, that is, 
their being intersubjectively accessible, then we should not follow Frege in 
equating the sense of a sentence with the thought it expresses. Consequently, 
we should not equate the sense of an expression such as T with its contribution 
to the thought expressed by a sentence containing it. Perry’s reading of (b.2) is 
to take the sense of T— its role, as he names it—as a function from a context to 
a value— its referent. In the case of T its role would be given by the token- 
reflexive rule— ‘1’ refers to the utterer of this token— , which would lead us, 
varying from context to context, to its referent. Such a referent, in turn, would be 
a constituent, together with the referent of a predicate expression (F), of the 
thought expressed by a sentence containing T. While Perry is departing from 
Frege's doctrine both with respect to senses (since Fregean senses take us 
directly to references, and not from contexts to references) and thoughts (given 
that P(erry)-thoughts contain objects and properties, and not modes of 
presentations of them), his account allows us to maintain the intersubjectivity of 
thoughts. For, by applying the token-reflexive rule, both the speaker and the 
utterer will grasp the same thought. Hence, for Perry the objectivity of l-thoughts 
is guaranteed by the fact that these thoughts are about a person, i.e. an
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embodied entity which can be perceived by other people.. Moreover, it is 
guaranteed by the fact that such thoughts are entertained by entertaining the 
linguistic meaning of which is publicly and intersubjectively accessible too. 
Let us now turn to Evans' criticism of Perry’s account.
4. i-Thoughts: Evans
Evans' reading of (b.2) is as follows: there is one mode of presentation of the 
self as a type, which is entertained by each subject as a token when she thinks 
about herself in the first person way. Moreover, when one entertains an I- 
thought, one has a thought about an object, i.e. the person one is, which, 
however, is presented in the first-person way. Hence, the constituents of the 
thought are an object together with its mode of presentation and the mode of 
presentation of a property.
However, it is important to stress that, according to Evans, the mode of 
presentation of the self is not given by any linguistic rule governing the use of ‘I’ 
as a referring device. For—he argues—what has the token-reflexive rule to do
"^"Cf. Evans 1985: 315-321. Notice that in Evans 1985 the thought is taken to be 
constituted by the object and its mode of presentation together. By contrast, 
McDowell’s reading of The Varieties of Reference has made popular the reading of 
Evans’ theory of singular thoughts as containing only senses, which, however, could 
not exist if their objects did not exist. The difference between Evans 1982 and Evans 
1985 is interesting but not fundamental to our purposes.
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with the subject's capacity to think of herself self-consciously?The problem, in 
his opinion, is that such a rule "plays no part in an explanation of what makes a 
subject's thought about h i m s e l f . I n  other terms, it does not seem to be 
plausible that, when a subject is entertaining an l-thought, she is thinking of 
herself as the utterer of that token of T.
A first objection to the idea that the mode of presentation of the first person is 
to be equated with the linguistic meaning of T is that a subject can entertain I- 
thoughts even if she is not uttering any sentence. Thus, it would not make 
sense to suggest that she is thinking of herself as the utterer of such an 
expression. A second objection would be that there are languages which do not 
have the first-person pronoun, but, presumably, speakers of those languages 
can nevertheless entertain 1-thoughts. Consequently, these thoughts cannot be 
dependent on a linguistic convention.
In order to meet these objections, one could suggest a different token- 
reflexive rule, namely, that I refers to the thinker of this token of the first-person 
concept. But now, according to E v a n s , i t  would seem that the conception we 
have of ourselves is such that we take ourselves to be mere authors of 
thoughts .Th is  would have unacceptable consequences for Evans, as we will
^^f. Evans 1985; 320.
14/'Cf. Evans 1982: 213, 252.
®^lt is not obvious at all that, contrary to what Evans maintains, the problem with the 
revised version of the token-reflexive rule is that one would think of oneself as the 
author of a certain thought. Rather, it seems that one should already be able to
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presently see. Therefore, Evans concludes that the mode of presentation 
associated with T must differ from the token-reflexive rule.
To recapitulate: Evans wishes senses to figure within the content of thought, 
thus giving rise to a form of “cognitive externaiism” .^ ® This is so because Evans 
was impressed by Frege’s puzzle and, in particular, by the fact that one and the 
same speaker can believe and disbelieve, or be agnostic about, one and the 
same content, if it is presented in a different way. Moreover, he was impressed 
by Perry’s insight that l-thoughts can have altogether different implications for 
action from thoughts with the same broad content, which, however, are not in 
the first-person mode of thought.^^ Thus, modes of presentation are at least 
cognitively relevant. However, Evans does not think of the mode of presentation 
as either a definite description, or as an entity which mediates the access of the 
subject to the object, like a sense-datum. Hence, Evans rejects both a 
descriptivist position about sense and a sense-data theory. Rather, the notion of 
sense or of mode of presentation is designed to capture the intuition that any 
object is always known from or under a certain perspective, i.e. even the most
entertain the first-person concept. Hence, to think of oneself as the author of a certain 
token of [I] would be a circular explanation of the first-person concept, for it would 
presuppose what it seeks to explain. Cf. Bermudez 1998.
^^According to externalism the content of a thought is determined by the objects it is 
about. “Cognitive externalism” is a kind of externalism according to which the content of 
the thought is also determined by the way in which these objects are given to the 
subject.
^^ Two thoughts have the same broad content if they are about the same objects. For 
instance [1 am F] and [AC is F] have the same broad content.
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immediate access to an object, that is the perceptual contact.with it, is always 
perspectival, depending on our position with respect to the object itself. 
Therefore, our access to any object, no matter how immediate it may be, i.e. no 
matter how non-mediated by either a conceptual repertoire or by any mediating 
entity, can never disclose to us the object with all its properties. Thus, Evans 
seems to think that the perspective from which an object is given to us is 
constitutive of the way in which we can think of that object, because the very 
content of our thought, i.e. that very object and some of its properties, are given 
to us according to that particular perspective. It has to be stressed, however, 
that the perspective from which an object is given is not a further ingredient, 
beside the object, which is part of the thought. Rather, the idea is that objects of 
thought are always given from a certain perspective and, as such, are 
constituents of thoughts.
However, the aboutness of the thought, i.e. its content, is always entirely 
determined by the object, without further ado, and it is the fact that various 
thoughts about X converge onto the same object which guarantees the 
possibility of communication, despite the various ways in which that very object 
can be given to different subjects or to the same subject on different occasions. 
That is to say, according to Evans, communicability is not secured by the fact 
that the subjects entertain the same modes of presentation of the referents. 
Rather it is secured by the fact that they talk about the same object, no matter 
how they think of it.^^ Consequently, according to Evans, on the one hand, the
®^Cf. Evans 1982, Ch. 11. Of course, it can be problematic to claim that convergence 
onto the same object guarantees successful communication. For if—as Evans
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fact that the mode of presentation is a constituent of the thought does not impair 
the possibility of communication of that thought and, on the other hand, it allows 
for an explanation of the different attitudes a speaker may take towards one and 
the same content, when it is presented differently.
In the case of l-thoughts, however, the perspective from which the object is 
given is cognitively even more effective than in other modalities of singular 
thought (e.g. perceptual demonstrative thought). We can better see why this is 
so if we consider that the aboutness of the thought is entirely determined by the 
object the thought is about. Thus, the thoughts [AC is F] and [I am F] do not 
differ with respect to what they are about, i.e. they do not differ in broad content. 
But, after all, there is a difference between these two thoughts and it is a 
difference that can be reflected in beliefs, actions and justificatory procedures, 
as we have seen. This difference can be summarised as a difference between 
thoughts which are about oneself and thoughts which are about oneself self­
consciously, i.e. which manifest the fact that the subject is aware that they are 
about herself. So, in the case of 1-thoughts, the relevance of the notion of mode 
of presentation or sense of the first-person can be better appreciated as being 
introduced in response to the question “What makes a thought about myself a 
self-conscious thought?”. Thus, an elucidation of the various ways in which we
maintains—sense does not determine reference and, moreover, speakers are allowed 
to entertain different senses, then it can look mysterious how they can actually be sure 
that they are talking about the same object. This, however, is a problem which does not 
directly concern us here.
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have access to ourselves which can lead to l-thoughts becomes an elucidation 
of self-consciousness.
5. Evans and The Objectivity Requirement
We saw before that, according to Evans, a thought which is not communicable 
because its sense-constituents are not intersubjectively accessible can still be 
objective. But what does it mean to say that a thought is objective if not that it is 
(completely) communicable? According to Evans, the notion of objectivity has to 
be re-interpreted as meaning that, no matter whether thoughts are 
communicable, they are objective provided they are about objects thought o f as 
“elements in the objective order of things”, i.e. thought of as objects amongst 
others, or on a par with others, and as located in space and time.^^
OR; A thought about an empirical object is objective iff the object is 
thought of as an empirical object which is located in space and time and 
which exists independently of being perceived.
Obviously OR will be specified in a different way if thought about places, or 
times or abstract objects, etc. is at stake. However, when applied to l-thoughts 
OR means that we should conceive of ourselves as spatio-temporal 
continuants. Thus, Evans aims to develop a conception of l-thoughts such that 
they turn out to be primitive, i.e. irreducible to other forms of thoughts; private,
^Evans 1982; 256. Cf. also Evans 1982: 210, 211.
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i.e. entertainabie only by their respective subjects, although understandable 
also by others (once expressed): and still objective, i.e. about a subject who 
thinks of herself as a physical object located in space and on a par with other 
objects. That is to say, one should think of oneself as a physical entity which 
exists in space independently of one’s current awareness of one’s own location 
and of the spatial features of one's body. This is also why Evans cannot be 
entirely content with the version of the token-reflexive rule we discussed above, 
according to which we think of ourselves as authors of certain thoughts. For, if 
that is the case, then it is no longer mandatory, in order for us to have an 
adequate Idea of ourselves, to think of ourselves as embodied and located in 
space. Of course, the latter position would be compatible with holding that, in 
fact, we also do think of ourselves as embodied. But it would not make l-ldeas 
inadequate, if they were not comprising a conception of ourselves as embodied. 
We will come back to this issue in the next chapters.^^
However, why should one hold that for l-thoughts to be objective they must be 
about an object in the world, i.e. a person, who thinks of herself as such? It has 
to be acknowledged that there is not much in the way of an explanation of this 
tenet in Evans. According to Cassam, the Objectivity Requirement, as it is 
interpreted by Evans, stems from the conviction that, since we are persons, and 
l-thoughts are object-dependent, in order to meet Russell’s Principle and the
^ In Ch. 7 we will argue that Evans’ characterisation of the first person concept is 
compatible with more “mentalistic” ones such as Peacocke's.
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Generality Constraint, we must think of ourselves as such.^^ Hence, it is 
because we are persons that meeting RP requires us to be (at least 
dispositionally) able to locate ourselves and meeting GO requires us to think of 
ourselves by exploiting the category of person, thus satisfying OR.
Hence, Evans wishes to show that a theorist who assumes that we are 
human beings can claim that in order to have the first-person concept we must 
think of ourselves as persons. By so doing, such a theorist will be able to point 
out that the Cartesian and the Idealist make use of a different first-person 
concept, which is not the concept of an embodied entity. Hence, far from 
teaching us something about the first-person the Cartesian and the Idealist 
would just conceive of it in a different way, which, however, is irrelevant to an 
understanding of our first-person concept.
It should also be stressed that Evans is not obviously begging the question 
against the Cartesian and the Idealist by assuming that the self is identical with 
a human being. For the dispute between them is at the level of sense, not of 
reference, in fact, even on the assumption that selves are identical with human 
beings, if it turned out that one’s first person concept did not depend on one’s
^Cf. Cassam 1997a. Notice that Cassam only talks about RP. But GC is indeed 
necessary in order to get to the conclusion that since we are persons we must think of 
ourselves as such. For it is only when we entertain l-thoughts that conform to 
GC—such as [I was born in Milan in 1973] or [1 will die]—that, in thinking about 
ourselves, we exploit a conception of ourselves as persons on a par with all others, i.e. 
as persons that exist through time and exist even when they are not able to perceive 
themselves, etc. There shall be more about this issue in Ch. 5.
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conception of oneself as embodied, then the Cartesian and the Idealist uses of 
the first person would be intelligible. Thus, it seems fair to say that Evans 
makes use of an indirect strategy against the Cartesian and the Idealist which is 
meant to show that their use of the first person deviates from ours to such an 
extent that it becomes unintelligible from our stand point. Let us now turn to the 
details of Evans' proposal.
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Chapter Five
Evans: Immunity to Error through Misidentiflcation of 
I-Thoughts and the Substantive Response to the Trilemma
We have seen in chapter three that a theory of singular thought should specify 
what satisfaction of Russell’s Principle requires in each case, i.e. in the case of 
perceptual demonstrative thoughts, here-thoughts, l-thoughts, thoughts about 
times and abstract objects. In particular, we have seen that in the case of 
singular thoughts about particulars perceptually given to us, satisfaction of RP 
requires us to be able to locate the objects relative to ourselves. Moreover, we 
have seen that, according to Evans, perception is often such as to enable us 
immediately to know the object’s location relative to ourselves. The 
corresponding demonstrative thought is thus lEM, for it is not based on any 
identification (in our terminology) of the object, but on its mere perceptual 
individuation. Hence, if [This is F] is a lEM thought, then it can be mistaken as 
far as the predication component is concerned, but it cannot be mistaken as to 
whether it is that particular object which is F.
According to Evans, on the assumption that the self is embodied, satisfaction 
of RP in the case of l-thoughts requires us to be able to locate ourselves. As we 
shall see, according to Evans, this capacity consists in the practical ability to 
locate oneself as an object with a certain position and orientation in space on
the basis of the perception of one’s environment and the awareness of the 
spatial features of one’s body afforded by somatic proprioception.
It is important to stress that these abilities must be dispositionally in place. 
Hence, a subject who were in a state of sensory deprivation and were thus 
prevented from exercising such abilities could still be said to have an adequate 
Idea of herself provided that she retained the ability (manifested in the past) to 
locate herself on the basis of the perception of her environment.^ Hence, Evans 
writes;
It is essential, if a subject is to be thinking about himself self­
consciously, that he be disposed to have such thinking controlled by 
information which may become available to him in each of the 
relevant ways.^
On this view, the Cartesian and the Idealist, who think that there can be I- 
thoughts even if these thoughts are not dependent on an awareness of oneself 
as embodied and located in space, would confuse "the possibility of a non­
activated disposition with no disposition at all".^ Hence, they would be mistaken 
in concluding that, since sometimes l-thoughts can fail to depend on an 
awareness of oneself as embodied and located in space, such knowledge is 
not essential to the very possibility of l-thoughts.
^Evans 1982: 215: “A subject may be amnesiac and anaesthetized, and his senses 
may be prevented from functioning: yet he may still be able to think about himself, 
wondering, for example, why he is not receiving information in the usual ways".
^Evans 1982: 216.
^O’Brien 1995: 237.
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We have also seen in chapter four that, according to Evans, l-thoughts must 
satisfy the Objectivity Requirement. So, for an l-thought to be objective, it must 
be the case that the subject thinks of herself as a person on a par with all 
others. Hence, on the one hand, she must think of herself as an embodied 
entity, which has the properties of physical objects. For instance, it cannot 
(wholly) exist at two different places at the same time, it exists through time and, 
finally, it exists even when it is not presently perceived either by others or by the 
subject herself. On the other hand, the subject must be able to conceive of 
herself as an entity with psychological properties that can be interpreted and 
made sense of also by others.
Now, it is important to stress that for OR to be met, both GC and RP must be 
satisfied and satisfied in the appropriate way. For, as we will see, satisfaction of 
RP in the case of first-person thoughts based on outer perception and somatic 
proprioception can at most give the subject a conception of herself as having a 
body which is presently perceived and thought of as located. But OR requires 
one to think of oneself as having a body located in space independently of the 
fact that one is now perceiving it and is presently able to locate it. Hence, 
satisfaction of OR requires GC to hold. For, according to GC, the subject should 
be able to entertain judgements like [1 (am the person who) was born in Milan in 
1973], [I (am the person who) was breast-fed for the first two months of her life], 
etc. Now, the relevance of these judgements is that they can only be 
entertained by someone who can make sense of, for instance, someone else’s 
testimony about herself. Thus, they can only be entertained by someone who
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takes herself to be a person on a par with all others, whose existence is 
independent of both her current perceptions and thoughts about herself.
The structure of this chapter will be as follows: we will present Evans’ account 
of lEM of bodily and physical self-ascriptions, first. Then, we will consider his 
arguments against the claim that all mental self-ascriptions are lEM. We will 
then turn to his attack against the Cartesian conception of the mind and to his 
defence of the idea that by being aware of their own mental properties subjects 
must also conceive of themselves as embodied entities. We will agree with 
Evans that the deliverances of somatic proprioception and perception can give 
one immediate knowledge of oneself as embodied and located in space. But we 
will also claim that Evans does not explain why mental self-ascriptions which 
are lEM are so, and, moreover, are so in any logically possible world. Hence, 
his account should be supplemented with such an explanation. This, in turn, will 
be the topic of the following chapters.
1. lEM Relative to Physical Self-Attributions As “The Most Powerful Antidote to 
a Cartesian Conception of the Self’"^
Recall Evans’ definitions of identification-dependent and identification-free 
knowledge of the truth of a proposition we introduced in Ch. 3. Here they are:
When knowledge of the truth of a singular proposition, [a is F], can be 
seen as the result of knowledge of the truth of a pair of propositions,
tva n s  1982: 220.
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[b is F] (for some distinct Idea, b), and [a = b], I shall say that the 
knowledge is identification-dependent: it depends (in part) on the 
second basis proposition, which I shall call the identification 
component.^
[Kjnowledge of the truth of a singular proposition is identification-free 
in the narrow sense if (i) it is not identification-dependent and (ii) it is 
based on a way of gaining information from objects.®
Recall also our interpretation of Evans’ definition we introduced in chapter 
three to make clear the compatibility between a judgement’s being I EM and yet 
be mistaken as far as the predication component is concerned. Here they are:
A judgement [a is F] is identification-dependent when it is causally and 
rationally triggered by a pair of (not necessarily occurrent) beliefs, [b is F] 
(for some distinct Idea b) and [a = b].
A judgement [a is F] is identification-free if (i) it is not identification 
dependent and (ii) it is based on a way of getting information directly from 
objects.^
Hence, an l-judgement will be lEM if it is identification-free in our sense. By 
contrast, it will be liable to EM if it is identification-dependent in our sense.
®Evans 1982: 180.
®Evans 1982: 181.
^All the constraints on these definitions and the reasons behind them we introduced 
in chapter three are still valid here. Recall also that the latter definition can also be 
phrased as follows: A judgement [a is F] is identification-free iff it is solely based on a 
way of gaining information directly from objects.
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According to Evans, there can be bodily self-ascriptions that are lEM. He 
writes:
There is a way of knowing that the property of |'s hair being blown by 
the wind is currently instantiated, such that when the first component 
expresses knowledge gained in this way, the utterance The wind is 
blowing someone’s hair, but is it my hair that the wind is blowing?’ will 
not make sense.®
Given our interpretation of identification-freedom this passage should read as 
follows: there is a way of coming to make the judgement [The wind blows my 
hair about], such that the claim The wind is blowing someone’s hair, but I 
wonder whether it is my hair that the wind is blowing’ is not a reasonable 
reaction to the epistemic situation the subject is in. Moreover, Evans claims that 
“the property of being immune to error through misidentiflcation is not one which 
applies to propositions simpliciter, but one which applies only to judgements 
made upon this or that basis’’.^  Hence, these two claims together imply the 
following: there are particular grounds on which, if one judges [The wind blows 
my hair about], then the claim The wind is blowing someone’s hair, but 1 
wonder whether it is my hair that the wind is blowing’ will not make rational 
sense .Thus ,  we have to investigate which grounds would lead to lEM bodily 
self-ascriptions.
®Evans 1982: 218, 
®Evans 1982: 219.
l O rPrecisely because Evans holds that identification-free and identification-dependent 
judgements are a function of the grounds on which judgements are based, it would be 
misleading to say, as he says, that the utterance The wind is blowing someone’s hair,
129 —
1.1 I EM of Bodily Self-Ascriptions Based on Somatic Proprioception
According to Evans, we have “a general capacity to perceive our own bodies” 
which “can be broken down into several distinguishable capacities: our 
proprioceptive sense, our sense of balance, of heat and cold, and of 
pressure”.A c c o rd in g  to him, when a judgement is based upon this way of 
getting information from one’s body, it is also lEM. He writes:
There just does not appear to be a gap between the subject’s having 
information (or appearing to have information), in the appropriate 
way, that the property of being F is instantiated, and his having 
information (or appearing to have information) that he is F; for him to 
have, or appear to have, the information that the property is 
instantiated just is for it to appear to him that he is F.'^
First of all, notice that Evans’ way of putting his point here suggests that he 
himself was aware of the fact that a judgement that is lEM does not necessarily 
amount to knowledge.
More importantly, however, in this connection Evans himself considers the 
possibility of deviant causal chains: i.e. we can think of a possible world in 
which subjects receive proprioceptive information from someone else’s body. 
For example: “the subject’s brain [is appropriately linked] with someone else’s 
body, in such a way that he is in fact registering information from that other
but is it my hair that he wind is blowing?’ will not make sense. For the utterance makes 
sense, i.e. we understand it, but is not a rational response to the epistemic situation the 
subject is in.
^^Evans 1982: 220.
^^Evans 1982: 221.
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body”.^  ^ The further assumption which, however, is not explicit, is that one 
retains one’s own body.
Let us consider the implications of Evans’ claims. In fact, Evans’ first claim 
quoted above just amounts to holding that proprioceptive information can fail to 
be veridical. Hence, it can lead to false bodily self-ascriptions. This, in turn, 
implies that what he calls proprioceptive information can be misleading about 
the issue of whether it is true that one’s body is F. Now, it seems reasonable to 
hold that such misleading information can only be something like an appearing 
to one as if one’s legs were bent. In such an event, one would just have the 
illusion that one’s legs are bent.
However, the fact that Evans considers the possibility of deviant causal 
chains may suggest the thought that bodily self-ascriptions based on somatic 
proprioception are not lEM after all. In fact, one may think that in deviant causal 
conditions one’s judgement, e.g. [My legs are bent] could be false (at least) 
because the subject mistakenly identifies herself with the subject from whose 
body she is receiving information. Hence, the judgement would seem to be 
affected by EM. Notice that, given our way of understanding EM, this would 
mean that the judgement should be seen as grounded in a belief in a 
predication component such as [The legs I am feeling now are bent] and in a 
belief in an identification component such as [My legs = the legs I am feeling 
now]. In other words, for the judgement to be affected by EM it should be the 
case that one’s concept [The legs I am feeling now], formed on the basis of the 
deliverances of somatic proprioception, and the concept [My legs], formed
13Ibid.
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through an individuation of one’s body as a physical entity with fixed spatial 
boundaries, were wrongly taken to be coinstantiated.
One could then suggest that the alleged counter-example could be blocked 
by endorsing a phenomenological conception of one’s body, i.e. by endorsing;
(0) my body =cf the body I am proprioceptively aware of
As a consequence of holding (0), the judgement [My legs are bent], when 
based on the deliverances of somatic proprioception, would result as being lEM 
in any possible world, because it would be based on an identification 
component which is true by definition.
However, whether or not a phenomenological conception of one’s body is a 
feasible position to hold, Evans could not endorse it.^ "^  For, as we saw in Ch. 4, 
he subscribes to the Objectivity Requirement, according to which for one’s 
conception of oneself to be objective, it must be a conception of an entity which 
exists independently of being perceived and which has fixed spatial boundaries, 
e.g. it cannot wholly be at two different places at the same time.
However, this is not to say that Evans cannot reply to the alleged counter­
example. For what the deviant case shows is that in certain conditions the 
judgement [My legs are bent] could be based on a belief in an identification 
component such as [My legs = the legs I am feeling now]. Now, according to 
Evans, we should ask under which conditions this would be so. For here the
"^^ As a matter of fact, the phenomenological conception of one’s body would have 
problems in its own right. For instance, there are parts of our bodies that we cannot 
access proprioceptively, such as some internal organs.
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relevant thought is that one’s judgement’s being EM/IEM is always a function of 
the grounds on which it is based. In turn, we have seen that, according to 
Evans, the grounds of a judgement must be causally and rationally efficacious. 
Hence, they must be at the subject’s disposal. So the alleged counter-example 
merely shows that if a subject is receiving proprioceptive information from 
someone else’s body and she knows or, more mildly, has reasons to believe 
that she may be receiving information from a body which is physically disjoint 
from the body in which her brain is located and judged [My legs are bent] on 
that basis, then her judgement would be identification-dependent and, 
consequently, affected by EM.^^ For the false (non-necessarily occurrent) belief 
in an identification component such as [My legs = the legs I am feeling now] 
would be part of the subject’s grounds for her judgement.
However, this does not show that in normal conditions, i.e. when one is 
receiving proprioceptive information from the unique body in which one’s brain 
is located, the judgement [My legs are bent], based on the deliverances of 
somatic proprioception, would be based on a belief in the relevant identification- 
component.^® For, true, here there is an assumption, i.e. that conditions be
^®Evans 1982: 221: “In the second place, there are problems about the Ideas that 
would be involved in the supposed identification component (...). Such an Idea [i.e. 'the 
body from which 1 hereby have information’] would certainly be involved in one’s 
thinking if one knew (italics mine) one was in the abnormal situation described (...)”.
^®Notice, in turn, that this means that for Evans genuine proprioceptive information 
counts as information received from one’s unique body, i.e. the unique body in which
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normal, but this is not an assumption that should figure as a belief in an 
identification component which is part of the subject’s grounds for her 
judgement.
In order to see why, let us consider a similar argument which is commonly 
used in favour of direct realism in philosophy of perception. On the assumption 
that conditions are normal, i.e. that one’s sense organs are working properly 
and the world cooperates, a subject who has a visual experience as if there 
were a bottle in front of her would be immediately entitled to the belief [There is 
a bottle in front of me now]. What is relevant here is the thought that in order for 
the subject to be entitled to her belief she does not have to ground it in a belief 
to the effect that conditions are normal, even less in a belief that certain deviant 
conditions are not obtaining.
one’s brain is located. This position has the merit to give us an objective account of 
somatic proprioceptive information which would be defined as follows;
(0*) somatic proprioceptive information =df information solely received from the body 
in which one’s brain is located and which is about that body
Those who think that genuine proprioceptive information could be at work in deviant 
causal conditions too must clearly depart from (0*). But, then, they should provide us 
with an alternative account of somatic proprioceptive information. Such an account 
could not make reference to the identity of the body from which the information derives, 
hence it should specify the intrinsic features of somatic proprioception. This can be far 
from being a straightforward matter. For the sake of the argument, however, let us 
concede that such an alternative account could be provided.
134
This has a bearing on our case too. For if one is receiving proprioceptive 
information in the normal way, i.e. from one’s unique body in which one’s brain 
is located, then one is immediately entitled to form the belief [My legs are bent] 
on those bases. That is to say, if conditions are normal, one can form that 
judgement without basing it on a belief In an identification-component such as 
[My legs = the legs I am feeling now]. Nor does one have to make sure that 
conditions are normal in order to be entitled to that belief.
Flence, Evans can rebut the alleged counter-example by saying that in this 
world bodily self-ascriptions based on somatic proprioception are identification- 
free and hence lEM. So they are at least de facto lEM, because de facto, i.e. in 
this world, they do not involve any identification component as part of the 
subject’s rational grounds for her judgement. This, however, does not mean 
that they could never involve such identification components in logically 
possible worlds where the subjects were appraised of the particular situation 
they may be in. However, de facto identification-freedom and, consequently, de 
facto I EM is all Evans needs in order to make the point that our first-person 
concept is immediately as of embodied entities, contra the Cartesian and the 
Idealist positions.
As a consequence of Evans’ treatment of bodily self-ascriptions based on 
somatic proprioception, we have that in this world these self-ascriptions are 
open to just one form of error. That is to say, if one’s proprioceptive system is 
not working reliably, then it could give one an illusion as if one’s legs are bent. 
Think for instance of the sensation of falling down the bed which one may have 
when one is waking up. Hence, one would be under the illusion of falling down 
and form the corresponding judgement [I am falling down]. In such an event,
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the subject may coherently wonder whether her judgement [I am falling down] is 
true or is just illusory, where this would be tantamount to wondering whether 
one’s proprioceptive system is working reliably. However, this is not the same 
as to wonder whether one’s proprioceptive system is giving one information 
about someone else’s body.
The conclusion we can draw from Evans’ discussion is that if a judgement is 
based on the deliverances of somatic proprioception, then it is (at least de 
facto) identification-free and, therefore, lEM. For, in our world, proprioceptive 
information is such as to give us information relative to the unique body in 
which our brain is located, which is immediately relevant to the formation of a 
first-person thought. If, then, Evans is right in holding that this kind of 
judgements must be at least dispositionally in place for one to have the first- 
person concept, then he is right in claiming that our first-person concept is 
firmly anti-Cartesian and anti-idealist.
1.2 lEM of Physical Self-Ascriptions Based on Outer Perception
According to Evans, there is another way of gaining knowledge of our physical 
properties beside being proprioceptively aware of our bodies, namely, through 
outer perception. He writes:
I have in mind the way in which we are able to know our position, 
orientation, and relation to other objects in the world upon the basis 
of our perceptions of the world. Included here are such things as: 
knowing that one is in one’s bedroom by perceiving and recognizing 
the room and its contents; knowing that someone is moving in a train
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by seeing the world slide by; knowing that there is a tree in front of 
one, or to the right or left, by seeing it/^
Once again, Evans thinks that all these Judgements are identification-free 
and, consequently, lEM.^® For, these judgements are based on the subject's 
perception of the environment. Hence it cannot be the case that on these bases 
the subject knows that there is a given object in front of someone, without 
thereby knowing that that object is in front of her, and, hence, that she is in front 
of it.
Moreover, according to Evans, these ways of forming first-person judgements 
are fundamental to having an adequate Idea of ourselves by the standards of 
the Objectivity Requirement. He writes:
I suggested that our knowledge of what it is for [I am 0^ ] to be true, 
where is a fundamental identification of a person (conceived of, 
therefore, as an element of the objective spatial order), consists in 
our knowledge of what it is for us to be located at a position in space.
(...) I argued that this in turn can be regarded as consisting in a 
practical capacity to locate ourselves in space by means of the kinds 
of patterns of reasoning that I have just described [i.e. locating 
oneself by perceiving other objects in one’s environment]. It is this 
capacity which enables us to make sense of the idea that we 
ourselves are elements in the objective order; and this is what is 
required for our thoughts about ourselves to conform to the 
Generality Constraint.^®
17 Evans 1982: 222.
^®Cf. Ibid.
^®Evans 1982: 223.
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Once again the idea is that since we are persons, in order for us to have an 
adequate Idea of ourselves, we must be able to think of ourselves as such. 
Hence, part of this ability consists in thinking of ourselves as located in space, 
like all other physical objects. In turn, the ability to think of ourselves as located 
in space is manifested in our forming— or being disposed to form— l-thoughts
which are based on the perception of our environment.
However, Evans himself considers the case of deviant causal chains in which 
the subject receives perceptual information from someone else’s body. Yet, as 
before, considerations having to do with deviant causal conditions do not show 
that in normal conditions, i.e. when perceptual information is received through 
one’s own sensory organs, the ensuing bodily judgement would be rationally 
grounded on an inference containing an identification component such as [1 am 
appeared to as if there were a tree], [The person who is appeared to as if there 
were a tree = the person who is in front of the tree], therefore [I am in front of a 
tree]. At most, what can be said is that the judgement [I am in front of a tree], 
when based on direct perception of the objects in one’s environment, could be 
affected by EM if it were formed by subjects living in a logically possible world in 
which they are hooked up to someone else’s body and are appraised of the fact 
that they may be receiving perceptual information through the sensory organs of 
those bodies. However, in our world one may coherently wonder whether one’s 
perceptions are veridical, hence, whether it is true that one is in front of a tree, 
but one cannot coherently wonder whether one’s perceptions are giving one 
information about one’s own position relative to the objects in the environment.
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Hence, as in the case of somatic proprioception, we can conclude by saying 
that Evans is right in holding that, at least in normal conditions, outer perception 
immediately gives one knowledge about one’s own position relative to the 
objects in the environment. Hence, bodily self-ascriptions formed on these 
bases are identification-free and, therefore, lEM. Thus, if Evans is right in 
saying that one must be disposed to entertain this kind of judgements in order 
to have the first-person concept, then we can conclude that he is right in saying 
that our first-person concept is firmly anti-Cartesian and anti-idealist.
2. Mental Self-Ascriptions and lEM: Why the Cartesian Cannot Get Off the 
Ground
According to Evans, the Cartesian conception of the self, both at the level of 
reference and of sense is motivated by the thought that all and only mental self­
ascriptions can be lEM. Hence, in order to undermine it, he tries to show that 
the assumption on which the Cartesian can get off the ground, i.e. that all and 
only mental self-ascriptions are lEM, is not safe. As we have just seen, he first 
convincingly denies that only mental self-ascriptions are lEM, by showing that 
also some bodily ones are. Secondly, he shows that not all mental self­
ascriptions are lEM. In order to make this latter point, Evans puts forward the 
following example, which is meant to show that mental self-ascriptions can be 
affected by error through misidentiflcation;
[l]t feels as if 1 am touching a piece of cloth, and my relevant
information is restricted to seeing, in a mirror, a large number of
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hands reaching out and touching nothing, and one hand touching a 
piece of cloth. Here it makes sense for me to say ‘Someone is feeling 
a piece of cloth, but is it 1?^
This example should be understood as follows: it can be the case that a 
subject feels as if she is touching a piece of cloth. She also sees, reflected in a 
mirror, one hand touching a piece of cloth. She surmises that that is her hand. 
Hence she infers that she is feeling a piece of cloth. However, she could be 
mistaken about the identification component, i.e. she could be wrong about the 
fact that the hand she sees reflected in the mirror is hers. Therefore, her 
judgement [I am feeling a piece of cloth] could be wrong because of an error in 
the identification component.
This example shows that there can be inferential mental self-ascriptions 
which are affected by EM. Still, if this happens it is because, first, there is a 
sensation, e.g. as if of touching a piece of cloth, which grounds a self-ascription 
which would be identification-free and hence lEM, i.e. [1 feel as if my hand is 
touching a piece of cloth]. Secondly, error occurs because there is a wrong 
identification component, which, however, does not contain any psychological 
property. That is to say, the subject misidentifies the hand she sees reflected in 
a mirror and takes it to be hers, thus entertaining the belief [The hand of the 
person who is touching a piece of cloth = my hand]. Holding this identity to be 
true, then the subject is entitled to holding [1 am touching a piece of cloth], from 
which the factive psychological self-ascription [I feel a piece of cloth] would 
follow. Hence, we see that, in this case, the factive psychological self-ascription,
20,'Evans 1982: 219-220.
140
though partly dependent on a sensation, is also dependent on an identification 
component. So, while awareness of a sensation would issue in an identification- 
free self-ascription which would be lEM, the presence of an identification 
component which is liable to EM makes the resulting factive psychological 
judgement liable to EM as well. Thus, in the case of EM of psychological self­
ascriptions we should conclude that their being liable to EM is a derivative 
feature of their being based on an inference.
Another, maybe clearer, example of a mental self-ascription which would be 
affected by EM is this. X meets regularly with a group of people who all have 
some neurotic behaviour they are trying to cure. They talk about their 
experiences and a psychoanalyst moderates the discussion. At some point X 
hears the psychoanalyst say ‘You are afraid of dogs’. However, the 
psychoanalyst, by saying ‘you’ does not mean to refer to X, but to Y. Still, X 
understands the psychoanalyst’s utterance as directed to her. Moreover, since 
she firmly believes what her psychoanalyst tells her, she forms the belief [1 am 
afraid of dogs]. However, her self-ascription of that mental property would be 
affected by EM, for it would be grounded on the following inference, containing 
a mistaken identification component: [1 = The person to whom the
psychoanalyst refers by using ‘you’], [The person to whom the psychoanalyst 
refers by using ‘you’ is afraid of dogs], therefore [1 am afraid of dogs]. Again, this 
example shows that not all mental self-ascriptions are lEM. But, once more, it 
also shows that the self-ascription would be EM because it is based on an 
inference containing an identification component. However, we still have to
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explain lEM of non-inferential mental self-ascriptions, for that will allow us to 
confront the Cartesian and the idealist directly.
But, instead of embarking on this task, Evans simply acknowledges that self­
ascriptions of propositional attitudes, sensations and psychological properties 
are lEM. He writes:
Presumably it goes without saying that both the ways of gaining 
knowledge of ourselves that I have discussed in this section [i.e. 
knowing one’s mental properties such as certain beliefs or 
sensations] give rise to judgements which are immune to error 
through misidentification. When the first component expresses 
knowledge gained in one of these ways, it does not make sense for 
the subject to utter 'Someone believes that p, but is it I who believe 
that p?’, or ‘It seems to someone that there’s something red in front of 
him, but does it seem to me that there is something red in front of 
me7*
Of course what Evans is saying here is right. For it would not make rational 
sense to wonder whether the sensations and beliefs of which one is 
introspectively aware could be someone else’s. But why is it so? Moreover, why 
is it the case that the corresponding self-ascriptions are logically lEM, i.e. lEM in 
any possible world in which the same self-ascription is made on the basis of 
introspective awareness of a certain mental state? True, in a sense we know 
why these self-ascriptions are lEM, for we know that they are not rationally 
grounded on inferences involving any identification components. However, this 
does not explain yet why these self-ascriptions are logically lEM, i.e. they are 
such that they could never (logically) involve any Identification component. In
*Evans 1982: 233.
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order to see the point more clearly, contrast the case of non-inferential mental 
self-ascriptions with the case of bodily self-ascriptions based on somatic 
proprioception. As we have just seen, the fact that a bodily self-ascription is 
made on the basis of the deliverances of somatic proprioception does not 
exclude that in deviant causal conditions (in which a subject is appraised of the 
facts) the judgement be also based on a belief in an identification component, 
which, if wrong, would make it EM.^^ But it seems reasonable to hold that any 
self-ascription of a mental property, which is made on the basis of introspective 
knowledge of it, could never (logically) involve as part of its grounds a belief in 
an identification component such as [1 = the person who is feeling this 
pain/thinking this thought] and would thus be logically lEM. This, however, is a 
difference that is in need of explanation.^^
Evans' discussion of lEM of mental self-ascriptions stops here. "^  ^ Instead of 
pursuing it further, he concentrates on an attack against the Cartesian
^he re  shall be more about the distinction de facfo/logical lEM in Ch. 6.
hint at explanation can be found in the following passage. Evans 1982: 229: “The 
judgement’s being a judgement with a certain content can be regarded as constituted 
by its being a response to that state’’. This is developed in Peacocke 1983. We shall 
discuss it in Ch. 7.
'^^ In fact Evans discusses memory-based l-thoughts as well. He claims that if, on the 
basis of the deliverances of memory, one remembers being F, then this does not leave 
open the possibility of EM. Although quasi-memories are possible, this just shows that 
in peculiar conditions one could have an apparent memory of an event which, in fact, 
“embodies information deriving from the perception of that event by a person who is not 
necessarily himself" (Evans 1982: 248). Once again, Evans is right in claiming that if it
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conception of the mind. We will present this attack briefly, following the order in 
which it appears in The Varieties of Reference. The interest of this discussion is 
that Evans presents another pattern of argument which is meant to show that in 
order to be able to self-ascribe any mental property we must conceive of 
ourselves as persons, i.e. as embodied entities. If this argument is successful, it 
would help Evans show that both the idealist and the Cartesian conception of 
the self are un-intelligible. For, if an understanding of any mental predicate 
depends on our ability to self-ascribe it and this, in turn, presupposes an ability 
to think of ourselves as persons, then it follows that we must necessarily think of 
ourselves as physical entities which exist in space and time and are perceivable 
by others. Let us now turn to these arguments.
3. Against the Cartesian Conception o f the Mind I. The Case of Beliefs
Evans wants to dismantle the Cartesian conception of the mind as a theatre, or 
a garden, in which the subject, situated in an epistemic advantageous position, 
can infallibly perceive objects and events going on within it. Evans tries to do so 
with regard to beliefs and perceptions. In other words, the aim is to show that 
what we call introspection is not like seeing something happening within
seems to me to remember being F, then the self-ascription of the apparent memory is 
lEM. Moreover, he is also right in saying that, in the usual circumstances, the content 
of the apparent memory is also lEM, relative to the subject. For a discussion, of. 
Shoemaker 1994b, Peacocke 1983; 174-179, Pryor 1998.
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ourselves.M oreover, he wants to show that knowledge of our mental states 
necessarily involves thinking of mental predicates as satisfiable by persons 
other than oneself, and necessarily involves thinking of oneself as just one 
possible argument for these functions on a par with other possible ones, i.e. 
other persons. Indeed, as we will see, it is only this last part of the argument 
which, if successful, would be effective against the Cartesian and the Idealist.^^ 
The anti-Cartesian move made by Evans in his discussion of self-attributions 
of beliefs consists in following Strawson on the point that an understanding of ‘I 
believe that p’ goes hand in hand with an understanding of x believes that p', 
where x can be instantiated by someone other than the subject herself. By so 
doing, one should gain a conception of mental predicates as ascribable on the 
basis of various kinds of evidence. However, Evans goes on to claim that these 
diverse kinds of evidence have a bearing upon the truth of first-person self-
similar enterprise is carried out by Shoemaker, especially Shoemaker 1996. Cf. 
Ch. 6 in the following.
^In order to get rid of the Cartesian conception of the mind and of introspection. 
Evans, to an extent, follows Wittgenstein’s solution to Moore’s Paradox—'I believe it 
rains but it doesn’t’ and ‘It rains but 1 don’t believe it’—which consists in denying that 
one can know whether one believes that p, when p is an empirical proposition, by 
looking within oneself and finding out whether there is such an object, i.e. a belief, 
amongst the ones one can distinctly perceive within one’s mental theatre. Rather, by 
finding out that it rains, one is immediately able to form the belief that it rains and, if 
conceptually endowed, is immediately able to self-ascribe such a belief. Cf. 
Wittgenstein PI, II, pp. 190-192. On Moore’s Paradox, cf. Heal 1994, Malcolm 1995, 
Picardi 1995, Shoemaker 1996, Essays 2, 4.
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ascriptions.^^ But this cannot be right. For one finds out whether someone else 
has the belief that p by looking at what she does (her verbal and non-verbal 
behaviour) and the kind of evidence on which third-person ascriptions of beliefs 
are based is such as to manifest an embodied subject. Yet, by Evans' own 
lights, one is often in a position to self-ascribe a belief immediately, without 
observing oneself. That is why, following a generalisation of Hume’s point we 
will consider shortly, one can be led to conclude that awareness of one’s own 
mental states is not also awareness of an object which instantiates those 
properties. Hence, one can also grant that an understanding of the 
psychological predicate ‘believing that p ’ depends on the ability to ascribe it 
both to oneself and to others. But from this it does not follow that in order to 
understand that predicate one must also think of oneself and others as on a par.
To put the point more vividly let us make use of an analogy: it may be true 
that in order to display an understanding of the predicate ‘big’, subjects must be 
able to attribute it to all sorts of things, e.g. objects, persons, numbers, etc. and, 
of course, they would do that on the basis of various kinds of evidence. But from 
this it does not follow that they should think of, say, numbers and physical 
objects as entities of the same sort, or on a par. Similarly, it does not follow that 
in order to understand psychological predicates, which are attributable on the 
basis of various sorts of grounds, subjects must think of themselves as on a par 
with other persons. Thus, this strand of the Generality Constraint is not 
sufficient in order to show that they must think of themselves as embodied.
27,Of. Evans 1982: 226.
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Let us consider the other strand of the Generality Constraint,, in which it is not 
the subject of the psychological self-ascription that varies, but the predication. 
The idea is this: it could be suggested that, in order to have an adequate idea of 
oneself, the subject should be able to entertain judgements like [1 = the person 
who can be said by X to believe that p on the basis of her utterances and 
deeds]. By so doing, an understanding of the mental predicate ‘to believe that p' 
would go hand in hand with one’s ability to think of oneself as a person on a par 
with all others, i.e. as a human being who can be perceived and interpreted by 
other human beings. Hence, an understanding of a mental predicate like 
‘believing that p ’ would involve the ability to think of oneself as a person who 
can be supposed by others to believe that p. Yet, this does not mean that the 
self-ascription of the belief in the first place is based on an awareness of oneself 
as a person. That is to say, it is not the case that ‘I believe that p ’ when formed 
on the basis of one’s direct awareness of one’s own mental states is also based 
on an awareness of oneself as an object, i.e. as an embodied entity. Hence, 
although the ability to self-ascribe a belief can depend on one’s ability to think of 
oneself as a person, the self-ascription of the belief not only fails to depend on 
“perceiving” one’s own mental states, but it also fails to depend on “perceiving" 
oneself as having a body.^®
^As we will see, this may induce the thought that the I who thinks, feels and 
perceives is not given as an object. That is to say, one’s ability to self-ascribe the 
relevant mental states is not grounded in one’s awareness of oneself as an embodied 
self. We shall discuss this issue at length in the following and in Ch. 7.
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4. Against The Cartesian Conception of the Mind II. The Case of Outer 
Perceptions, Hume’s Point and the Case of Inner Perceptions
Evans’ treatment of outer perception has by now become familiar, given the 
recent intense debate on the content of perception. But here is a quick sketch 
which summarises some of the points made in one of the previous chapters: 
perceptions have non-conceptual content, which represents the world as being 
in a certain way and can either be true or false. Judgements are then based on 
the non-conceptual content of perceptions, although they require the mastery of 
the relevant concepts.
According to Evans, then, one can gain knowledge of one’s own internal 
informational states by going through “exactly the same procedure as he would 
go through if he were trying to make a judgement about how it is at this place 
now, but excluding any knowledge he has of an extraneous kind"^^ and by 
prefixing the judgement based on one’s outer perception with the locution ‘It 
seems to me as though...’. By so doing, one would produce in oneself “a 
cognitive state whose content is systematically dependent upon the content of 
the informational state”.H o w e v e r ,  contrary to the Cartesian model of 
knowledge of one’s own mental states through introspection, there would not be 
anything like “perceiving that state”.
% f. Ch.3, fn. 13. 
^Evans 1982: 227. 
^Evans 1982: 228.
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Evans’ further move against the Cartesian conception of the mind consists in 
undermining the idea that subjects can have infallible knowledge of their 
perceptual states. He writes:
[Cjonsider a case in which a subject sees ten points of light arranged 
in a circle, but reports that there are eleven points of light arranged in 
a circle, because he has made a mistake in counting, forgetting 
where he began. Such a mistake can clearly occur again when the 
subject re-uses the procedure in order to gain knowledge of his 
internal state: his report ‘1 seem to see eleven points of light arranged 
in a circle’ is just wrong.^
Finally, we have to take into account Evans’ reading of Hume’s point, which is 
the following:
[Wjhen 1 enter most intimately into what 1 call myself, 1 always 
stumble on some particular perception or other (...). 1 can never catch 
myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe 
anything but the perception.^
Now, Evans argues that, once we dispense with the perceptual metaphor, as 
indeed we should do, Hume’s point can be read as establishing the following 
conclusion:
[Wjhat we are aware of, when we know that we see a tree, is nothing 
but a tree. In fact, we only have to be aware of some state of the 
world in order to be in a position to make an assertion about 
ourselves.^
^Evans 1982: 228-229.
^Hume 1978; 252. Cf. Evans 1982: 231.
^Evans 1982: 231.
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Then Evans goes on to say that by being aware of a state of affairs in the 
world we are ipso facto aware of a substantial and persisting self.^^ Now, the 
problem arises with his way of arguing to that conclusion. For here Evans does 
not avail himself of ecological theories of perception, according to which outer 
perception and, in particular, visual perception, involves also a perception of 
some of one's bodily parts and, therefore, contains a representation of “a 
substantial and persisting se lf’.^ ® Nor does he avail himself of the point he has 
already made that by perceiving a state of affairs, one gets knowledge of 
oneself as located, and hence as a physical entity. Rather, Evans tries to make 
his point by arguing, first, that by just perceiving a state of affairs, we can gain 
knowledge of our mental state. That is to say, by perceiving a tree we can have 
knowledge of ourselves as the perceivers of this state of affairs. Secondly, 
Evans argues that we can only attribute a perceptual predicate to ourselves, if 
we are able to think of the first-order property, i.e. seeing a tree, as instantiated 
by other persons, i.e. other persisting selves, in conformity with one of the 
strands of the Generality Constraint. However, as before (cf. § 3), this cannot 
be carried on to establish that by so doing we must think of ourselves as 
persons. Nor can it be carried on to establish that we are aware of a substantial
Notice in fact that the quotation from Evans above goes on as follows “Now this 
might raise the following perplexity. How can it be that we can have knowledge of a 
state of affairs which involves a substantial and persisting self, simply by being aware 
of (...) a state of the world?" (Evans 1982; 231).
^^Ecological theories of perception have been developed starting from Gibson’s 
work. Of. Gibson 1979.
150
and persisting self. For one thing, the kind of evidence on which these 
predicates are ascribed is different in the case of the first and the third person. 
In the case of the former, by perceiving a state of affairs, the subject is ipso 
facto able to attribute the predicate to herself; whereas in the latter case it is 
only on the basis of either observation of a person or testimony about a person 
that the subject can think of someone else as perceiving a state of affairs. 
Consequently, by Evans' own lights, it is only when these predicates are 
attributed to a third person that the bases on which this can be done manifest a 
subject with both physical and psychological properties. But, in our own case, 
that kind of knowledge is not available exactly because no observation of 
someone perceiving a tree is going on.^^ So, once again, this strand of the 
Generality Constraint, i.e. the strand according to which in order to be able to 
self-ascribe a mental property a subject must be able to ascribe it to others, is 
too weak to establish the intended points, i.e. that by attributing any mental 
property whatever to oneself one is ipso facto aware of oneself as a bodily 
entity, and that one can only attribute a mental property to oneself if one thinks 
of oneself as embodied.
Moreover, the second strand of the Generality Constraint, i.e. the one in 
which it is the predication that varies, would have similar problems to the ones 
we saw at the end of § 3. For, although an understanding of ‘perceiving that p ’ 
may go hand in hand with an understanding of what it would be for one to be 
supposed by someone else to perceive that p, this does not show yet that self­
ascriptions of perceptions are based on an awareness of oneself as an
^For a discussion of this point of. Ch. 6 and, in particular, Ch. 7.
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embodied entity. Hence, according to Evans, self-ascriptions of outer 
perceptions are neither based on anything like “perceiving” one’s own mental 
state, nor are they based on anything like “perceiving” oneself as an object 
(unless we subscribe to ecological theories of perception, but Evans does not; 
or else we insist on the point already made by Evans that by perceiving a state 
of affairs we gain knowledge of ourselves as located in space and, hence, as 
physical entities). Still, they may involve thinking of oneself as a person and 
could be based on a mental state which represents the subject as located in 
space relative to other objects.
Considerations partly similar to the ones just exploited for outer perceptions 
apply to Evans’ treatment of reports of sensations as based on informational 
states of the subject’s body. He claims that by having pain in one’s leg (say) 
and so judging a subject thereby gains knowledge of being in an informational 
state which represents a part of her body as feeling awful. Hence, she would 
have knowledge of herself as e m bo d ied .T h us , bodily sensations give one 
knowledge of oneself as embodied. Hence, although bodily sensations are not 
based on anything like observing oneself, they give one information about one’s 
own body. Therefore, contrary to the Cartesian and the Idealist claims it is not 
true that awareness of mental properties is never an awareness of oneself as 
embodied.
Still, even if bodily sensations give one knowledge of oneself as embodied, 
this is not yet to say that all sensations would be based on anything like
tva n s  1982; 231.
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“perceiving” oneself as embodied. In fact, it is reasonable to maintain that, for 
instance, sensing blue would not give one awareness of oneself as embodied.
Hence, we can conclude this section on Evans’ second pattern of arguments 
against the Cartesian and the Idealist by saying that he has not managed to 
show that all cases of psychological self-ascriptions are based on an awareness 
of oneself as an embodied e n t i t y . F o r  he has convincingly argued to that 
effect only in the case of self-ascriptions of bodily sensation. Still, he has shown 
that the ability to self-ascribe all sorts of mental properties requires the subject’s 
ability to think of herself as a person who can be perceived and made sense of 
by others. Hence, he has shown that our concept of the first-person is at odds
with the Cartesian and the Idealist uses of it. Yet, he has not completely shown j
1fthat their views cannot have a grip at all, because, as we have seen, he has not I
Ifully shown that self-ascriptions of mental properties are based on an 
awareness of oneself as an embodied entity. Hence, he has not managed to j
show how awareness of a mental state which does not manifest an embodied j
owner can ground a se/f-ascription of it, i.e. an ascription of that mental state to ;
a human being. j
^  We will come back to this issue in connection with Peacocke’s discussion of 
representation-dependent and representation-independent uses of the first person. Cf. 
Ch. 7.
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5. Conclusions
Evans is right in saying that bodily self-ascriptions based on either 
proprioception or perception of one’s environment are lEM. Hence, if he is right 
in saying that one must retain the capacity, exercised in the past, to make these 
self-ascriptions in order for one to have the first-person concept, then he has 
managed to show that our first-person concept is firmly anti-Cartesian and anti­
idealist. Hence, his account of lEM offers the prospects of a sound substantive 
response to the trilemma.
However, an exhaustive explanation of lEM requires: (a) a satisfactory 
characterisation of the phenomenon at hand; (b) a determination of the class of 
(in particular) l-judgements which are lEM; finally, (c) an explanation of why 
these judgements are lEM. Now, Evans has accomplished (a) relative to a 
particular kind of lEM judgements, i.e. those which, de facto, do not involve an 
identification (as part of the subject's grounds for the self-ascription) and are 
based on a way of gaining information directly from objects (one’s body 
i nc luded ) .He has also accomplished (b), since he has shown that, beside 
non-inferential mental self-ascriptions, there are some bodily self-ascriptions 
which, when based on appropriate grounds, are lEM and he has also shown 
that not all mental self-ascriptions are lEM. However, he has accomplished (c) 
only in part. For he has shown that bodily self-ascriptions can be lEM when 
based on a way of gaining information directly from one’s body or from the
‘*^ But recall our amendments to his definition of identification-freedom and, 
consequently, of lEM (cf. Ch. 3 and § 2 above).
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environment. However, he has not shown how non-inferential mental self­
ascriptions can be I EM. Nor has he shown why introspection-based mental self­
ascriptions are logically lEM, i.e. they are such that they could never be based 
on an identification component such as [I = the person who is enjoying this 
mental state], which, if wrong, could lead to EM. Hence, in the following we will 
try to supplement Evans' substantive response to the trilemma with a 
satisfactory account of lEM of these kinds of mental self-ascriptions, which will 
also show why they are logically lEM, i.e. it can never be the case that the 
rational grounds for them involve a belief in an identification component.
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SECTION 111
REVISIONIST ACCOUNTS OF IMMUNITY TO ERROR 
THROUGH MISIDENTIFICATION AND DEFLATIONIST 
RESPONSES TO THE TRILEMMA
Summary
In this section we consider the proposals of various authors in which 
revisionist accounts of I EM and deflationist responses to the trilemma are put 
forward.
In Ch. 6
• we consider Shoemaker’s account of EM and his distinctions between 
absolute vs. circumstantial and de facto vs. logical lEM (§ 1);
• we claim that his account of lEM of non-inferential mental self-ascriptions, 
which is fundamental to his response to the trilemma, is partially wanting 
( § 1.1);
• we turn to Wright’s account of EM and to his revisionist account of lEM 
(§ 2);
• we then turn to Wright’s account of lEM of non-inferential mental self­
ascriptions, which is fundamental to his response to the trilemma, and claim 
that it is incomplete (§ 2.1);
• we turn to Pryor’s distinction between de re and which-Eh/\ and to his 
corresponding distinction between de re lEM and which-\EN\. We argue that 
since there is just one kind of EM, namely de re EM, there is just one 
corresponding kind of lEM, i.e. de re lEM. Hence, we conclude that his
revisionist account of lEM is partially wanting and no real response to the 
trilemma has been given.
In Ch. 7
• we discuss Peacocke’s theory of l-thoughts and propose some 
amendments to it (§ 1). Moreover, we claim that it can be combined with 
Evans’;
• we maintain that it explains I EM of introspection-based mental self­
ascriptions only partially (§ 2), for it rests on the assumption, which is in need 
of explanation, that one cannot be introspectively aware of someone else’s 
mental states;
• we then turn to Peacocke’s more recent work on the epistemology of first- 
person thoughts (§ 3);
• we present his account of (Rl) “representation-independence” which is 
typical to some l-thoughts in his view (§ 3.1);
• we turn to Peacocke’s delta-account of the epistemology of Rl l-thoughts 
(§ 3.2). We claim that it presupposes an explanation of why mental states are 
necessarily owned and owned by the same person who is introspectively 
aware of them. Drawing on Peacocke’s own proposal we supplement it in 
order to provide an explanation of the former fact; we leave the explanation of 
the latter for the following section;
• we summarise our conclusions (§ 4).
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Chapter Six
Revisionist Accounts of lEM 
and Deflationist Responses to the Trilemma: 
Shoemaker, Wright and Pryor
The conclusion we drew in the last section was that if Evans’ theory of I- 
thoughts is correct, then the Cartesian and the Idealist positions are not only 
problematic, for the reasons we saw in Ch. 2, but also because their use of the 
first person is unintelligible from our stand point. However, although their views 
about the self are obviously contentious, they provide at least a prima facie 
explanation of why non-inferential mental self-ascriptions are I EM, according to 
lEMdfi. To repeat, the Cartesian will claim that they are lEM because of the 
peculiar nature of the self and of the conditions of one’s encounter with it, i.e. 
the self is a mental substance which is presented to oneself for each act of 
thought and which cannot be mistakenly identified given the transparency of the 
mind. By contrast, the Idealist will claim that since no object at all is given for 
identification or recognition when the relevant mental self-ascriptions are made, 
it follows that there cannot be error through misidentification either.
In this chapter we will examine various revisionist accounts of lEM, i.e. 
accounts of lEM which are revisionist of lEM^n, yet offer deflationist responses 
to the trilemma. That is to say, they do not try to confront the Cartesian and the
idealist on conceptual grounds. Rather, they claim that there can be an 
explanation of lEM in general and of non-inferential mental self-ascriptions in 
particular, which is compatible with the fact that the self is embodied. Hence, 
they undermine the motivation to go either Cartesian or Idealist. In the following, 
we will assess whether they really do manage to give a satisfactory explanation 
of lEM of non-inferential mental self-ascriptions. Recall, in fact, that a 
satisfactory explanation of I EM of non-inferential mental self-ascriptions is the 
missing piece of an exhaustive substantive response to the trilemma. For, as 
we have seen, Evans does not really provide us with an explanation of lEM of 
this kind of self-ascriptions. Hence, if the deflationists offer us a sound 
explanation of this phenomenon, their views will help us supplement Evans’ 
own proposal. However, as we will see, deflationists illuminate the phenomenon 
we want to explain only in part. Hence, we will have to integrate their views in 
important respects. This, however, shall be the topic of the last section of our 
work.
1. Shoemaker: Absolute vs. Circumstantial lEM, De Facto vs. Logical lEM
Recall Shoemaker’s definition of lEM we introduced in Ch. 1:
To say that a statement ‘a is cj)’ is subject to error through 
misidentification relative to the term 'a' means that the following is 
possible: the speaker knows some particular thing to be c|) but makes 
the mistake of asserting ‘a is because, and only because, he
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mistakenly thinks that the thing he knows to be (j) is what “a” refers 
to?
Obviously Shoemaker’s definition should be amended in such a way that not 
only sentences but also judgements can be EM, and that we can falsely believe 
a to be (j), i.e. EM is compatible with an error in the predication component.^
However, although Shoemaker offers a definition of EM which is essentially 
correct, he does not present a corresponding definition of lEM. Rather, he 
distinguishes between various kinds of lEM.
The first kind of distinction is between l-judgements which are absolutely lEM 
and those which are only circumstantially so. As the labels suggest, this 
distinction has to do with the circumstances in which the l-judgement is made. 
We can be more precise and say that the distinction has to do with the grounds 
on which the judgement is made.^ That is to say, the same content can be 
entertained on the basis of different grounds. For instance, I can judge [My hair 
is blowing in the wind] on the basis of the observation of my reflection on a 
glass window or on the basis of the deliverances of somatic proprioception. If 
the former is the case the judgement can be liable to EM, whereas, in the latter 
case, it is lEM.
However, according to Shoemaker, there are self-ascriptions which are 
absolutely lEM. In this connection, he seems to have in mind mental self-
^Shoemaker 1994a: 82.
^A similar amendment to Shoemaker’s definition can be found in Peacocke 1999: 
269, although he opts for beliefs and thought constituents or modes of presentation.
^Cf. Evans 1982, Wright 1998, Garrett 1995, Peacocke 1999.
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ascriptions. Yet, as we saw with Evans, also mental self-ascriptions can be 
liable to EM, when they are based on Inference. Hence, also mental self­
ascriptions can be circumstantially lEM, depending on which grounds they are 
based. The only case in which it seems to make sense to say that the self­
ascription of a mental property is absolutely lEM seems to be the case of self­
ascriptions of sensations. For it would be quite difficult to imagine that one may 
know that one is in pain or is appeared to redly on inferential bases. However, it 
has to be stressed that, if at all, these would be the only examples of absolute 
lEM.
Hence, Shoemaker’s distinction between circumstantial and absolute lEM is 
potentially misleading, for it suggests that there are self-ascriptions, i.e. mental 
ones in particular, which are lEM no matter which grounds they are based on. In 
fact, it would be more correct to say that lEM is always a function of the grounds 
on which a self-ascription is based, and then notice that there are some mental 
self-ascriptions, like self-ascriptions of sensations, which seem to be (at least 
almost always) based on grounds that make them lEM.
Moreover, according to Shoemaker, judgements that are circumstantially lEM 
are so because they are ultimately based on a judgement that is absolutely 
lEM. Shoemaker illustrates the distinction between circumstantial and absolute 
lEM and this dependence-thesis as follows:
First-person statements that are immune to error through 
misidentification (...) [are] those in which "I” is used ‘as subject’, [and] 
could be said to have ‘absolute immunity’ to error through 
misidentification. A statement like ‘1 am facing a table’ does not have 
this sort of immunity, for we can imagine circumstances in which 
someone might make this statement on the basis of having
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misidentified someone else (e.g. the person he sees in a mirror) as 
himself. But there will be no possibility of such a misidentification if 
one makes this statement on the basis of seeing a table in front of 
one in the ordinary way (without aid of mirrors, etc.); let us say that 
when made in this way the statement has ‘circumstantial immunity’ to 
error through misidentification relative to “I". It would appear that, 
when a self-ascription is circumstantially immune to error through 
misidentification, this is always because the speaker knows or 
believes it to be true as a consequence of some other self-ascription, 
which the speaker knows or is entitled to believe, that is absolutely 
immune to error through misidentification; e.g. in the circumstances 
just imagined the proposition I am facing a table’ would be known or 
believed as a consequence of the proposition ‘I see a table in the 
centre of my field of vision’.
Shoemaker rightly points out that certain physical self-ascriptions like [I am 
facing a table], when based on the direct perception of one’s environment, are 
I EM. By contrast, if the same self-ascription is based on observation of the 
reflection in a mirror, it will be liable to EM. However, he thinks that bodily self­
ascriptions that are circumstantially lEM are based on a self-ascription that is 
absolutely lEM. As the example he discusses suggests. Shoemaker wants to 
make the point that the relevant bodily self-ascription would be based on a 
mental one, which, depending on whether or not we allow for absolute lEM in 
the case of self-ascriptions of sensations, will be either absolutely lEM or, at 
least, circumstantially so. That is to say, since, in those circumstances, it would 
be based on introspective awareness of one’s sensations, it would be lEM. 
Thus, in the case of bodily self-ascriptions, their being lEM depends, according
Shoemaker 1994a: 82.
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to Shoemaker, on the fact that they are based on a non-inferential, and hence,
I EM, mental self-ascription.
Finally, it is important to be clear about what is meant by saying that a certain 
judgement is lEM “as a consequence of some other self-ascription (...) that is 
absolutely immune to error through misidentification”. In particular, we have 
claimed that one need not actually entertain the relevant self-ascription which is 
lEM. Rather, it is sufficient for it to be (not necessarily currently) believed, where 
such a belief would be part of the subject’s grounds for the physical self­
ascription.
Moreover, Shoemaker distinguishes between de facto and logical lEM. He 
illustrates that distinction as follows:
[In the case of] 1 was angry’, [said on the basis of memory in the 
ordinary way], a mistake of identification is impossible. It goes with 
this that the (...) past-tense, first-person judgement does not rest on 
an observationally based reidentification of the person referred to with 
T (...). [But] one might ‘quasi-remember’ past experiences or actions 
that are not one’s own (...). To allow that this is [logically] possible is 
to allow that in a certain sense first-person memory judgements are 
subject to error through misidentification.^
A definition of quasi-memory can be found in Evans who writes:
[A] subject q-remembers an event e if and only if (I) he has an 
apparent memory of such an event, and (ii) that apparent memory in 
fact embodies information deriving from the perception of that event 
by a person who is not necessarily himself.®
^Shoemaker 1994b: 130-131, 
®Evans 1982: 247-248.
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Hence, according to Shoemaker, while non-inferential mental self-ascriptions 
are logically lEM, i.e. they are lEM in any logically possible world, bodily self­
ascriptions based on proprioceptive grounds or on perception of one’s 
environment as well as memory-based self-ascriptions are only do facto so. 
That is to say, according to him, in this world bodily self-ascriptions based on 
these kinds of grounds are based on a non-inferential mental self-ascription, 
such as [1 fee! as if my legs are bent] or [I seem to remember that p], but do not 
involve an identification component like [The body I am feeling now = my body] 
or [1 = the person whose past I remember]. However, in a logically possible 
world, according to Shoemaker, the relevant self-ascriptions could involve such 
an identification component, which may or may not be right. Hence, these self- 
ascriptions are lEM only because, in this world, certain contingencies obtain, i.e. 
we receive proprioceptive information from our bodies and remember our own 
experiences.
However, as we saw with Evans, if it is maintained that EM and lEM have 
always to do with the subject’s rational grounds for her judgement, bodily self- 
ascriptions based on somatic proprioception and self-ascriptions based on q- 
memories would be liable to EM just in case in deviant possible worlds the 
subject knew or had reasons to believe that she might be receiving information 
from someone else’s body or might be q-remembering another person’s past. 
For, if she did not know that, then she would have no reason to ground her self- 
ascriptions on a belief in an identification component.
To recapitulate: we have seen that Shoemaker offers an explicit definition of 
EM which, once some amendments to it have been made, is essentially correct.
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By contrast, he does not offer an explicit definition of lEM. Rather, he 
distinguishes between absolute and circumstantial lEM and between logical and 
de facto lEM. Both these distinctions need to be amended, though. For the 
distinction between circumstantial and absolute lEM can rarely (if ever) make 
sense, although it has the merit to bring out the fact that EM/I EM is a function of 
the grounds on which a judgement is based. Moreover, the distinction between 
logical and de facto lEM has to be relativised to the subject's rational grounds 
for the judgement (or to her state of information) in a logically possible world. 
However, Shoemaker rightly recognises that lEM is compatible with the view 
that selves are embodied, contrary to the Cartesian and the Idealist claims.
Finally, Shoemaker also points out that circumstantial and de facto lEM 
depend, in a sense which we have specified, on some self-ascription that is 
logically lEM. In particular, these kinds of lEM depend on some non-inferential 
mental self-ascription. However, precisely because, according to Shoemaker, 
lEM of bodily self-ascriptions is a consequence of their being based on 
psychological non-inferential self-ascriptions, which are logically I EM, the latter 
are what must still be explained. Without such an explanation, Shoemaker’s 
account of lEM does not represent a fully-fledged alternative to either the 
Cartesian’s or the Idealist’s.
1.1 Shoemaker’s Account o f lEM o f Non-inferential Mental Self-Ascriptions
Shoemaker himself points out that a satisfactory explanation of lEM of self­
ascriptions depends on the viability of a satisfactory explanation of I EM of non-
1 6 6
inferential mental self-ascriptions. For, according to him, they are what must be 
explained in order to explain any other form of lEM, when self-ascriptions are at 
stake. For this reason, Shoemaker embarks on a discussion of introspection. To 
anticipate, on the one hand, he wants to claim that Hume is right in pointing out 
that in introspection one does not encounter a peculiar object like a mental 
substance which is identical to oneself, and is a bearer of mental properties. On 
the other hand, he wants to defend the claim that in being introspectively aware 
of one’s own mental properties, one is ipso facto aware that they are 
instantiated in oneself. Consequently, although one is not quasi-perceptually 
aware of an object, when one is introspectively aware of one’s own mental 
properties, one has nevertheless the right to se/f-attribute them. That is to say. 
one has the right to consider them as instantiated in a subject, which is identical 
to oneself. Let us consider Shoemaker’s claims in more detail.
First of all, he points out that in introspection the subject is not aware of 
herself as a physical object.^ We saw how Evans tried to deny this point by 
appealing, first, to the fact that introspection should be conceived as involving 
also somatic proprioception, in which case the subject would be aware of 
herself as a physical entity. Secondly, Evans claimed that awareness of one’s 
bodily sensations gives the subject awareness of herself as embodied. Hence, it 
gives her awareness of herself as a physical object. Here is how Shoemaker’s 
reply to Evans’ claims would go:
(...) [I]f my ‘self is a flesh-and-blood person, why shouldn’t it be
accessible to me (itself) in a way in which it is not accessible to
Cf. Shoemaker 1994a; 85.
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others, so that in knowing that what is presented to me is presented 
in this special way—from the inside, as it were— I would know that it 
can be nothing other than myself?
Now there is a perfectly good sense in which my self is accessible 
to me in a way in which it is not to others (...). I see nothing wrong 
with describing the self-ascription of such predicates as 
manifestations of self-knowledge or self-awareness. But it is plainly 
not the occurrence of self-awareness in this sense that has been 
denied by those philosophers who have denied that one is an object 
to oneself; e.g. it is not what Hume denied when he said; ‘I can never 
catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe 
anything but the perception.’ What those philosophers have wanted 
to deny, and rightly so, is that this self-awareness is to be explained 
in a certain way. They have wanted to deny that there is an 
experiencing or perceiving of one’s self that explains one’s 
awareness that one is, for example, in pain in a way analogous to 
that in which one’s sense perception of John explains one’s 
knowledge that John has a beard.®
Hence, the reply would consist in pointing out that at least awareness of one’s 
own mental properties does not give one awareness of oneself as a physical 
object. This, in turn, can be glossed as the view that when one self-ascribes a 
mental property in a non-inferential way, the self-ascription is neither based on 
the identification of an object, nor on its individuation. For no self as an object is 
presented to one when one self-ascribes a mental property.
However, Shoemaker’s claim is too strong. For, arguably, when one is aware 
of one’s bodily sensations one is also aware of oneself as a physical entity with, 
for instance, an aching wrist. Surely he is right in saying that this kind of 
awareness is not based on an observation of oneself, which can disclose to one
^Shoemaker 1994a: 87.
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one one’s own properties, like having an aching wrist. Nevertheless, it seems 
wrong to deny that one would be presented to oneself as a physical entity and, 
therefore, as an object. Still, Shoemaker’s claim is valid when it comes at least 
to self-ascriptions of beliefs and non-bodily sensations. For, when one judges [I 
believe that p] or [I am appeared to redly] one does not do so by being 
presented with oneself as embodied and by finding out that that self has the 
property of believing that p/sensing red, etc. Rather, one has a belief that p or a 
sensation of red and one is ipso facto entitled to self-ascribe it, without being 
presented to oneself in thought.
Secondly, Shoemaker proposes a reductio of the view that in introspection 
one is aware of an object, whether it be empirical or peculiar like a Cartesian 
ego. He writes:
An essential part of the explanation of my perceptual awareness that 
John has a beard is the fact that the observed properties of the man I 
perceive, together with other things I know, are sufficient to identify 
him for me as John. If the awareness that I am in pain had an 
explanation analogous to this, it would have to be that 1 ‘perceive’, by 
‘inner sense', something whose ‘observed properties’ identify it to 
myself. And if the supposition that the perception is by ‘inner sense’ is 
supposed to preclude the possibility of misidentification, presumably 
this must be because it guarantees that the perceived self would 
have a property, namely, the property of being an object of my inner 
sense, which no self other than myself could (logically) have and by 
which I could infallibly identify it as myself. But of course, in order to 
identify a self as myself by its possession of this property, I would 
have to know that I observe it by inner sense, and this self- 
knowledge, being the ground of my identification of the self as 
myself, could not itself be grounded on that identification. Yet, if it 
were possible in this one case for my self-knowledge not to be 
grounded on an identification of a self as myself, there seems to be 
no reason at all why this should not be possible in other cases, e.g. in
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the case of my knowledge that I feel pain or my knowledge that I see 
a canary. Thus the supposition that there is observation by inner 
sense of oneself—where this is something that is supposed to 
explain, and therefore cannot be simply equated with, the ability to 
self-ascribe those predicates whose self-ascription is immune to error 
through misidentification—is at best a superfluous hypothesis: it 
explains nothing that cannot be just as easily, and more 
economically, explained without it.®
The point made by Shoemaker can be put as follows: if knowledge that I am 
in pain depended on some form of perceptual awareness of my self, it would 
also involve an identification of that object as my self. Hence, I should be able 
to entertain identity judgements of the form [I = this self]. However, knowledge 
of the first component, i.e. knowledge relative to [I], cannot be grounded on 
some previous identification, on pain of a vicious infinite regress. Therefore, 
one must already have knowledge of one’s self which is not based on 
identification. Hence, there is no reason to suppose that knowledge that, for 
instance, I am in pain cannot be independent of any identification of a self as 
myself. Thus, appeal to the object-perceptual model, in the case of 
introspection, is, at best, superfluous.
Although Shoemaker’s argument is correct, it is not conclusive because it 
overlooks the following possibility. Although no recognition or identification of 
one’s self is involved when one is aware of feeling pain, it could be the case 
that an object be presented and, hence, individuated. Indeed, this would square
^Shoemaker 1994a: 87-88.
^°For a discussion of the object-perceptual model of introspection, of, also 
Shoemaker 1996, Ch. 10.
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with the intuition that when one self-ascribes a bodily sensation, one is also
presented to oneself as an embodied entity. However, this possibility would not
square with the phenomenology of self-ascriptions of beliefs and non-bodily
sensations, for, in those cases, the embodied self does not seem to be
presented in introspection.^^
Let us now turn to Shoemaker’s positive suggestion. To repeat, he wants to
show that, although we are not aware of an object when we are aware of our
mental properties, we can, nevertheless self-attribute them, i.e. attribute them
to a self, which is necessarily one’s self. Here it is:
I think that the main source of trouble here is a tendency to think of 
awareness as a kind of perception, i.e. to think of it on the model of 
sense-perception. I have been denying that self-awareness involves 
any sort of perception of oneself, but this should not be taken to 
mean that in making a judgement like 'I feel pain’ one is aware (italics 
mine) of anything less than the fact that one does, oneself, feel pain; 
in being aware that one feels pain one is, tautologicaliy, aware, not 
simply that the attribute feel(s) pain is instantiated, but that it is 
instantiated in oneself.^^
The idea is this: introspection should not be construed on the basis of the 
object-perceptual model. However, awareness of one’s mental properties is 
ipso facto awareness of those properties as instantiated in oneself.
^^Cassam 1997b makes the same point. Consequently, a materialist theory of the 
self, in his view, should show, contra Hume and Kant, that, when subjects self-attribute 
all sorts of mental properties on the basis of introspection, they are also introspectively 
aware of a material self, i.e. of an embodied self.
^^Shoemaker 1994a: 89.
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The trouble with this claim is that it is made in terms of awareness. And 
awareness seems to imply the presentation of something. Hence, saying that in 
being aware of a mental property one is "aware (...) that it is instantiated in 
oneself' is in danger of suggesting that, in introspection, one is, after all, aware 
of one’s self as an object. However, since awareness seems to involve the 
presentation of an object, this interpretation would be in danger of slipping into 
the object-perceptual model again. Alternatively, Shoemaker’s point could be 
understood as meaning that one is not aware of one’s self as an object 
(empirical or peculiar like a Cartesian ego, it does not matter). Indeed this 
seems to be the right interpretation, given Shoemaker’s purposes. However, it 
is totally unclear how simple awareness of one’s mental properties is ipso facto 
awareness that they are instantiated in oneself, when no self as an object is 
given or presented in introspection. That is to say, the problem is to explain how 
we can justify, once Hume’s point is taken on board, the passage from the 
awareness of, for instance, there being a tree, which would lead to the 
judgement [There is a tree] to the self-ascription of it, i.e. the judgement [1 
believe that there is a tree]. In other words, once Hume's point is endorsed, the 
problem arises of explaining how it is possible to justify the ascription of a 
mental property to a self, i.e. one’s self, thereby avoiding the Idealist position.
At this stage, however. Shoemaker also mentions the fact that it is 
tautological that if one is aware of a mental property, it is ipso facto aware that it 
is instantiated in oneself. Equivalently, he claims that there are certain 
predicates “each of which can be known to be instantiated in such a way that 
knowing it to be instantiated in that way is equivalent to knowing it to be
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instantiated in oneself"/^ But the question still is: how should we develop this 
suggestion in such a way that it is no longer mysterious why the relevant self­
ascriptions are logically lEM? That is to say, what makes it the case that, 
contrary to other predicates, some mental ones are such that to know in a 
certain way that they are instantiated does not (logically) leave open the 
question of who instantiates them, i.e. oneself?^"^
Finally, Shoemaker mentions the fact that from Hume’s point, which is 
phenomenological, and consists in claiming that in introspection we are not 
aware of a self who has the relevant mental properties, it would not follow that 
there is no self at all.^^ For the former is a correct epistemological claim, which, 
however, would not license the latter metaphysical conclusion. This observation 
seems a sound one, but, in order to carry some weight, it must be placed in a 
wider context. We will do so in Ch. 7 and 8.
To conclude, Shoemaker’s way of phrasing his positive suggestion (i.e. there 
is no self presented in introspection when one self-ascribes a mental property 
and yet one has the right to ascribe it to oneself) is, at times, infelicitous and, in 
any case, partially incomplete. However, it is an interesting and important one, 
on which we will elaborate at length in the following two chapters. Hence, we 
can conclude by saying that Shoemaker has provided us with a good 
understanding of EM, useful distinctions between various kinds of lEM (once 
some amendments to them have been made), good arguments in favour of the
^®Shoemaker 1994a: 90.
14The fully-fledged answer to this question will be given in Ch. 8.
^^Shoemaker 1994a: 85-86.
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“elusiveness of the se lf in introspection (at least in some c a s e s ) b u t  with an 
insufficient explanation of lEM of non-inferential mental self-ascriptions, which 
could seem highly favourable to the Idealist position. Therefore, he has failed to 
provide us with a satisfactory deflationist account of I EM of mental self- 
ascriptions which is capable of dissolving the trilemma about the self.
2. A Revisionist Conception of lEM: Wright
Recall Wittgenstein’s passage in the Blue Book we quoted at the beginning of 
Ch. 1. There it looked as if he were drawing the line between self-ascriptions 
which are liable to EM and those which are lEM on the basis of their subject- 
matter, i.e. their being either mental self-ascriptions or bodily ones. By contrast, 
Crispin Wright, in his discussion of Wittgenstein’s passage, follows Evans and 
Shoemaker in pointing out that this need not be the case. Although, on the one 
hand, it can be a matter of exegetical dispute, whether Wittgenstein held such a 
naive view, on the other hand, no matter whether he held it or not, this would 
indeed be wrong—so it is argued. For, according to Wright, it is not so much 
the subject-matter of a sentence (or a judgement) that decides whether the use 
of T in it is immune to error through misidentification, rather the grounds alone 
on which a subject attributes to herself all sorts of predicates can decide the 
issue. For, as we have already seen, the same judgement, e.g. [My hair is
®^This expression is due to Cassam 1994: 1-18 and Cassam 1997b: 1-6. 
^^ Cf. Wright 1998: 19, but also Evans 1982, Ch. 7 and Garrett 1995; 351.
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blowing in the wind], can either be based on the observation of oneself in a 
glass window, or on somatic proprioceptive feelings. If the former is the case, 
then one could mistake someone else's hair for one’s own, in which case the 
use of the first-person pronoun would be affected by error through 
misidentification. By contrast, according to the latter option, there is no room (at 
least de facto) for the self-attribution to be affected by error through 
misidentification. Hence, Wright is making the point that lEM has to do with the 
circumstances, and, more specifically, the grounds, on which the judgement is 
formed.
In particular, however, Wright maintains that uses of T as subject, i.e. uses of 
T that are lEM, are those for which, if one's grounds for the self-attribution were 
defeated, they could not survive as grounds for the corresponding existential 
generalisation. By contrast, the use of T as object would be such that, if one's 
grounds for the self-attribution were defeated, the existential generalisation 
would nevertheless continue to be supported by the grounds which justified the 
judgement.^^
Let us illustrate Wright’s claim with reference to our previous example: if the 
judgement [My hair is blowing in the wind] is based on seeing a reflection in a 
shop window, and the observation is defeated, maybe because someone else is 
reflected in the shop window, then the observation of the reflection would 
nevertheless survive as a ground for the existential generalisation [Someone’s 
hair is blowing in the wind]; whereas this would not be the case if the judgement 
were based on proprioceptive feelings. That is to say, if I am a victim of a
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hallucination and hence it is not true that my hair is blowing in the wind, then my 
proprioceptive feelings could not survive as grounds for the existential 
generalisation [Someone’s hair is blowing in the wind]. Nor would those feelings 
survive as grounds for a third-personal ascription if, in deviant causal conditions 
in which the subject is receiving proprioceptive information from someone else’s 
body, she did not know that. For she would not have any reasons to consider 
those feelings as grounds for a third-personal ascription.^®
Therefore, the conclusions drawn by Wright can be summarised as follows; 
(1) self-attributions which are lEM cut across the physical and the psychological 
domains, since they depend on the kind of grounds on which they are made. 
Such grounds, in turn, (2) can allow or fail to allow for the existential 
generalisation once they have been defeated. Consequently, the ensuing 
judgements will be EM or lEM respectively.
Hence, we have seen that Wright gives an elegant account of the fact that 
IBM is a function of the grounds on which the judgement is based. In the case 
of bodily self-ascriptions, however, he thinks that their being IBM is only a
T f .  Wright 1998: 19.
^®Wright's account of EM and lEM is compatible with ours. For, if the judgement is 
based on a belief in an identification and in a predication (or individuation) component, 
the former can be defeated by undercutting evidence and the latter survive. Hence, the 
existential generalisation would follow from the predication or individuation component. 
By contrast, if the judgement is not based on any identification component, then if the 
subject's grounds are defeated, then they cannot remain as grounds for an existential 
generalisation.
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derivative feature of their being based on a possible mental self-ascription. Here 
is what Wright writes:
[T]he source of lEM in non-psychological first-personal claims is 
always their being based on avowable psychological matters (...). The 
lEM of non-psychological self-ascriptions, when they have it, is 
presumably to be viewed as an inheritance from their basis in an 
underlying possible avowal.^
To recapitulate: Wright explicitly recognises the fact that lEM is not a function 
of the subject-matter of a sentence or a judgement. In particular, he points out 
that some bodily self-ascriptions are lEM when based on somatic proprioceptive 
feelings. In turn, these feelings could give rise to a non-inferential mental self­
ascription. However, precisely because of Wright’s account of lEM of bodily 
self-ascriptions, the quest for an explanation of lEM of non-inferential mental 
self-ascriptions is even more pressing. For either lEM of non-inferential mental 
self-ascriptions is what must be explained in the first place, or it is what must be 
explained anyway in order to provide an explanation of lEM of bodily self­
ascriptions. Hence, the Cartesian and the Idealist are not defeated yet, 
because, at least prima facie, they do provide us with such an explanation. Let 
us now turn to Wright’s account of lEM of non-inferential mental self-ascriptions.
bright 1998: 20.
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2.1 Wright’s Explanation of lEM of Non-inferential Mental Self-Ascriptions and 
His Response to the Triiemma
Wright’s observations about EM/IEM are placed in the wider context of his 
discussion of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mind. In particular, he is interested in 
various kinds of avowals. Thus, he writes:
It is not the fact that lEM is not the exclusive property of psychological 
claims which entities us to bracket the phenomenon in the present 
context, but rather the reflection that avowal’s exhibition of it is a 
derived feature, as it were—effectively a consequence of respects in 
which we have already noted the distinction from third-personal 
psychological claims. Specifically it is a consequence of their being 
groundless while the corresponding third-personal claims demand 
evidential support. For if an avowal, 1 am (j)’, did not exhibit lEM, then 
its defeat would be consistent with the subject’s retention of an 
entitlement to the corresponding existential genera­
lization—‘Someone (else) is <^’—which could then be asserted 
groundlessly. But to suppose that such a claim could be both 
admissible and groundless would clash with the original asymmetry.
The basic thought is clear enough: lEM of mental self-ascriptions is a 
derivative feature of the fact that these are avowals, i.e. they are neither based 
on inference nor on observation of oneself. For, if avowals were not lEM, then, 
given Wright’s definition of lEM, their defeat would sustain a third-personal 
psychological claim. This, in turn, would be groundless, i.e. neither based on 
inference nor on observation. However, all third-personal psychological claims
W ig h t 1998: 20.
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are either based on inference or observation. Consequently, avowals must be 
lEM on pain of contradiction.
Even so, however, a number of questions are still open. For instance, we are 
told that lEM is a consequence of the fact that avowals are groundless (in the 
specific sense meant by Wright). But what we want to know is how it is possible 
to make se/f-ascriptions which are neither based on inference nor on 
observation. In other words, as we saw with Shoemaker, what we want to know 
is how it is possible that one’s awareness of one’s own mental properties 
licenses an ascription of them to oneself, when no object is in view (at least in 
some cases); and, secondly, why one cannot be mistaken in identifying the 
subject to which these properties belong. As long as there is no answer to these 
questions, then no real advance has been made in order to explain IEM.=^  
However, Wright is certainly right in suggesting that an explanation of lEM of 
non-inferential mental self-ascriptions has to be looked for in a wider domain, 
i.e. the domain of one’s justification to move from awareness of one’s own 
mental properties to the relevant self-ascriptions. We will come back to this in 
the following chapters.
Finally, let us concentrate on Wright’s attack against the no-reference view. 
He writes:
[T]he idea that Wittgenstein’s ‘as subject’ uses of ‘1’ are somehow 
shown to be non-referential by their having lEM should have been
^Of course, since Wright’s main aim is not to explain lEM he cannot be blamed for 
not having provided us with a fully-fledged explanation of why non-inferential mental 
self-ascriptions are lEM.
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strangled at birth by the reflection that a similar imrnunity is 
characteristic of many demonstrative claims, in which case there is of 
course no question but that reference to an object is involved. If I see 
an object hurtling towards us and say, That thing is approaching very 
fast’, there is no way in which that claim can be defeated (...) yet my 
original grounds for it survive as grounds for the claim ‘Something is 
approaching very fast’.^
Thus, Wright suggests that demonstrative judgements can be lEM and yet 
nobody would deny that they are genuinely referential. Consequently, lEM is 
compatible with the fact that the singular term used to give expression to one’s 
judgement be genuinely referential.
However, as we have noticed in the Ch. 2, it is prima facie true that first- 
person judgements which are lEM license the existential generalisation, 
contrary to the no-reference view. Hence, there is no obvious need to make this 
point by arguing indirectly from the demonstrative case. Thus, if the no­
reference theorist is so much as in a position to try and defend her claim, she 
must be arguing on different grounds. In other words, she must be struck by 
something which is so relevant as to make her ignore or override ordinary 
semantic considerations. In fact, when we look closer at the no-reference 
theorist’s position, it seems obvious that the route to this peculiar claim has to 
be viewed in the epistemology underlying non-inferential mental self-ascriptions. 
That is to say, the basis of the no-reference view is Hume’s denial—endorsed 
by Lichtenberg, to an extent—that we are introspectively aware of a subject who 
has got mental properties, when we perceive or think. As a consequence, also
b r ig h t  1998: 20.
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the surface grammar of the phrases used to give expression to that awareness 
is reinterpreted in such a way that T is taken to be similar to ‘it’ in ‘It rains’. 
Hence, epistemological consideration make the no-reference theorist believe 
that from the presence of a grammatical subject it cannot be inferred that there 
is someone who has the property in question.
Hence, Wright is right in saying that lEM is not incompatible with the fact that 
the uses of ‘I’ as subject are genuinely referential. However, on closer reflection, 
it is clear that the no-reference view and the no-subject view are consequences 
of Hume’s point. Once more, it becomes evident that the solution to our 
problems cannot but be found in a better understanding of the epistemology of 
first-person mental self-ascriptions and that reminders about the referring role of 
the first-person are not enough to settle the worries in this area. In particular, we 
need an explanation of why, from the mere awareness of mental properties, in 
which no proper object is in view (at least in some cases), subjects are entitled 
to self-ascribe those properties and why this ascription cannot be mistaken 
relative to the first person (no matter whether it is a self-ascription of a 
sensation, an outer perception or of a propositional attitude).
3. A Reminder: Pryor’s De Re and Which-Misidentification and the 
Corresponding Forms of lEM
As we saw in chapter 1, Pryor puts forward a distinction between two kinds of 
EM and, consequently, of lEM. Recall the definitions offered by Pryor;
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[W]e have a case of de re misidentification whenever the. following 
three conditions obtain:
(i) There is some singular proposition about x, to the effect that it is 
F, that a subject believes or attempts to express. (...).
(ii) The subject’s justification for believing this singular proposition 
rests on his justification for believing, of some y, that y is F and 
that y is identical to x. (...).
(iii) However, unbeknownst to the subject, y x x. (...).
I do not assume that whenever your justification for believing one 
proposition rests on your justification for believing other propositions, 
you will have formed or even entertained a belief in those latter 
propositions. Nor do I assume that you have based the first belief on 
a belief in those latter propositions. '^*
[Which-misidentlfication] occurs when:
(i) A subject has some grounds G that offer him knowledge of the 
existential generalization 3xFx.
(ii) Partly on the basis of G, the subject is also justified, or takes 
himself to be justified, in believing of some object a that it is F.
(iii) But in fact a is not F. Some distinct object y is F, and it’s 
because the grounds G “derive” in the right way from this fact 
about y that they offer the subject knowledge that 3xFx. ^
The definition of which-misidentification is then revised in the following way:
[W]e can say that a singular proposition about a to the effect that it is 
F is vulnerable to wh-misidentification when justified by grounds G 
just in case:
When that proposition is believed on grounds G, it is possible for 
those grounds to be defeated by undercutting evidence in such a way 
that the following two conditions hold:
(i) the combination of G and that undercutting evidence no longer 
justifies you in believing of a that it is F; but
^Vryor 1998: 274-276. 
^Pryor 1998: 282.
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(ii) the combination of G and that undercutting evidence cou/d, by 
itself, offer you knowledge that 3xFx.^
We saw in Ch. 1 that, according to Pryor, while de re EM involves a mistaken 
identification component, which-misidentification does not. However, we 
maintained that the latter position is the result of a mistaken view about the 
“ingredients” which can occur in the identification component. We also claimed 
that once the identification component is liberalised in such a way as to include 
not only indexicals such as T, or proper names whose use is based on 
acquaintance with their bearers, but also rigidified descriptions, then also which- 
EM can be seen as a result of a mistaken identification component. Therefore, 
we concluded that it is wrong to claim that there are two kinds of EM (and 
consequently of lEM). Rather, there are different kinds of identification 
components, which can be the subject's rational grounds for her judgement. 
Moreover, we claimed that there is no need for the subject actually to entertain 
such identification components, so long as the latter rationally ground her 
judgement.
Let us now consider Pryor’s subsequent claims. De re lEM occurs when the 
subject’s justification for believing [X is F] does not rest on her justification for 
believing an identity judgement. By contrast, wh-IEM occurs when the defeat of 
one’s grounds is not compatible with the possibility for one’s grounds to survive 
as grounds for the existential generalisation [Someone is F].
^Pryor 1998: 284. Notice that ‘wh-EM’ and ‘wh-IEM’ are Pryor’s own abbreviations 
for which-EM and which-lEM respectively.
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Pryor also holds that wh-IEM entails de re lEM. This is so because, if the 
judgement does not rest on an identification component then it follows that it is 
de re I EM. By contrast, he claims that there could be de re lEM, but it would not 
follow that there is wh-IEM.^^ That is to say, the absence of an identification 
component is not sufficient to guarantee wh-IEM. As an example of the latter 
possibility, he considers Evans’ treatment of memory-based first-person 
thoughts. Since these thoughts are identification-free for Evans, they are de re 
lEM (according to Pryor’s definition). However, Pryor argues that this does not
entail that they are wh-IEM. He then goes on to discuss the case of a subject 
who quasi-remembers some event and self-ascribes the relevant property. 
Pryor argues that, in this case, the subject’s judgement would be affected by 
wh-EM, although no identification component would be involved.®®
Some points are worth-making in this connection. First, although Pryor is right 
in saying that the actual judgement could fail to be formed or based on any 
identity belief or judgement, this, by his own lights, does not exclude the fact 
that one’s justification for a certain judgement depends on believing some other 
identity proposition (cf. definition of de re EM above). Secondly, we saw that de 
re EM and wh-EM are not really two different kinds of EM. Hence, we can 
conclude that if EM arises this is due to a mistaken identification component. 
Putting these considerations together, we do in fact have our own 
understanding of EM. Namely, EM occurs iff the subject’s judgement is causally
^Cf. Pryor 1998: 285-286. 
^Cf. Pryor 1998: 288-297.
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and rationally triggered by a pair of (not necessarily occurrent) beliefs in a 
predication component and in a mistaken identification component. As a result, 
we have it that if Evans’ treatment of memory-based l-thoughts is open to EM, 
this must depend on the subject’s belief in a mistaken identification component. 
As we saw at length in Ch. 5, discussing Evans’ treatment of l-thoughts based 
on the deliverances of somatic proprioception, in a possible world where the 
subject is hooked up to someone else’s body and she knew (or had reasons to 
believe) that she might be receiving information from someone else’s body she 
could entertain EM l-thoughts. These, in turn, would be triggered by a (not 
necessarily occurrent) belief in the identity judgement [My body = the body I am 
feeling now]. We concluded that this shows that l-thoughts based on the 
deliverances of somatic proprioception are only de facto lEM. For, in a different 
possible world, they could be liable to EM. Similarly, we should conclude that 
also memory-based l-thoughts are only de facto lEM (relative to the state of 
information a subject may be in in a logically possible deviant causal world) and 
for the same reasons as before.®®
Finally, recall that in Ch. 2 we introduced two definitions of lEM. The first one 
mentioned the subject’s commitment to an identification component, which, 
however, could not be mistaken. By contrast, the second mentioned the 
absence of such a commitment to an identification component. Here they are;
^Pryor himself stresses the parallel between memory-based l-thoughts and 1- 
thoughts based on the deliverances of somatic proprioception. Cf. Pryor 1998; 304, fn. 
54.
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lEMdfi A singular judgement of the form [a is F], formed on the basis of a 
recognition or an identification, is I EM, relative to the subject, iff it is not 
possible for the thinker to apply the particular singular concept [a] to any 
other object but the relevant object a.
lEMdf2 A singular judgement of the form [a is F] is lEM relative to the 
subject, iff it is not formed on the basis of a recognition or an identification 
of the object thought about and, consequently, iff it does not involve an 
identification component.
The difference between Pryor’s account and ours is that he thinks, 
mistakenly, that two ways in which a judgement can be lEM correspond to two 
ways in which it can be liable to EM. By contrast, we have maintained that there 
is just one kind of EM, i.e. that which involves a mistaken identification 
component, which is the equivalent of Pryor’s de re EM. In Ch. 8, we will claim 
that there is just one kind on lEM, namely IEMdf2 , which is the equivalent of 
Pryor’s de re lEM. Hence, it follows that lEM is due to the fact that no 
identification component is involved. However, we must still explain why non- 
inferential mental self-ascriptions are lEM in this sense, and, moreover, why 
they are logically so. Yet, Pryor does not give us a clue as to why certain 
judgements, and, in particular, 1-judgements are de re lEM. Hence, we are left 
without any explanation of logical lEM of non-inferential mental self-ascriptions 
and, consequently, without any satisfactory and complete response to the 
trilemma about the self.
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4. Conclusions
In this chapter we have seen a number of ways of understanding EM and lEM. 
We have maintained that Shoemaker’s definition of EM is basically right and 
that his distinctions between de facto/\og]ca\ lEM and circumstantial/absolute 
lEM, once properly qualified, are relevant. However, we have claimed that he 
does not provide us with an explicit definition of lEM and with an explanation of 
why non-inferential mental self-ascriptions are logically so. Hence, he has failed 
to provide us with a revisionist account of lEM and, although he has rightly 
argued for compatibility between lEM and the fact that the self is embodied, he 
has failed to provide us with a fully-fledged response to the triiemma. We then 
moved to Wright’s definitions of EM and lEM. We have claimed that they are 
sound ones and allow for compatibility between lEM and the fact that T refers to 
an embodied self. This latter fact, however, is not enough to rule out the Idealist 
position, for the latter is motivated by epistemological considerations. In 
particular, it is motivated by Hume’s insight that we are not presented with an 
object in introspection (at least when self-ascriptions of non-bodily sensations 
and of propositional attitudes are at stake). We have also claimed that although 
Wright gestures in the right direction for an understanding of lEM of non- 
inferential mental self-ascriptions, when he points out that it has to do with the 
grounds on which they are based, he does not substantiate it in detail. 
Consequently, he fails to provide us with a fully-fledged response to the 
triiemma. Finally, we have considered Pryor’s position. We have argued that it 
neither provides us with a sound revisionist account of lEM, nor with a 
satisfactory explanation of I EM of non-inferential mental self-ascriptions. Thus, it 
fails to provide us with a deflationist response to the triiemma. Hence, we still 
need a sound account of lEM of non-inferential mental self-ascriptions. 
However, in order to provide one, we had better look at an account of how our
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self-ascriptions of mental properties can be justified, although—as Hume 
noticed—there is no object in view when one is aware of one’s own mental 
properties (at least in some cases). Hence, we will now turn to Peacocke whose 
recent work addresses this very question.
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Chapter Seven
1-Thoughts and A-Theories: Peacocke
We concluded the last chapter by saying that a proper explanation of lEM of 
non-inferential mental self-ascriptions has to be looked for in the domain of the 
epistemology of these first-person thoughts. In this chapter we will consider 
Peacocke’s account of first-person thoughts which was first presented in Sense 
and Content. This will allow us to supplement Evans’ account of this class of 
thoughts with the quite intuitive idea that the possession of the first-person 
concept requires a subject to be able to form l-thoughts on the basis of her 
psychological evidence. Then we will claim that it is because the relevant self­
ascriptions are lEM that Peacocke’s account of first-person thoughts is correct, 
but that he does not fully explain why these self-ascriptions are I EM. Finally, we 
will turn to Peacocke’s more recent work on the epistemology of non-inferential 
mental self-ascriptions presented in Being Known, in order to see whether it can 
shed some light on the reason why they are lEM. We will agree with Peacocke 
that in introspection no subject of thought is manifested as an object (at least In 
some cases). Yet, we will argue that Peacocke’s account of non-inferential 
mental self-ascriptions in terms of what he labels “delta-accounts” can explain 
only in part why the subject is nevertheless entitled to se/f-ascribe the relevant 
properties, i.e. why the subject is not only entitled to ascribe the relevant
property to someone, but also why she is entitled to ascribe it to herself. For 
deita-accounts presuppose an explanation of this latter fact. In turn, only an 
explanation of this fact will allow us to see why direct awareness of one’s own 
mental properties can lead to the corresponding self-ascriptions that are both 
representation-independent and lEM. Hence, Peacocke’s account of the 
epistemology of some l-thoughts is very instructive but, in order to provide an 
exhaustive solution to the trilemma about the self, it needs to be supplemented 
with an account of why, when one is introspectively aware of a mental state, 
then one cannot be aware of someone else’s. An explanation of this fact is what 
an explanation of logical lEM of non-inferential mental self-ascriptions requires. 
For, whether or not they are based on the presentation of the self as an object, 
it is the fact that one cannot be introspectively aware of someone else’s mental 
state that guarantee that the subject who self-ascribes the mental property on 
those bases is the same as the one who enjoys the mental state. Hence, it is an 
explanation of this fact that guarantees that the relevant self-ascriptions are not 
based on taking someone else to have a given mental state and mistake that 
person for oneself.
1. I-Thoughts
Peacocke aims to offer a broadly Fregean account of l-thoughts. Recall the 
distinctive features of l-thoughts we individuated in Frege’s approach and 
introduced in Ch. 4. Here they are; (a) l-thoughts are primitive; (b) they are 
private to their thinkers; (c) they are incommunicable; (d) they are objective.
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Hence, we will expect Peacocke’s account to satisfy these conditions. Here is 
his proposal:
There is some initial plausibility in the claim that when someone 
thinks of himself in the [self] type of way, his way of thinking of 
himself is specified by the mixed descriptive-demonstrative ‘the 
person who has these conscious states’, where the demonstrative 
picks out his token conscious states at the time of thinking.^
How does this proposal fare with respect to (a)-(d)? Now, it looks prima facie 
hopeless with respect to (a) for the sense or mode of presentation of the first- 
person is given by a mixed description. In fact, we have already seen (cf. Ch. 4) 
that the application of Frege’s test for difference of sense shows that the sense 
of the first-person cannot be equivalent to the sense of any definite description 
CO-referring with the first-person. So here is Peacocke’s way out of this 
impasse:
[W]e shall need to draw a distinction between two ways in which a 
description may determine an m.p. It may do so simply by giving the 
content of an m.p., as it does with descriptive m.p.’s. ‘The person who 
has these conscious states’ certainly does not give the content of the 
[self] m.p. Some can have first-person-thoughts without having the 
intellectual sophistication actually to think about his own experiences 
and thoughts, either demonstratively or in any other way. But giving 
the content is not the only means by which a description can 
determine an m.p. It can also specify what I shall call the constitutive 
role of an m.p.^
Veacocke 1983: 109.
^Peacocke 1983: 109-110. Note that “m.p.” is an abbreviation for “mode of 
presentation”.
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So let us see how Peacocke characterises the notion of constitutive role:
I suggest that associated with each type of demonstrative m.p. is a 
kind of evidence which disposes a thinker to judge thoughts 
containing constituents of that type.
[Wjith [self] is associated evidence concerning the person who has 
the token experiences and thoughts which the thinker in fact has.^
Hence, we see that, according to Peacocke, a subject will have the first- 
person concept if she is disposed to judge [I am F] in light of the appropriate 
kind of evidence, i.e. when the person with f/iese conscious states is F."^
A first minor qualification is needed here, however. For Peacocke claims that 
the mode of presentation of the first-person is given by ‘the person who has 
these conscious states’. Yet, in fact, there is no guarantee that a person could 
keep track of her own mental states. Nor is there any reason why, in order to 
have the first person concept, this should be the case, at least prima facie.^ 
Rather, it seems enough, for a subject to be credited with the first-person 
concept, that she is disposed to judge [I am F] when she has got one particular 
conscious mental state. So the proposal is to consider the first-person mode of 
presentation as given by ‘the person with this conscious mental state’. Thus, a
^Peacocke 1983: 110.
‘^ In Peacocke 1992 concepts are equated with modes of presentation and 
constitutive conditions are replaced by possession conditions specified in a canonical 
form (A(C) form). So we will use these terms interchangeably.
®At least, Peacocke does not argue that one should be able to keep track of her own 
mental states in order to have the first-person concept and I do not see why we should 
impose this condition.
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subject will have the first-person concept if she is disposed to judge [I am F] on 
the basis of an occurrence of a particular mental state. In this way, a possible 
objection to Peacocke’s account, according to which it is surreptitiously 
presupposing some version of the bundle theory of the self would be avoided 
from the start.® For his account would not presuppose the subject’s ability to 
keep track of her own mental states across time.
Another minor qualification has to do with the fact that the sortal ‘person’ 
enters into the characterisation of the first-person mode of presentation, 
according to Peacocke. it is important to stress that, given his account of the 
mode of presentation in terms of constitutive role, this does not mean that in 
order to have the first-person concept one must master the use of the sortal 
‘person’. Rather, one must just be disposed to form l-judgements on the basis 
of the evidence that the person with this particular conscious mental state is F.
One further clarification has to do with the notion of evidence employed by 
Peacocke. He has in mind a notion of canonical evidence, which, in general, 
need not be conclusive. However, in the case of the first person, the sort of 
evidence he mentions is, after all, conclusive. For, if there is an a priori 
guarantee that one can only be aware of one’s own mental states, and hence, 
that one can only demonstratively refer to one’s own mental states, then it will 
be a priori guaranteed that by using the first-person on that kind of evidence, 
then one will refer to oneself. So, as we will see, it is only on the assumption 
that the subject who judges [I am F] and the subject who has got the relevant 
mental state are one and the same that the kind of evidence on which [I] is used
"Peacocke takes into account this possible objection. Cf. Peacocke 1983; 120.
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^Peacocke 1983: 117.
in the judgement—specified by ‘the person with this conscious mental 
state’— will be conclusive evidence that it is the subject who judges [1 am F] to
be F. Indeed, this assumption is sound, but, as we will see, Peacocke offers no 
defence of it. We will come back to this point shortly.
Notice, moreover, that the constitutive role of [I] mentioned by Peacocke is 
compatible with the fact that one can be disposed to judge [I am F] on the basis
of a different kind of evidence from the one required by the constitutive role of
I
[self]. For instance, one can form the judgement [I am F] on the basis of one’s |
proprioceptive information, or on the basis of one’s perception of the |
environment. As we have seen with Evans, these kinds of judgements will be I
lEM. Hence, they give one conclusive evidence that the person who has the |
property F is indeed oneself. Still, Peacocke claims that his specification of the
constitutive role of [self] is “meant to capture what is essential (italics mine) to I{
the evidential pattern of first-person thoughts even when the collateral I
information is absent”.  ^ We will come back to this claim. For the time being, it !
suffices to say that, first, Peacocke has managed to find a way out of the charge I
that his account of the first-person concept would pass Frege’s test for ;
difference of sense and would thus be inadequate. Moreover, he has found a 
way out of the obvious problem that we would like to grant subjects with first- ■
person thoughts even when they are not actually able to articulate the mixed 
description which would give the content of the first-person concept. Finally, he 
has provided us with a constitutive role for [I] which specifies (at least in part)
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the canonical evidence on which a judgement would count as a first-person 
one, which is compatible with the presence of other evidence but which is also, 
in this specific case, conclusive evidence.®
Let us now consider how Peacocke’s account fares with respect to the 
Fregean claim (b) that the mode of presentation or sense of the first-person is 
private to the thinker. We have already seen how Evans distinguished between 
two possible readings of this claim (Cf. Ch. 4). On the one hand it can be 
thought that there are as many types of first-person concepts as there are 
thinkers. By contrast, on the other hand, it can be thought that there is just one 
first-person concept as a type that is exemplified in as many tokens as there are 
thinkers. Peacocke adopts this second reading and illustrates it in a way we 
have already mentioned in Ch. 4, but which is worth-repeating in this 
connection:
Suppose Peter thinks ‘I am hungry’ and Paul thinks ‘I am hungry’.
Since we are following the Fregean model, the modes of presentation 
they each express by T must be different: for they determine different 
objects, Peter and Paul respectively. But of course when they think 
these thoughts, Peter and Paul think of themselves in the same type 
of way. It is this type which is denoted by ‘[self]’. The constituent of all 
Peter’s first-person thoughts is called a token mode of presentation; it 
can be taken to consist of the type [self] indexed by Peter, that 
person himself. This token m.p. will be denoted by ‘[self Peter]'- So it is 
token m.p.’s which are constituents of thoughts and which pick out 
particular objects. But one should not be misled by the label ‘token’: 
there is nothing relevantly unrepeatable about [selfpeter]- On many
®By contrast, according to Peacocke, the specification of the constitutive role of a 
demonstrative concept will not mention conclusive evidence.
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different occasions, Peter may have attitudes to thoughts which 
contain it as a constituent.®
Hence, Peacocke’s account of the concept [I] in terms of possession 
conditions is an elucidation of that concept as a type. But what is relevant is that 
each subject will employ a token of it that nobody else could entertain, for only 
the subject is immediately aware of her own mental states. Consequently, only 
the subject can be disposed to form a first-person judgement in light of that 
specific piece of evidence. This, as we will see, however, is a fact in need of 
explanation.
Notice, moreover, that this strategy allows Peacocke to avoid Husserl’s 
conclusion (possibly endorsed by Frege as well, as we saw in Ch. 4) that the 
meaning of T is always altering, from person to person and according to the 
circumstances of utterance. For the pattern of canonical evidence to which first- 
person judgements are respondent in any given occasion can be specified as a 
type. Consequently, it is true that each time a given first-person judgement is 
respondent to the occurrence of a specific mental state, but it is equally true that 
the judgement always responds, at least essentially, to occurrences of mental 
states.
As far as (c), i.e. incommunicability is concerned, Peacocke argues, on the 
one hand, that l-thoughts can find linguistic expression. Moreover, the meaning 
of T as a linguistic device is correctly and fully specified by the token-reflexive 
rule (TRR) according to which each token of T refers to whoever produces it. 
On the other hand, he claims that this should not lead to the dispensability of
Peacocke 1983; 108.
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the mode of presentation of the first-person and that the latter is, as such, 
incommunicable. Here is the relevant passage:
The position i am endorsing, then, is one according to which: (a)
Barwise and Perry are right in thinking that the reference ruie for ‘i’ 
fuliy determines its meaning in Engiish; (b) The first-person way of 
thinking or mode of presentation exists and It is important for 
understanding T that one realize that this word is used to express 
thoughts containing m.p.’s of this type; (c) Points (a) and (b) are
compatible because there is an argument that in this case the
reference rule determines what m.p. is expressed.^®
The idea is this: the token-reflexive ruie makes it the case that intentional, 
sincere utterances of T do not only refer to the speaker, but express a first- 
person thought as well. Still, TRR cannot specify the sense or mode of 
presentation of the first-person. For not all first-person thoughts are uttered and, 
consequently, it would not make sense to say that in those occasions one thinks 
of oneself as the producer of a certain token of T. Secondly, as Evans 
suggested (cf. Ch. 4), it would not be plausible to say that all there is to self- 
consciousness is one’s ability to think of oneself as the producer of a certain 
token of T. Nor would it be plausible to hold this position once TRR is amended 
in such a way as to be applicable to tokens of the concept [I], whereby one
would be thinking of oneself as the producer of that token of [I]. Finally, if one
were to defend this last version of TRR as specifying our first-person concept, 
one should also be prepared to hold that one would be thinking about oneself
10,Peacocke 1983: 138.
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as the producer of a certain token of [1]/^ But, in this case, the exercise of the 
concept of [I] would be presupposed. That is to say, one should already be able 
to entertain [I] in order to think of oneself as the producer of that token of the 
first-person concept. Hence, TRR cannot be seen as an explanation of what it 
takes for one to be able to have first-person thoughts or be self-conscious 
because it would already presuppose the occurrence of first-person self- 
conscious thoughts.
From this we can conclude that Peacocke is right in holding that TRR does 
not specify the concept [I]. Consequently, he is also right in saying that TRR 
does not allow us to dispense with the mode of presentation of the first person. 
For utterances of T would count as intentional just in case they were the 
expression of a first-person thought. So we do need an account of the first- 
person concept in order to have a complete account of our mastery of the first- 
person pronoun.
Finally, we have seen with Evans that the issue of (d) the objectivity of first- 
person thoughts is paramount. In fact, Evans claimed that first-person thoughts 
must be objective, in the sense of being about publicly accessible persons who 
think of themselves as such. Yet, given Peacocke’s account of the first-person 
concept, it does not seem to be necessarily the case that, by being able to 
entertain the first-person concept, subjects should think of themselves as 
embodied. Consequently, they would not (necessarily) think of themselves as
^^Campbell 1995 defends the view that the token-reflexive rule can specify the sense 
of the first-person.
^^f. Bermudez 1998, Ch. 1.
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physical entities on a par with all others. In this sense Peacocke’s account of 
the first-person concept is not objective. But is this a real problem? In fact, it is 
not, for Peacocke’s position is entirely compatible with the fact that selves are 
embodied and that they do think of themselves as such.
In fact, amongst the mental states which a subject could demonstratively refer 
in thought and which would be the evidence on which her use of the first-person 
is grounded, there are bodily sensations. However, bodily sensations give one a 
representation of oneself as embodied. Hence, even if the kind of evidence of 
the constitutive role of [I] is psychological, it also gives one a representation of 
oneself as embodied.
One may then argue that Peacocke is looking for the canonical evidence on 
which our use of the first-person is grounded. Hence, he is looking for 
necessary conditions for our use of the first person. Since, however, we can 
think of a subject who, despite being anaesthetised and hence unable to form 
bodily l-judgements on the basis of her proprioceptive feelings and of outer 
perception, is still able to entertain l-thoughts, then the latter must be grounded 
only on psychological evidence. Thus, one may conclude that the ability to form 
l-judgements on the basis of proprioception and perception is not necessary for 
self-conscious thought, while the ability to form l-judgements on the basis of 
evidence that the person with this particular mental state is F is.
However, recall that Evans does not require the relevant bodily self­
ascriptions to be always in place (cf. Ch. 5). Rather, he argues that they must 
be dispositionally in place for one to be self-conscious. Hence, a subject who is 
anaesthetised (and also amnesiac) may have retained the disposition to think of
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herself as embodied on the basis of the kind of evidence she may be prevented 
from having at a particular time.
Moreover, one may say that after all Peacocke is looking for conclusive 
evidence, i.e. evidence that guarantees that the person who appears to be F is 
indeed oneself. Hence, if it is somehow admitted that somatic proprioception 
and perception of one’s environment may give one information relative to 
someone else’s body, then it would no longer be guaranteed that the person 
who appears to be F is oneself. But, we have seen at length how bodily self­
ascriptions made on the relevant bases are at least de facto lEM, hence the 
person who appears to be F on those bases is oneself.
Finally, notice that even if some deflationists like Shoemaker and Wright (cf. 
Ch. 6) were right in saying that the relevant bodily self-ascriptions are ultimately 
based on “avowable psychological matters”, it would not follow that such 
psychological evidence does not give one a conception of oneself as embodied. 
For, as we have already remarked, it is precisely the fact that one enjoys bodily 
sensations that gives one a representation of oneself as embodied, e.g. as the 
person whose legs feel as bent.
Moreover, Peacocke’s account if integrated with Evans’ acceptance of the 
Generality Constraint will imply that for one to be able to self-ascribe a mental 
property one must be able to think of that property as satisfiable also by other 
persons and of oneself as someone who can be supposed by others to have 
such a property (cf. Ch. 5). We discussed the implications of this latter strand of 
GC in chapter five, but it is worth-repeating that, although not all mental 
properties would be self-attributed on the basis of a presentation in
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introspection of oneself as an object, the ability to self-ascribe them would go 
hand in hand with the ability to think of oneself as embodied.
To conclude: the kind of evidence mentioned by Peacocke, although 
psychological, is not favourable to either the Cartesian or the Idealist conception 
of the self. Rather, it supplements Evans’ position with respect to the 
possession conditions of the first-person concept in important ways. For surely 
part of what it takes for a subject to be self-conscious is to be able to think of 
oneself as an author of thoughts and as a possessor of sensations and 
experiences. Yet this does not mean that one would be thinking of oneself as a 
possessor of just those properties. We will now turn to Peacocke’s account of 
logical lEM.
2. Peacocke’s Account of IBM of Non-lnferential Mental Self-Ascriptions
The question is: what is it that makes it the case that Tm in pain’ is logically 
lEM? Peacocke’s answer is this:
[T]he possession by the first-person m.p. of the constitutive role 'the 
person who has these experiences’ can explain why it is that in the 
first-person present-tense ascriptions of conscious states, one does 
not have to apply any tests of identity to check that the person in pain 
is oneself.
He then goes on to say:
For any given particular token conscious states and thoughts a 
thinker enjoys, only he and no one else has those particular token 
states and thoughts (and this is not a contingent fact). So he alone
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can make demonstrative reference in thought to them, in ways 
someone is capable of making such reference in virtue of having 
those particular states?^
The argument seems to be as follows. In order to make demonstrative 
reference to a mental state one must be conscious of it, i.e. one must be 
introspectively aware of it. Yet, (a) one can only be introspectively aware of 
one’s own mental states, hence (b) only the subject who has the mental state 
can demonstratively refer to it, therefore (c) the use of T on the basis of the 
evidence specified by ‘the person with this conscious mental state’ will make it 
the case that one’s use of ‘I’ necessarily refers to the owner of the mental state. 
Hence, when T is used on the basis of the evidence specified by ‘the person 
with this conscious mental state’ one will not have to apply any tests of identity 
in order to know that the person who has the property of being in pain is 
oneself.
Notice, however, that Peacocke’s account of why [I am in pain] is 
identification-free, and hence I EM, rests on assumption (a). For if it were 
possible to be introspectively aware of someone else’s mental states, then it 
would become possible to refer to them demonstratively, contrary to (b). But 
then, the evidence that the person with this conscious mental state is F would 
no longer give one conclusive evidence that one is F oneself. The 
consequences of this fact are twofold: first, one’s non-inferential mental self­
ascriptions would not be lEM, for one could have evidence that someone is in 
pain, wrongly take that person to be oneself and hence judge [I am in pain],
^^Peacocke 1983: 121. Cf. Peacocke 1983: 175.
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when in fact someone else is. Secondly, ‘the person with this conscious mental 
state’ would not be conclusive evidence that the [I] used in the judgement based 
on that evidence picks out the same subject which is identified through the 
mixed-definite description. Hence, that description would no longer be 
guaranteed to give the correct specification of the constitutive role of [I]. Thus, if 
we want an explanation of logical lEM (and motivate the fact that ‘the person 
with this conscious mental state’ is a good specification of the constitutive role 
of [I]) we need to rule out the possibility that someone could be introspectively 
aware of someone else’s mental states and demonstratively refer to them. 
However, this is what Peacocke writes on the topic:
No one can think of another’s states demonstratively where the 
demonstrative way is dependent upon being in those conscious 
states. To say this is not to be committed in any objectionable sense 
to the privacy of another’s sensations and conscious thoughts: it is 
quite consistent with these claims about the constitutive role of [self] 
that one can on occasion know what type of experience and what 
thoughts another is having. All that is entailed is that one cannot think 
of the other’s conscious states in the particular ways in which that 
other person can think of them.
Of course what Peacocke is saying here is perfectly correct, but the question 
still remains: why is it that we cannot be directly or introspectively aware of 
someone else’s mental states? So long as no answer is given to this question, 
then no satisfactory account of I EM of non-inferential mental self-ascriptions 
would be given either. We will now turn to Peacocke’s more recent work on the
^Veacocke 1983: 121-122.
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first-person where the issue of lEM is addressed again, although from a 
different perspective.
3. Peacocke’s Account o f the Epistemology of First-Person Thoughts: A- 
Theories
In “Self-Knowledge and the Illusions of Transcendence” Peacocke addresses 
the question of the epistemology of first-person thought.^® In this connection he 
distinguishes three phenomena that concern some l-thoughts: (i) immunity to 
error through misidentification, (ii) infallibility, (iii) representation-independence. 
He deems the third of these responsible for “the illusions of transcendence” with 
regard to the first-person. This claim is defended on theoretical grounds rather 
than on historical ones (although some Kantian exegesis is offered). The 
supporters of the transcendental view about the self mentioned by Peacocke 
are Kant, Schopenhauer, Husserl and Wittgenstein. In short, all of them have 
held the view that the subject who does the experiencing and the thinking, i.e. 
the one who is able to think [I see that p] and [I think that p], cannot be an 
empirical subject, for no such subject is manifested in experience and thought. 
It then becomes mysterious why these thoughts should in fact be in the first- 
person, rather than being impersonal, e.g. [There is a perception] or [There is 
thinking], since no empirical subject is manifested. Hence, in order to guarantee 
one’s entitlement to the self-ascription they assume that the self referred to is a
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transcendental subject, i.e. they assume that the self shrinks to a condition of 
possibility of thought and experience. Peacocke aims to offer a diagnosis of 
their mistake and to provide an account of the epistemology of this kind of 
thoughts which does not make mysterious the fact that they are indeed 
knowledgeable se/f-ascriptions. Moreover, he wants to show that a correct 
explanation of these self-ascriptions is compatible with the fact that the subject 
referred to be an empirical subject. In fact, he thinks that their mistake calls for 
what he labels “the integration challenge".^® That Is, the challenge to integrate 
considerations having to do with the content and the epistemology of the 
relevant class of thoughts, in such a way that one will no longer feel the need to 
appeal to peculiar metaphysical positions in order to account for the problematic 
phenomena. Let us consider Peacocke’s claims in more detail.
The basic question addressed by Peacocke is this: how is it possible for the 
judgement [I ip that p], when based on direct awareness of one’s own mental 
states to amount to knowledge? This question can be broken down into two 
parts: (a) how can a subject be justified in judging [/ ip that p] when her ground
for the judgement is awareness of a mental state of type ip and content p? That
is to say, how can the subject be justified in self-ascribing that property if no 
subject of thought is manifested in introspection? Moreover, (b) how can the 
judgement [I %p that p] amount to knowledge? Obviously, given our purposes,
^®PeacQcke 1999, Ch. 6.
®^Cf. Peacocke 1999, Ch. 1.
17,Ip' ranges over psychological predicates.
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Peacocke’s answer to question (a) is more relevant. Hence, in order to evaluate 
it, we will have to consider his claim that non-inferential mental self-ascriptions 
are representation-independent in more detail. Moreover, we will consider 
whether, despite the endorsement of the claim that no self as an object is 
presented in introspection, Peacocke manages to give an adequate account of 
the fact that one is nevertheless entitled to ascribe the mental state not only to 
someone, but also to oneself. Finally, we will see whether Peacocke manages 
to account for the fact that in introspection one can only be aware of one’s own 
mental states so that there is no possibility of having reasons to believe that 
someone is F and be wrong about the fact that it is oneself who is F. This, in 
turn, will explain why ‘the person with this conscious mental state’ is a good 
specification of the constitutive role of [I].
3.1 Representation-independence
First of all Peacocke introduces the notion of representation-dependence 
(hereafter, RD) thus:
We can say that a use of the first person, in a particular belief with the 
content ‘I am P, is representationally dependent if
(i) ‘I am F is the content of one of the thinker’s current mental states,
a state which represents that content as correct; and
(ii) the thinker forms the belief ‘I am P by taking the mental state
mentioned in (I) at face value, in respect of this content. That is,
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(...) the thinker is operating in a mode in which such states are 
taken at face value.
Here is an example of RD use of the first person:
The way the visual experience represents the world as being is one 
which justifies his [i.e. the subject’s] acceptance of the first-person 
content endorsed in his belief ‘I am in front of a door’ (...). More 
generally, when a person forms a perceptual belief ‘I am P, he does 
so because his experience itself has the content I am P, or has 
some content which justifies the content I am P.^ ®
So the idea is that, as in Evans, one’s perceptual experience gives one 
egocentric information, i.e. information of the environment relative to the 
subject. Consequently, its content comes, as it were, in the first-person way, i.e. 
it includes a representation of the subject. Hence, if one takes such a content at 
face value, then one is immediately in a position to form a first-person 
judgement. For this reason, the relevant judgement will contain a 
representation-dependent use of the first-person. Let us now turn to Peacocke’s 
characterisation of representation-independent uses of the first-person:
A representationally independent use of the first person, in a belief I 
am P, is a use in a belief which the subject forms for a reason, but 
whose content I am P’ does not meet the conditions (i) and (ii) in the 
definition of representational dependence.^
The examples given by Peacocke of R1 uses of the first person are the 
following ones:
^®Peacocke 1999: 265. 
^®Peacocke 1999: 264.
20,Peacocke 1999: 266.
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am thinking about Pythagoras’s Theorem, 
see the phone is on the table, 
remember attending the party, 
remember that Russell was born in 1872, 
am beginning to dream, 
fear that the motion will not be carried.
Peacocke then makes it clear that Rl first-person judgements are held for 
reasons that are quite special, though. For instance:
[wjhen our thinker comes to judge I am thinking about Pythagoras’s 
Theorem’, his reason for his judgement is not a mental event or state 
whose representational content is that he is thinking about 
Pythagoras’s Theorem. His reason is rather his particular occurrent 
thoughts about Pythagoras’s Theorem.^
This much seems to be clear, Rl uses of the first-person are those which are 
not grounded in mental states that contain a representation of oneself as having 
that particular mental state. This qualification is needed in order to avoid at least 
the following objection.
Consider one of the examples of Rl use of the first-person mentioned by 
Peacocke. That is to say [I see the phone to be on the table]. Here is 
Peacocke’s explanation of it:
When our thinker judges ‘I see the phone to be on the table’, his 
reason for making his judgement is the occurrence of his visual 
perception. That perception is a seeing that the phone is on the table; 
but that perception is not one which has the representational content 
that he is seeing the phone. An experience in a given modality does
^Ibid.
^Peacocke 1999: 267.
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not normally have the representational content that the subject is 
having an experience in that modality/^
It is then clear that for this example to count as Rl, it must be the case that its 
grounds do not Involve the representation of oneself as seeing the table. 
Otherwise, if the point were just that that the grounds should not contain a 
representation of the subject, this would contrast with Peacocke’s example of 
RD use of the first-person, namely [I am in front of a door], we discussed 
above. For, in that case, he argued that the experience of seeing a door does 
indeed have a first-person content.
What we can learn from this discussion is the following: the content of the 
experience or of the mental state is relevant to the determination of which sort 
of use of [I] is made in the Judgement only in the case o f RD uses o f the first- 
person. By contrast, Rl uses of the first person can be grounded in any sort of 
experience or mental state, irrespective of its content, because the relevant 
judgements are the result of the subject's sensitivity to the occurrence o f the 
experience or o f the mental state itself Similar points can be made with 
reference to Peacocke’s example [! remember attending the party], where the 
content of one’s memory is, in normal conditions, about oneself and yet the use 
of the first-person is said to be Rl. So we can generalise and conclude that the 
content of the mental state is relevant to the determination of the RD use of [I] 
in the judgement, but not to the determination of Rl uses of [I]. For the latter 
ones are just the result of one’s sensitivity to the occurrence of one’s own 
mental states, irrespective of the latter’s content. Hence, Peacocke is drawing
^^Ibid.
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attention to the fact that mental states, whatever their content may be, do not as 
such manifest who their owner is. Yet, they can lead to the corresponding self- 
ascription, in suitably conceptually endowed thinkers, thus giving rise to the use 
of [I] as subject. Hence, what Peacocke aims to explain is the passage from 
one’s awareness (which can either be perceptual or in any given prepositional 
attitude) that p (which can also contain a representation of oneself) to the 
corresponding self-ascription o f the relevant mental state. Let us now turn to 
Peacocke’s account of the epistemology of these l-thoughts in terms of what he 
labels the “delta-account”.
3.2 A-Theories
A-theories are introduced by Peacocke in order to explain how awareness of 
one’s own mental states can lead to self-ascriptions of the relevant mental 
properties which amount to knowledge^^ Yet, A-theories can help us get clear
on the role that lEM plays in the epistemology of non-inferential mental self­
ascriptions. For this reason it is worth considering them in detail. Here is the 
delta-model.
24,Cf. Peacocke 1999: 272, 273.
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conscious mental state or event 
of type and content p judgement [I \p that p]
co-consciousness
relation
relation of 
reference to
relation of ^  
ownership by
the subject
According to this model, a conceptually endowed creature, by enjoying a 
mental state of type ip and content p is immediately in a position to form the
judgement [I ip that p]. In fact, her possession of the concepts [I], [i/;], and the 
concepts which are needed for entertaining the content p is shown by her 
disposition to judge [I ipthat p] in light of the appropriate evidence, i.e. in light of
being enjoying the relevant mental state.
According to Peacocke, first-person beliefs formed according to this model 
are true ones. That is so because (a) the owner of the conscious state is the 
reference of [I] in the judgement; (b) the person is right about the kind of mental 
state she is enjoying, because this is not inferred from the content of some 
other representational state. Moreover, these true beliefs amount to knowledge 
(where knowledge is not just a matter of having reliably formed true beliefs), 
because (a) is a priori true and (b) holds for the following reason:
The transition (...) from an event with a certain representational 
content [a personal memory] to one with a corresponding content ‘I
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remember doing so-and-so’ should not be construed as inferential.
Rather, there is a rational sensitivity to the distinction between those 
of one’s states which are memories, and those which are not. This 
sensitivity is already employed in ordinary first-level conscious 
thought and practical inference. This pre-existent sensitivity is 
exploited by someone who has the concept of memory, and self- 
ascribes personal memories in the manner given in a delta account.
Similar remarks apply to other conscious attitudes.
What is relevant to our purposes, however, is to understand in what sense A- 
theories can account for the subject’s entitlement to se/f-ascribe a given mental 
state. Basically, what A-theories assume is that mental states are owned and
that one can be aware only of one’s own mental states, so that a suitably 
conceptually endowed creature is actually entitled to se/f-ascribe them, without 
any need to make sure whose mental states these are. Here is Peacocke’s 
acknowledgement of the situation:
[A] delta account cannot amount to an elucidation of the relation of 
ownership, nor of its close relative, the relation of co-consciousness.
On the contrary, delta accounts simply presuppose those relations.
The most that can be said is that if a delta account is correct, a good 
explication of these relations must leave room for a delta account.^
And again,
[T]he delta account offers no positive support for ‘no-subject’ theories 
of mental states. By ‘no-subject theories’ I mean theories according to 
which mental phenomena have no subjects—and a fortiori no 
owners—at all. Perhaps Hume held a no-subject view in some 
moods; it is also suggested in some early and middle period writings
^Peacocke 1999: 277. 
^Peacocke 1999: 277.
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of Wittgenstein; some Buddhist texts may also express it (...). A delta 
account explains the status as knowledge of beliefs containing 
representationally independent uses of the first person, while 
agreeing that conscious states are owned. So, if anything, delta 
accounts are rather in the first instance ammunition for the opponent 
of the no-subject theorist. These highly distinctive phenomena can be 
explained without resort to a no-subject account.^
Indeed, in so far as the relations of ownership and co-consciousness are not 
explained, then it is quite mysterious how A-theories can so much as explain the
subject’s entitlement to se/Aascribe specific mental states.
However, Peacocke offers an explanation of why mental states are 
necessarily owned. Here it is:
The very idea of a conscious state or event involves the existence of 
a subject of that state or event. A conscious state, as Nagel said, is 
one such that there is something it is like to be in that state. This must 
mean; something it is like for the subject. Reference to the subject of 
conscious mental states is essential in elucidating what it is for them 
to be conscious.^
Hence, according to Peacocke, conscious events have phenomenal content. 
Thus, there must be a subject for whom there is something like being in that 
state. Notice, however, that whether or not we endorse the thesis that all
^Peacocke 1999: 278. Notice the tension between Peacocke’s initial claims that the 
early Wittgenstein was a supporter of the transcendental self and the claim that in his 
early stage he held a version of the no-subject view. In fact, as we have maintained all 
along, Wittgenstein’s no-subject period coincides with his middle writings.
^Peacocke 1999: 292. Peacocke himself acknowledges to be indebted to Galen 
Strawson in this connection. Cf. Strawson 1994: 129-134.
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conscious events have phenomenal content, still it is the very idea that a mental 
state be conscious which involves the fact that that state is occurring in 
someone’s consciousness, i.e. that there is someone who is introspectively 
aware of it. That is, we are considering mental states as objects of awareness 
and this presupposes that there is someone who is aware of them.^® For ‘being 
aware o f is a relational property which involves the existence of someone who 
is aware of something. Hence, it is only a misconstrual of this relation which
may lead one to think that there can be mental states which are objects of i
Iawareness without there being someone who is aware of them. i
However, part of the explanation is still missing. For a complete account of {
Ithe subject’s entitlement to se/f-ascribe a certain mental state should comprise |
also an explanation of why the subject is right not only in ascribing those mental i
states to someone, but, above all, of why she is right in ascribing them to •
herself. We have seen as part of the explanation may go; since the constitutive 
role of [1] is specified by ‘the person with this conscious mental state’, then when 
one is aware of a mental state then one is entitled to self-ascribe it.
However, as we have seen, this account of our first-person concept is correct 
only in so far as it is assumed that the subject who has the mental state and the 
one who self-ascribes it in the judgement are one and the same. But only an
^ However, by saying that mental states are objects of awareness, we do not mean 
to say that they are like objects, given in one’s mental theatre, of which one is 
introspectively aware. In fact, mental states could be taken as acts, e.g. the act of 
thinking that p. Such an act, in turn, can be object of awareness for someone. That is to 
say, the subject may be introspectively aware of thinking that p.
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account of the relation of co-consciousness will make it evident why whenever a 
subject is immediately aware of a mental state she cannot be wrong or even 
wonder about the fact that she herself is having it, so that it is a priori 
guaranteed that the subject who is aware of the mental state is also and 
necessarily the one, who, being aware of It, is in a position to self-ascribe it in 
the judgement. Hence, we still need an explanation of why, whenever a subject 
is immediately aware of one of her mental states, she is ipso facto entitled to 
self-ascribe it without finding out whose mental state it is.
4. Conclusions
In this chapter we have argued that Peacocke’s account of first-person thoughts 
is essentially correct and can be profitably combined with Evans’. The result is 
that our first-person concept is a concept of an entity who thinks of herself as 
embodied and as a possessor of mental properties. Indeed, this is a vindication 
of the intuitive thought that we think of ourselves as persons, i.e. as irreducible 
entities with both physical and psychological properties.
We have then moved on to Peacocke’s account of I EM, in terms of the 
constitutive role of [self]. We have made explicit that it rests on the assumption 
that one cannot be introspectively aware of someone else’s mental states. We 
have then maintained that it is an explanation of this assumption which is 
needed in order to account fully for logical lEM of non-inferential, introspection- 
based mental self-ascriptions.
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We have then turned to Peacocke’s more recent work on the epistemology of 
first-person thoughts. We have argued that he is right in claiming that conscious 
mental states, which may fail to present their bearer, are nevertheless owned. 
Yet, we have also argued that Peacocke’s explanation of why from the 
awareness of a mental state one is entitled to ascribe it to oneself is partially 
wanting. For it presupposes that the subject who is in a position to judge [I am 
F] on the basis of the awareness of the mental state is the same subject who 
has it. It has to be stressed that it is not our intention to deny the soundness of 
this assumption, but to defend it on rational grounds, i.e. we want to explain why 
it is logically impossible for someone to be aware of someone else’s mental 
states and demonstratively refer to them. We will now turn to this task.
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SECTION IV
THE EXHAUSTIVE SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE
TO THE TRILEMMA
I
Summary
In this section we summarise our previous findings and provide an 
exhaustive substantive response to the trilemma. To such an end,
• we offer a proper revisionist account of lEM and arguments in order to 
maintain that there must be lEM uses of demonstrative concepts and of the 
first person in order for judgements to be possible at all (§ 1);
• we point out that lEM so understood is an epistemological phenomenon, 
which has to do only with the grounds for one’s judgement (§ 1.1);
• we summarise our findings according to which it is not true that all and 
only mental self-ascriptions are lEM, for there are some mental self­
ascriptions which are not lEM, and also because there are some bodily self­
ascriptions which are at least de facto lEM (§ 2);
• still we must explain why introspection-based mental self-ascriptions are 
logically lEM, i.e. they are such that they could never involve as part of their 
grounds a belief in an identification component. In order to do so, we 
recapitulate the gist of our discussion of Peacocke’s proposal and we point 
out that it rests on an assumption, i.e. that one can only be introspectively 
aware of one’s own mental states (§ 3). We contend that an explanation of 
why this is a priori true is the missing element of both an explanation of 
logical lEM and of why the constitutive role of [I] is given by ‘the owner of this 
mental state’;
• we provide such an explanation (§ 4): if one is immediately aware of a 
mental state, then this means that that mental state is occurring in one’s 
consciousness. Hence, it follows that each mental state one is introspectively 
aware of is one’s own;
• we consider and dism iss a possible counter-example to this view which 
has been recently put forward by John Campbell (§ 5);
• we conclude that we have managed to provide an exhaustive substantive 
response to the trilemma about the self (§ 6).
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Chapter Eight
Immunity to Error through Misldentiflcation 
of Mental Self-Ascriptions 
and the Exhaustive Substantive Response to the Trilemma
Our inquiry into EM/IEM and the nature of our first-person concept started with 
a passage from Wittgenstein’s The Blue Book. There, as we saw, Wittgenstein 
was trying to suggest several claims; (a) EM/IEM are genuine phenomena 
which are characteristic of some uses of the first-person; (b) whether an I- 
judgement is EM or lEM seems to be a function of its subject-matter. In 
particular, (b. 1) all and only mental self-ascriptions seem to be lEM; finally, (c) 
uses of T as subject (i.e. those which are lEM) are not about a particular 
person. Hence these uses of T are not genuinely referential. We also saw how 
a possible consequence of Wittgenstein’s claim is that mental states lack an 
owner. In this chapter we will summarise our discussion of (a)-(c) 
supplementing it with some further arguments where necessary. Finally, we will 
provide an explanation of logical lEM of introspection-based mental self­
ascriptions, which will allow us to put forward an exhaustive substantive 
response to the trilemma.
1. EM and IBM
In Ch. 1 and 2 we defended and explained the first point made by Wittgenstein, 
namely (a) EM/IEM are genuine phenomena which are characteristic of some 
uses of the first-person. We defined EM as follows:
A singular judgement of the form [a is F] is affected by EM, relative to the 
subject, iff the thinker has the singular concept [a] of an object a and 
applies [a] to the distinct object x as a consequence of either a 
misrecognition or a misidentification.
We pointed out that EM has to do with the grounds on which the judgement is 
based. That is to say, a judgement is EM iff the subject bases her judgement on 
a pair of (not necessarily occurrent) beliefs in a predication component and in 
an identification one and the latter component is wrong.
As far as lEM is concerned, we saw that there are two possible definitions. 
They are as follows:
lEMdfi A singular judgement of the form [a is F], formed on the basis of a 
recognition or an identification, is I EM, relative to the subject, iff it is not 
possible for the thinker to apply the particular singular concept [a] to any 
other object but the relevant object a.
IEMdf2 A singular judgement of the form [a is F] is I EM relative to the 
subject, iff it is not formed on the basis of a recognition (or identification) of 
the object thought about and, consequently, iff it does not involve an 
identification component.
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We saw that the attempt to comply with the first definition leads to either the 
Cartesian or the Idealist position about the self; or else to the impossibility—on 
the view that the self is identical with a human being—of explaining lEM of (at 
least) mental self-ascriptions. By contrast, the second definition does not lead 
to these difficult positions and is indeed compatible with primitivist views about 
the self, according to which the self is identical with a human being. However, 
that mental self-ascriptions in particular comply with it still requires showing.
One could think that our preference for lEMdf2 over lEMdn is ad hoc. That is to 
say, since lEMdfi necessarily leads to unbearable conclusions, IEMdf2 is 
obviously preferable because, at least prima facie, it does not incur those 
problems. But there does not seem to be any independent argument in favour 
of IEMdf2 , apart from its prima facie aptness to avoiding the dilemma.^ However, 
it is worth bearing in mind that for misrecognition and misidentification to be 
possible at all, and hence, for error through misidentification to occur at all, the 
exercise of two singular concepts must be involved. In particular, the 
identification concept must be possessed already. Hence, on pain of an infinite 
regress, there must be a separate exercise of these two concepts and, in 
particular, an exercise of the identification concept which is not itself based on 
recognition (or identification), i.e. an exercise of it outside an Identification 
component. That is to say, according to the terminology we introduced in the 
first chapter, there must be some uses of those concepts, which can eventually 
feature in an identification component, which figure only in an individuation 
component, i.e. as subject in a judgement that is not based on recognition (or
^Cf. Ch. 2.
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identification), but just on mere individuation of a particular. Hence, these 
judgements will be lEM according to the second definition introduced above.
Therefore, it is obvious, recalling our examples in Ch. 2, that many uses of 
demonstratives will be IBM. But it is equally obvious that also (at least some) 
uses of indexicals such as ‘here’, ‘now’ and ‘you’ will turn out to be IBM. That is, 
any judgement containing these concepts, when formed on the basis of a mere 
individuation of a particular, a person, a place or a particular time, will be IBM. 
In fact, it is the primary function of indexical concepts to be used on the basis of 
an individuation of either a particular— persons included, of course— or a place
or a time. For, without such a kind of concepts, exercised on the basis of an 
individuation, we would lack the building-blocks of our judgements.
However, if we stick to the first definition of IBM, then demonstrative 
judgements could not be IBM. For, in the case of empirical objects, it can never 
be the case that the subject be infallible in recognising them. This is why it has 
been thought that perceptual demonstrative judgements are always liable to 
EM. Thus, we can better appreciate why Cartesianism and idealism have been 
thought to be the only possible ways of explaining IBM of mental self­
ascriptions: since ordinary empirical objects could not be at the origin of a IBM 
judgement, given lEM^n, the same has been taken to be true of persons. In 
other words, a peculiar metaphysics of the self would be necessary, given 
lEMdfi, to explain IBM of some first-person judgements.
^Cf. Ch. 2.
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But why is it that demonstrative judgements have been thought to involve 
identification, thus necessarily involving an identification component? The 
answer to this question depends on the fact that demonstrative concepts have 
been considered necessarily to involve a general concept. In other words, 
demonstratives have often been taken not to be sufficient, on their own, to pick 
out an object in the context of utterance and in need of a sortal completion.^ 
Although this is obviously true in the case of demonstratives as linguistic 
devices, it has been taken to be true of demonstrative concepts as well. Hence, 
all demonstrative concepts have been taken to have the form [This/That F]. 
However, it has also been thought that the application of a general 
concept— like the sortal concept [F]—would always involve some form of
identification. That is to say, it would always involve taking a particular object as 
an instance of a certain sort or kind. Accordingly, it has been deemed that the 
general scheme activated for recognition which consists in taking an object to 
be an instance of an identification concept is already applicable at the level of 
individuation, although the identification concept would be a general and not a 
singular one. Thus, all cases of individuation have been treated as cases of 
identification. However, we can always be mistaken in taking a particular object
^h is is clearly stated by Anscombe, for instance, but it can also be seen at work in 
Frege and Wittgenstein. Anscombe 1990: 142 writes: “Assimilation [of T] to a 
demonstrative will not (...) do away with the demand for a conception of the object 
indicated. For, even though someone may say just ‘this’ or ‘that’, we need to know the 
answer to the question ‘this what?' if we are to understand him; and he needs to know 
the answer if he is to mean anything”.
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to be an instance of a sortal concept and this is why— it has been 
argued— demonstrative judgements are always liable to EM.
This model, however, is wrong for two reasons. First, in order to bring any 
object under a sortal concept we must have already formed a concept relative 
to the object. Such a base concept would be [This] or [That], i.e. the concept of 
that object, whatever it is, which is perceptually given to us. Hence, for complex 
demonstrative concepts to be possible at all, we do need simple ones, based on 
the individuation of a particular before its sort has been determined. Therefore, 
there are uses of demonstratives, which are indeed fundamental to the very 
possibility of judgement, which are lEM. But only lEM^^ is compatible with this 
claim. Therefore, lEM i^g ought to be preferred over lEM^n
Secondly, this model obviously rests on a conflation between identification 
and characterisation. For, when we individuate a particular like that F, this is not 
the result of an identification, i.e. it is not the result of an identity judgement 
involving two singular concepts, to the effect that they are taken to be 
coinstantiated. Rather, it is the result of taking a particular object to be an 
instance of a certain sort or kind, which could be instantiated also by other 
individuals. Hence, our complex demonstrative concept [That F] is, in fact, the 
result of a predication or a characterisation. Of course we can be wrong about 
taking a given particular to be an instance of a certain sort or kind, but that 
would be a mistake of predication, not of identification proper. Therefore, it 
could not count as a case of error through misidentification properly so-called, 
since it would not involve the exercise of a pair of s/ngu/ar concepts.
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In the case of the first person we have seen that in order for [I] to be used in a 
judgement that can properly be said to involve error through misidentification, it 
must already be available to the subject. In particular, on pain of an infinite 
regress, it must already be available as a concept that does not feature in an 
identification component. Therefore, there must be uses of [I] which are lEMdf2 - 
In fact, both Evans and Peacocke, as we have seen, aim to specify a pattern of 
evidence which would immediately (i.e. non-inferentially) license an I- 
judgement, thus leading to an lEMdf2 use of the first-person concept. This, in 
turn, provides us with the concept [I] which, in an episode of misrecognition or 
misidentification, we wrongly apply in such a way as to produce an EM I- 
judgement. Once again, this result is compatible only with lEM^^. Hence, given 
our distinction between conservative and revisionist accounts of lEM (cf. Ch. 2), 
drawn on the basis of whether they comply with lEM^n or lEM^e, we can 
conclude that a proper solution to the trilemma can only be revisionist.
Finally, notice that since an lEM judgement is compatible with its being false, 
our reasons for saying that there must be lEM uses of demonstratives and 
indexicals differ, at least in part, from Evans' (Ch. Ch. 3 and 5). That is to say, 
we cannot argue that I EM judgements are necessary because, on pain of an 
infinite regress, knowledge must rest on judgements which are not themselves 
the result of an identification. Rather, our argument stresses that the very 
possibility of there being identification judgements at all requires that the 
identification concepts be possessed independently of their occurrence within 
identification components, since, in order for them to occur in identification 
components, they must be already available to the subject. Notice, however.
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that our reasons are compatible with Evans’, for true lEM judgements will be at 
the basis of knowledge.
1.1 lEM as a Feature of the Grounds of One’s Judgement
It is a consequence of our way of understanding EM/IEM that lEMdc has to be 
slightly amended in light of the fact that we have taken EM to arise in 
connection with judgements in which the identification concept is applied to the 
wrong object because the grounds on which the judgement is based would 
involve a wrong identification component. Hence, IEMdf2 must be replaced by 
the following definition;
IEMdf2* A singular Judgement of the form [a is F] is lEM relative to the 
subject, iff it is not formed on the basis of a recognition (or identification) of 
the object thought about and, consequently, iff it does not contain an 
identification component as a rational ground for the judgement.
Let us expound on lEM f^a* before going on. A problem with lEM^ g^ is that it 
might suggest the thought that lEM has to do with the content of one’s 
judgement. One could in fact think that, in so far as we do not bring 
identification concepts to bear in the judgement— thus sticking to, for instance,
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demonstratives— then we are ipso facto guaranteed that the judgement will be 
lEM.^
However, we can think of counter-examples to lEM f^z so understood. For 
instance, we could think that in so far as we are sticking to the use of a 
demonstrative expression like ‘That woman’, our statement That woman is 
flying to Italy tomorrow’ will always be lEM. However, this conclusion would be 
mistaken. For, if the judgement has been made on the basis of collateral 
information, like [That woman = NN], [NN told me she is going to fly to Italy 
tomorrow], therefore [That woman is going to fly to Italy tomorrow], then, of 
course, there is room for misidentification to occur, because of an error in the 
identification component, although the judgement contains a demonstrative 
concept. Hence, it would be wrong to conclude that EM is a function of the kind 
of concepts involved in the judgement. That is why it is important to stress that 
the judgement is lEM iff it has not been formed on the basis of a recognition (or 
identification), i.e. iff it does not involve an identification component. Indeed, this 
is a point we have already stressed in connection with Evans’ discussion of 
identification-free judgements in the narrow sense and of the example of [That 
man is the chairman of the Department] (of. Ch. 3).
^Pryor makes the same point when he writes: “However, we should note that it’s 
not—or not just—the propositionai content of a belief that determines the belief’s scope 
for error through (...) misidentification. Whether or not a belief is immune to (...) 
misidentification depends on its grounds". Pryor 1998:279. Of. also Evans 1982, Wright 
1998, Peacocke 1999.
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But, then, we can ask at which level we should look for the presence (or the 
absence) of the identification component. As we saw in Ch. 1, the idea is that it 
is not necessary for the subject to form the judgement on the basis of an 
occurrent inferential process involving an identification component. Rather, we 
are saying that the belief on the subject’s part in an identification component 
causally and rationally triggers the judgement. Hence, the identification 
component must be available to the subject as part of the grounds for her 
judgement. Similarly, in the case of lEM judgements, they are such because 
they do not involve as part of their grounds a belief in an identification 
component on the subject’s part. Thus, we have agreed with Evans in so far as 
he himself stresses that EM and lEM are a consequence of either identification- 
dependence or identification-freedom respectively, and that they have to do with 
the grounds on which a judgement is based. Thus, we have agreed with Evans 
on the fact that those grounds are the subject’s grounds for her judgement and 
must be available to her.
To conclude: given IEMdf2* we can now see what an explanation of lEM of I- 
judgements really amounts to. Namely, it amounts to an explanation of which I- 
judgements will not involve an identification component as part of their grounds 
and of why this is so. We will now summarise our previous findings and we will 
supplement them with new arguments when necessary.
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2. The Extension of JEM l-judgements
In Ch. 5 we turned to a discussion of Wittgenstein’s second claim, i.e. (b) the 
fact that an l-judgement is EM or lEM seems to be a function of its subject-
matter, and (b. 1) all and only mental self-ascriptions are lEM. We did so by
jintroducing Evans' criticism to the idea (b. 1) that all and only mental self­
ascriptions are lEM. As we saw, not only does he show that when mental self­
ascriptions are based on inference, they are liable to EM, but, more importantly, 
he also shows that there are some bodily self-ascriptions which, if made on 
appropriate grounds, are lEM. For instance, when a bodily self-ascription like 
[My legs are bent] is based on the deliverances of somatic proprioception, it 
does not involve as part of its grounds a belief on the subject’s part in a 
predication and in an identification component such as [The legs I am feeling 
now are bent] and [The legs I am feeling now = my legs]. For, in this world, 
subjects receive somatic proprioceptive information from just one body, i.e. the 
body in which their brain is located. Flence, there is no reason to base one’s 
judgement on a belief in an identification component such as the one mentioned 
above.
However, this, as we saw in Ch. 5 and 6, is compatible with holding that in a 
logically possible world, where there are deviant causal conditions and the 
subjects are appraised of the fact that they may be receiving information from 
someone else’s body, their bodily self-ascription would be based on an 
identification component which, if wrong, would lead to a EM l-judgement.
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Nevertheless, in this world, some bodily self-ascriptions conform to IElVldf2*. 
This, in turn, shows that I EM is compatible with the fact that the self be 
embodied. Moreover, if the relevant self-ascriptions are based on “avowable 
psychological matters”, i.e. if they are based on a belief such as [1 feel my legs 
as bent], as Shoemaker and Wright maintain (cf. Ch. 6), this means that some 
mental states like bodily sensations far from just giving one a conception of 
oneself as a mere author of thought and a possessor of sensations give one a 
representation of oneself as embodied, contrary to the Cartesian and the 
Idealist proposals.
So here we have the first elements of a substantive response to the trilemma, 
which aims to show that our concept of ourselves is anti-Cartesian and anti- 
idealist. To recapitulate; (i) there are bodily self-ascriptions that are lEM (and 
must be at least dispositionally in place). These are based on discriminative 
knowledge of ourselves and allow us to meet RP. In turn, RP states a 
fundamental condition upon concept-possession (according to Evans). 
Moreover, if (following Peacocke), we hold that the manifestation of the 
possession of a concept is shown by being able to form a judgement containing 
that concept on bases which do not involve inferential components—for those,
in turn, would require the subject’s possession of that concept—then being able
to form the relevant bodily self-ascriptions would count as a manifestation of 
one’s possession of the first-person concept. Finally, (ii) even if the relevant 
bodily self-ascriptions are based on self-ascriptions of bodily sensations, this 
does not mean that the former are based on an identification of one’s body, or 
that one would just be thinking of oneself as a mere possessor of sensations. In
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fact, precisely because those sensations give one a representation of oneself 
as embodied, one would thereby acquire a conception of oneself as a physical 
entity. Hence, our first person concept is anti-Cartesian and anti-idealist.
However, in order to dispense fully with the Cartesian and the Idealist, a 
theorist who wants to give an exhaustive substantive response to the trilemma 
must show why non-inferential mental self-ascriptions are logically lEM, 
according to lEMdfi. i.e. why they are lEMdra* in any logically possible world. As 
we saw, however, Evans does not provide us with such an explanation and the 
deflationists do so only in part. Looking for such an explanation, we then turned 
to Peacocke.
3. Logical lEM o f Non-inferential Mental Self-Ascriptions
In Ch. 7 we considered Peacocke’s claim that lEM of non-inferential mental self­
ascriptions is explained by the fact that the constitutive role of [I] is given by the 
mixed definite description ‘the person with this conscious mental state’. Since, 
according to Peacocke, one can only be aware of and demonstratively refer to 
one’s own mental states, then the constitutive role of [I] explains why, when one 
judges e.g. [I am in pain] on the basis of feeling pain, one need not apply any 
tests of identity in order to find out who is in pain. That is to say, one does not 
have to apply any tests of identity in order to find out that the person who has 
that conscious mental state is the one to whom the [I] in the judgement refers.
We did not take issue with this explanation, but we simply pointed out that it is 
based on the assumption that one can only be aware of and demonstratively
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refer to one’s own mental states. In turn, we made it clear that it is not our aim 
to deny the soundness of this assumption. Rather, our aim is to explain why this 
assumption is logically and not just empirically sound. In other words, our aim is 
to show why there is indeed an a priori guarantee that the mental states one 
can be immediately aware of and demonstratively refer to in thought are one’s 
own, so that it is right to characterise the constitutive role of [I] in terms of ‘the 
person with this conscious mental state’. This in turn explains why, when one 
judges [I am F] on those bases, one does not have to find out that the subject 
referred to by [I] and the subject who has the mental state are one and the 
same.
We also saw that the interest of Peacocke’s proposal is not just that it gives 
us part of an explanation of lEM of non-inferential mental self-ascriptions, but 
that it helps us to vindicate the idea that in order for one to have the first- 
concept one must have a conception of oneself as a person, i.e. as an entity 
with both physical and psychological properties. Hence, we argued for the 
compatibility between Evans’ and Peacocke’s accounts of the conditions of 
possession of the first-person concept.
In order to see whether Peacocke could offer us an explanation of the a priori 
guarantee that the mental states that one is immediately aware of and can self- 
ascribe in thought are one’s own, we turned to his more recent work on the 
epistemology of non-inferential mental self-ascriptions. The interest of the views 
presented in Being Known is twofold, given our purposes. On the one hand, 
Peacocke’s account of the epistemology of this class of l-thoughts draws on the 
assumption that the subject who is immediately aware of a mental state and the
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one who has the mental state are one and the same. So, we looked at such an 
account hoping to find an explanation of why that assumption is a priori true. On 
the other hand, according to Peacocke, self-ascriptions of propositionai 
attitudes are not based on the presentation in introspection of the self as an 
object. However, this requires explaining why one is, after all, not only entitled 
to ascribe the relevant mental states to someone, but also to oneself. That is to 
say, once it is taken on board that at least some mental self-ascriptions are not 
based on awareness of the self as an object, the problem arises of avoiding 
Wittgenstein’s conclusion (c) that the uses of T as subject (i.e. those mental 
self-ascriptions which are lEM) are not about a particular person. This 
conclusion implies, in turn, that the uses of T in the relevant cases are not 
genuinely referential and, possibly, that mental states lack an owner. Hence, if 
Peacocke’s account of the epistemology of the relevant class of self-ascriptions 
is successful, it would provide an alternative to the Idealist view about the self.
In order to understand how representation-independent uses of the first- 
person are possible (recall that uses of the first person are representation- 
independent if they are not based on a mental state which represents the 
subject as enjoying that particular mental state), we introduced Peacocke’s 
account of the epistemology of this class of thoughts in terms of what he labels 
“delta-theory”. According to such a model (1) mental states are owned; (2) the 
subject who has the mental state is the same as the one who is immediately 
aware of it; (3) it is guaranteed by the constitutive role of [I] in terms of ‘the 
person with this conscious mental state’, that the person to which [I] refers is the 
same as the one who has the mental state.
234
We considered Peacocke’s explanation of (1), which appeals to the fact that 
conscious mental states have phenomenal content and that this, in turn, 
requires the existence of a subject for whom there is something like being in 
that state. We supplemented this explanation by noticing that, whether a 
conscious mental state has phenomenal content or not, it is a mental state 
which is an object of awareness. But it would take a misconstrual of the relation 
‘being aware o f to think that there are states which are objects of awareness 
but which are not objects of awareness for someone. Hence, in so far as a 
mental state is a conscious one, then it has an owner. However, we could not 
find an explanation of (2). But, an explanation of (2) is both the missing piece of 
an explanation of why non-inferential mental self-ascriptions are lEM and a 
necessary element for making the delta-account of the epistemology of the 
relevant self-ascriptions a workable model.
We will now provide an explanation of why it is a priori guaranteed that the 
mental states one is introspectively aware of and can demonstratively refer to in 
thought are one’s own. By so doing, we will provide a reason for holding 
Peacocke’s account of the constitutive role of [I] (which can be integrated with 
Evans’), which, in turn, will explain why one need not apply any tests of identity 
in order to find out that the person the [I] in the judgement refers to and the 
person who has the mental state and who is introspectively aware of it are one 
and the same.
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4. Why There Is An A Priori Guarantee That the Mental States One is 
Immediately Aware o f Are One’s Own
Let us consider a conscious mental state like feeling pain. For it to be conscious 
it means that there is a subject who is immediately (or introspectively) aware of 
it. That is to say, for it to be a conscious mental state there must be a subject 
who is aware of it non-observationally and non-inferentially."^ This is indeed a 
consequence of the fact that conscious mental states cannot exist un-owned 
and of how “immediate awareness” should be understood. But if a subject is 
immediately aware of pain this just means that she herself is feeling pain. If we 
then suppose that the subject could be immediately aware of someone else’s 
mental states, e.g. someone else’s pain, then it would follow that the subject 
herself would be feeling pain. Similarly, if X is immediately aware of the belief 
that it is raining, this means that she is believing that it is raining. So, even if, 
per impossibile, she could be immediately aware of Y’s belief that it is raining, 
this would just mean that X herself would be believing that it is raining.
Notice here the difference with the case of somatic proprioception. For, from 
the fact that one could be immediately aware of bodily sensations which are 
located in someone else’s body, it does not follow that that body is one’s own. 
This is so because we have independent non-phenomenological criteria of 
identity for what has to count as one’s body. But we do not have criteria of 
identity for what has to count as one’s own conscious mental state which are
positive characterisation of what introspection amounts to falls beyond the scope 
of this work.
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independent of one’s being immediately aware of it. Hence, there is an a priori 
guarantee, namely a conceptual guarantee, that if someone is immediately 
aware of a mental state, then this just means that that mental state is her own. 
Therefore, in the case of direct awareness of a mental state, even if, per 
impossibile, one could be directly aware of someone else’s mental state, this 
would just mean that the very subject would be enjoying that mental state. 
Thus, the subject would be entitled to self-ascribe that mental state since that 
mental state would rightly be said to be her own.
This indeed vindicates Shoemaker’s observations, partially discussed in Ch. 
6, that “in being aware that one feels pain one is, tautologically, aware, not 
simply that the attribute feel(s) pain is instantiated, but that it is instantiated in 
oneself’.^  For the “tautology” has to do with the fact that we do not have an 
independent grasp of what it means for a conscious mental state to be one’s 
own, but by reference to the fact that there is a subject who is 
immediately/introspectively aware of it. Similarly, our explanation of why it is a 
priori guaranteed that the subject who is introspectively aware of a mental 
property is the one who has that property explains why Shoemaker was right in 
saying that there are certain predicates (e.g. mental ones) “each of which can 
be known to be instantiated in such a way that knowing it to be instantiated in 
that way (italics mine) is equivalent to knowing it to be instantiated in oneself.® 
For if one knows that someone is in pain by being directly aware of that mental
^Shoemaker 1994a: 89. 
^Shoemaker 1994a: 90.
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S ta te , th is  m e a n s  th a t  o n e  o n e s e lf  is in p a in  a n d  th is , in tu rn , e x p la in s  w h y  o n e  
w o u ld  k n o w  th a t  th a t  p a in  is in s ta n tia te d  in o n e s e lf .
Therefore, we can conclude that it is a priori true that for each mental state 
one is immediately aware of and is in a position to self-ascribe in judgement on 
the basis of introspection, that mental state is one’s own. To repeat, this is due 
to the fact that immediate awareness of a mental state logically guarantees that 
the subject herself is enjoying that mental state. Hence, saying that a subject is 
immediately aware of a certain mental state guarantees that the relevant mental 
state is her own.
This also explains why Peacocke is right to characterise the first-person 
concept in the way proposed in Ch. 7. That is to say, the first-person concept is 
correctly characterised as that concept which is used in judgements on the 
basis of the evidence that the person with a certain mental state is F. For, there 
must be such an owner and it cannot be but oneself. Hence, [I] refers to the 
same subject who has the relevant mental state and who is necessarily the 
same subject as the one who could self-ascribe that mental state on the basis 
of introspection.
To conclude, whether or not a non-inferential self-ascription of a mental state 
is based on the presentation of the self as an object, it would be logically lEM 
because there is an a priori guarantee that any mental state one could be 
immediately aware of would be ipso facto one’s own and there is no possibility 
of mistaking someone else’s mental states for one’s own. Consequently, 
subjects are not only entitled to ascribe these mental properties to a subject, but
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they are also— and without carrying out an investigation— entitled to self-ascribe 
them.
It has to be stressed that nothing said so far is favourable to the Cartesian 
position about the self. For, even if conscious mental states are necessarily 
owned (contrary to the Idealist position), and they are owned by the very subject 
who is immediately aware of them and can form an l-judgement on the basis of 
the evidence that the owner of that mental state is F, it does not follow that the 
subject is a mental substance which is immediately present to the mind every 
time a mental property is manifested.
In fact, this conclusion would be based on several mistakes. First of all, it 
would conflate the claim that mental states are necessarily owned with the claim 
that their owner is manifested any time such properties, which belong to her, 
are. Yet, we have agreed that when one is aware of a mental state, at least in 
some cases, one is not aware of a subject who has it.
However, the Cartesian could avoid the conclusion that a subject is 
manifested any time one is aware of a mental property by holding the more 
plausible view that by being aware of one’s properties one also acquires 
knowledge about the object which has that property. Hence, by being aware of 
our mental properties we acquire knowledge of ourselves as entities that have 
those properties. But then, given that we are also aware of bodily sensations 
which give us a conception of ourselves as embodied, the Cartesian would not 
be justified in concluding that awareness of mental properties just gives us a 
conception of ourselves as mere owners of sensations and thoughts.
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Moreover, even if it were right to say that awareness of mental states Just 
gives us a conception of ourselves as owners of sensations and authors of 
thoughts, the Cartesian would not be warranted at all in concluding from the 
kind of property the subject is immediately aware of to the very nature of the 
subject these properties belong to. For, as Shoemaker noticed,^ that would 
involve an unwarranted passage from considerations pertaining to the 
epistemological level to considerations pertaining to the metaphysical level. 
Hence, the Cartesian would be wrong in concluding that the nature of the self 
could be entirely determined by the kind of properties one is aware of in 
introspection. Therefore, the Cartesian has no reason to maintain that the self is 
just a mental substance.
5. Are There Counter-Examples to the View that Non-lnferential Mental Self- 
Ascriptions are Logically IBM?
John Campbell has recently maintained that “the phenomenon of thought 
insertion as described by schizophrenic patients (...) seems to involve an error 
of identification”.® For, he writes:
A patient who supposes that thoughts have been inserted into his 
mind by someone else is right about which thoughts they are, but 
wrong about whose thoughts they are. So thought insertion seems to 
be a counterexample to the thesis that present-tense introspectively
^Cf. Ch. 6.
^Campbell 1999: 609.
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based reports of psychological state cannot involve errors of 
identification.®
First of all, let us clarify the phenomenon of thought insertion. The following 
report made by a schizophrenic patient is used by Campbell as an example of 
the phenomenon at hand;
Thoughts come into my head like ‘Kill God’. It’s just like my mind 
working, but it isn’t. They come from this chap, Chris. They’re his 
thoughts.''®
Notice, however, that for this report to be a counterexample to the thesis that 
present-tense introspectively based se/f-ascriptions of mental states are 
logically lEM, it should be expressed in the first person way. But, interestingly, 
the subject is not saying ‘I am thinking ‘Kill God” . Rather, she is saying that 
Chris is thinking the thought, which is occurring in her mind. So, if anything, this 
report would show that it is conceivable to make third-person psychological 
ascriptions on the basis of direct knowledge of someone else’s mental states. 
But this would not show yet that the relevant se/f-ascriptions are liable to EM. 
The case would be similar to alleged cases of telepathy, whereby subjects 
maintain that they are introspectively aware of someone else’s mental states. 
Let us consider this possibility in more detail.
If, on the one hand, we take it seriously, then it would mean that Y’s mental 
states are occurring in X’s consciousness. For instance Y’s pain or belief that it 
is raining would be occurring in X’s consciousness. But, then, X herself would
® Campbell 1999: 609-610.
Frith 1992: 66 quoted in Campbell 1999: 609.
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be in pain or thinking that it it is raining. Thus, that pain or that belief would be 
X’s own. Hence, under this reading, telepathy would not represent a 
counterexample to the view that mental states one is introspectively aware of 
are (logically) one’s own. Howevei, telepathy so understood would not license 
third-person psychological claims either. For the subject does not have any 
reason to suppose that the thought she is currently introspectively aware of is 
someone else’s. Hence, if X were to self-attribute the relevant mental state, 
then she would be right and her self-ascription would be logically lEM.
If, on the other hand, telepathy is to be understood in a loose sense as a kind 
of awareness of someone else’s mental states, which however, does not make 
it the case that those states are occurring in one’s consciousness, then it would 
be more a case of empathy. That is to say, X can be aware, though not really 
introspectively, of the fact that Y is suffering or believing that it is raining. But 
this does not mean that X is in pain herself (unless Y’s pain causes X to be in 
pain herself. In this latter case, however, if X were to self-attribute pain she 
would be right). Nor does this mean that X herself believes that it is raining. 
Moreover, X’s report would be either Tm feeling that Y is in pain’ or, 
equivalently, Tm aware that Y is in pain’ or, in the case of the belief, ‘I am 
aware that Y believes that it is raining’. So X would not be erroneously self- 
attributing Y’s pain or belief, for she would just be saying that she is aware of 
someone else’s pain or belief. Hence, neither the first understanding of 
telepathy nor the second are counterexamples to the view that mental states 
one is introspectively aware of are (logically) one’s own and if one were to self­
attribute them, then the self-ascription would be logically I EM.
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Let us go back to the case of thought-insertion and let us suppose that a 
genuine first-person claim be made. So X says: 'I am thinking ‘Kill God” . Now, 
this report is perfectly in order. For the schizophrenic subject is actually thinking 
that thought and she is self-ascribing it. If she goes on to wonder whether it 
really is she who is thinking that thought, then this does not show that she is or 
can be introspectively aware of someone else’s thoughts and thus rationally 
wonder whether a certain thought is her own. For, after all, the phenomenon of 
thought-insertion is taken to be a symptom of schizophrenia. So, we do not 
want to end up saying that she is actually introspectively aware of someone 
else’s mental states nor that, after all, she could be and would thus be justified 
in wondering whether that thought Is her own. Nor, by the same token, does this 
show that her first-person report is affected by EM or that it could be.
Rather, what the subject’s wondering about the possessor of the thought just 
shows is her loss o f a “sense of ownership” over her thoughts. S o  the idea is 
that the schizophrenic patient, for whatever reason, disavows her own 
th o u g h ts .In  fact, Campbell himself writes:
Cf. Campbell 1999: 617.
Campbell gives an explanation of the loss of the sense of ownership at a sub­
personal level (of. Campbell 1999: 611-622). It is not our concern to assess it. Rather, 
our aim is to see whether the phenomenon of thought-insertion is a counterexample to 
the view that non-inferential mental self-ascriptions are logically lEM. Notice, however, 
that one could give an alternative explanation of the loss of sense of ownership over 
one’s thoughts at the personal level along the following lines: schizophrenic patients do 
have certain thoughts which, however, they cannot recognise as their own because, for
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The thought inserted into the subject’s mind is indeed in some sense 
his, just because it has been successfully inserted into his mind; it 
has some special relation to him. He has, for example, some 
especially direct knowledge of it (italics mine). On the other hand, 
there is, the patient insists, a sense in which the thought is not his, a 
sense in which the thought is someone else’s (...).^ ®
So, by Campbell’s own lights, the fact that the subject has “some specially 
direct knowledge” of the thought is enough to make it her own. Still, Campbell 
seems to think that the best way of explaining the subject’s attribution of the 
thought to someone else would be in terms of an error of identification. But, 
further on, he himself writes:
(...) [Wjhen things go wrong, as with the schizophrenic (,..). The 
sense of ownership of the occurrent thought will be disturbed too.'"*
And finally:
[T]he form of words I am recommending—that the schizophrenic has 
introspective knowledge of a thought of which he does not recognise 
himself to be the agent (italics mine)—does best elucidate the content 
of the illusion of thought insertion (...).^ ®
instance, they would feel too ashamed of them. Hence, they pretend that someone else 
has put them in their head.
Campbell 1999: 610. Notice that when Campbell writes that the thought has been 
successfully inserted into the subject’s mind, he must not be taken literally, otherwise 
the schizophrenic patient would, after all, be right in saying that the thought is not her 
own. But, then, she would not be schizophrenic but sane.
Campbell 1999:617.
Campbell 1999: 619.
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However, a loss of a sense of ownership, or of agency (if we are to follow 
Campbell’s terminological suggestion) over one’s thoughts does not make the 
thoughts one is introspectively aware of someone else’s, nor is it sufficient for 
making them not to be one’s own. Nor, and this is the real point, does a loss of 
a sense of ownership over one’s thoughts show that it is logically possible to be 
introspectively aware of someone else’s thoughts or that it is logically possible 
that the mental states one is introspectively aware of are not one’s own. For the 
alleged counterexample just shows that there is more to the phenomenology of 
conscious thought than the mere having a thought in one’s stream of 
consciousness. Still a phenomenological difference does not produce a logical 
one. So, even if there were a community whose members were all prone to 
disavow the thoughts which occur in their consciousness because they do not 
feel them as their own (or because they do not recognise themselves as their 
agents), this would not mean that these thoughts would not be theirs, i.e. 
thought by them and introspectively accessible only to them. Therefore, we can 
conclude that the phenomenon of thought-insertion is not a counterexample to 
the view that if someone makes a psychological self-ascription on the basis of 
introspection, then her judgement is logically lEM.
6. Conclusions
We have provided a sound revisionist account of lEM and we have offered 
arguments in its favour. However, we have also showed how both some 
physical and psychological self-ascriptions can comply with it either de facto or
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logically. Moreover, we have endorsed and supplemented in important respects 
the substantive response to the trilemma which was first presented by Evans.
Hence, our reflections on lEM show that it is not true that only a peculiar 
metaphysics of the self— like the Cartesian or the Idealist— could account for
this phenomenon. Rather, lEM is a phenomenon that is entirely compatible with 
the fact that the T be always a genuine referring expression which refers to a 
person, i.e. to an entity with both physical as well as psychological properties. 
Moreover, if lEM l-thoughts are the ones which must be in place for a subject to 
be credited with the possession of the first-person concept, then our 
considerations, drawing on Evans’ and Peacocke’s, show that selves, i.e. 
persons, have a concept of themselves as such.
Thus, the considerations developed in this work have shown not only that the 
Cartesian and the Idealist positions are problematic for both metaphysical and 
semantic reasons. For they would lead us to maintain either the existence of 
mental substances or the absence of a bearer of conscious mental states, 
together with the denial of the genuinely referential role of T. Nor have they just 
shown that the Cartesian and the Idealist views fail to be required in order to 
account for the epistemology of some l-thoughts. For, even if some mental self­
ascriptions are not based on a presentation in introspection of the self as an 
object, there is an a priori guarantee that conscious mental states are owned 
and they are owned by the very subject who is immediately aware of them and 
who is in a position to self-ascribe them in thought; where none of this— as we
saw— is compatible with the Cartesian claim that the self be a mental 
substance. Rather and foremost, our reflections have shown that the Cartesian
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and the Idealist positions are inconsistent with our use of the first-person 
concept. For the various kinds of evidence on which our first-person concept is 
deployed are such as to give us knowledge of ourselves as embodied and 
located in space and as persons that exist through time and can be perceived 
and made sense of by others.
Hence, not only is there no need to be either Cartesian or Idealist in order to 
explain lEM, but in fact we cannot be either Cartesian or Idealist. For 
Cartesianism and Idealism are problematic in their own right, both at the 
metaphysical and at the semantic level. Moreover, they fail to be required for 
epistemological reasons and, finally, they are incompatible with our first-person 
concept. The considerations developed in this work have thus allowed us to 
provide an exhaustive substantive response to the trilemma about the self.
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